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ABSTRACT 
Background: Prepayments and risk pooling through social health insurance has been 
advocated by international development organizations. Social health insurance is seen as a 
mechanism that helps mobilize resources for health, pool risk, and provide more access to 
health care services for the poor. Hence Ghana implemented the National Health Insurance 
Scheme (NHIS) to help promote access to health care services for Ghanaians. Objective: The 
study examined the influence of the NHIS on the behaviour of health care providers in their 
treatment of insured and uninsured clients. 
 
Methods: The study took place in Bolgatanga (urban) and Builsa (rural) districts in Ghana. 
Data was collected through exit survey with 200 insured and uninsured clients, 15 in-depth 
interviews with health care providers and health insurance managers, and 8 focus group 
discussions with insured and uninsured community members.  
 
Results: The NHIS promoted access for insured and mobilized revenue for health care 
providers. Both insured and uninsured were satisfied with care, according to the survey.  
However, increased utilization of health care services by the insured leading to increased 
workloads for providers influenced their behaviour towards the insured. Most of the insured 
perceived and experienced long waiting times, verbal abuse, not being physically examined 
and discrimination in favour of the affluent and uninsured. The insured attributed their 
experience to the fact that they were not making immediate payments for health care services. 
A core challenge of the NHIS was a delay in reimbursement which affected the operations of 
health facilities and hence influenced providers’ behaviour as well. Providers preferred clients 
who would make instant payments for health care services. Few of the uninsured were 
utilizing health facilities and visit only in critical conditions. This is a consequence of the 
increased cost of health care services under the NHIS. 
 
Conclusion: The NHIS is beneficial for promoting access to health care services, but there is 
the urgent need to streamline the reimbursement process in order to sustain the NHIS. 
Improving the capacity of health facilities and personnel for the provision of quality care also 
requires immediate action. 
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SUMMARY OF STUDY PROTOCOL 
Background: Ghana provided free health services to her citizens after independence in 1957. 
This became impossible in the 1970s and 1980s as a result of the economic crisis at the time. 
The situation led to the introduction of user fees (cost recovery) in public health facilities. 
However, the introduction of the user fees prevented the utilization of health care services by 
Ghanaians. In order to promote access, the Government of Ghana enacted the National 
Health Insurance (NHI) Act (650) in 2003, which brought about the implementation of the 
National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in 2005.  
 
Aim: The study will investigate the influence of the NHIS on the behaviour of health care 
providers.  Specifically, the study will explore the perceptions of providers about the NHIS, 
especially the reimbursement process. The perceptions and experience of insured and 
uninsured clients, and health insurance managers will also be assessed.  
 
Methods: Both quantitative and qualitative methods will be used for the data collection. The 
quantitative method will involve the use of patient exit interviews. The qualitative methods 
will make use of in-depth interviews with providers and health insurance managers, and focus 
group discussions with community members.  
 
The study will help give a better insight and understanding on issues driving the behaviour of 
health care providers in their treatment of insured and uninsured clients upon the 
implementation of the NHIS. This information will be important for Ghana and other 
countries that are planning to introduce the concept of social health insurance/mandatory 
health insurance. 
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1.0. Introduction 
Ghana is among the few African countries that promulgated a National Health Insurance 
(NHI) Act (650). Hitherto, the country had been providing free health care services for her 
citizens after independence in 1957. This was possible due to the small population size (about 
8 million) at the time and a flourishing economy (Assensoh & Wahab, 2008). However, the 
free health care services could not be sustained because of the economic crisis in the 1970s 
and early 1980s which adversely affected all sectors of the economy leading to budget cuts 
on social spending including health and education. Thus, little money was available for the 
health sector, leading to widespread shortages of essential medicines, supplies and equipment 
which adversely affected the quality of care (Agyepong & Adjei, 2008).  
 
To forestall these problems, cost recovery or user fees (popularly called “cash and carry”) 
was introduced in the late 1980s in all government facilities. Patients were made to pay for 
the full cost of medication and care. The argument for the user fees was to generate revenue 
and to discourage frivolous use of health care services. However, the user fees policy affected 
the utilization of health services by Ghanaians. The poor especially, were undertaking self-
medication and also reporting late to health facilities for treatment (Arhin-Tenkorang, 2001, 
Arhinful, 2003). This prompted the need to look for other alternatives of health care 
financing, thus the introduction of some Community-based Health Insurance Schemes 
(CBHIS) in the early 1990s. As at 2003, such CBHIS covered only about 1% of the country’s 
population (19 million), leaving many Ghanaians uncovered against high health care service 
costs (Sulzbach et al., 2005).   
 
1.1. Background 
The Government of Ghana passed the National Health Insurance (NHI) Act (650) in August 
2003, which saw the implementation of the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in 
2005. The mission statement of the NHIS is to promote equitable and universal access for all 
residents of Ghana to an acceptable quality package of essential health care services without 
making out-of-pocket payments (OOP) at the point of consumption (Government of Ghana, 
2003). The NHIS is seen as a health financing mechanism that will help provide universal 
health coverage to Ghanaians.  
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1.2. Design of the NHIS 
The design of the NHIS is based on the District Mutual Health Insurance Schemes (DMHIS), 
which operates in all 145 districts of the country. The NHIS covers both the formal and 
informal sectors of the economy. Apart from the District Mutual Health Insurance Schemes 
(DMHIS), there are other health insurance schemes permitted to operate under the NHI Act. 
They included; Private Mutual Health Insurance Schemes and Private Commercial Health 
Insurance Schemes. Ghanaians have the option to either join a District Mutual Health 
Insurance Scheme operating in each of the districts or join any private insurance scheme. The 
government of Ghana is however, committed to support the District Mutual Health Insurance 
Scheme. The National Health Insurance Council (NHIC) has been set up for the purpose of 
running the NHIS. Under the National Health Insurance Council, there is the National Health 
Insurance Authority (NHIA) which is responsible for the accreditation and payment of health 
care providers.  
 
1.3. Financing of the NHIS 
The sources of funding for the NHIS include 2.5% sales tax, 2.5% monthly payroll deduction 
for formal sector workers as part of their contribution to the Social Security and National 
Insurance Trust (SSNIT) fund, government budgetary allocation and donor funding support. 
Ghanaians in the informal sector are required to make a contribution to the District Mutual 
Health Insurance Scheme based on how they were classified (as agreed by the National 
Health Insurance Council). The following classification existed; the very rich, the rich, the 
middle rich, the poor, the very poor and finally the core poor. The District Mutual Health 
Insurance Schemes are to apply this classification in the collection of the premium. The 
minimum and maximum premium to be paid is GH7.20 ($8) and 47.70 ($53) 
respectively.  
 
1.4. Benefit package under the NHIS 
There is a minimum benefit package developed for clients under the NHIS. The benefit 
package consists of basic health care services, including outpatient consultations, essential 
drugs, inpatient care and shared accommodation, maternity care (normal and caesarean 
delivery), eye care, dental care, and emergency care. Ninety-five percent (95%) of diseases 
afflicting Ghanaians have been covered by the NHIS. Family planning and immunizations 
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which were previously provided for free have also been captured under the NHIS.  However, 
some services classified to be unnecessary or very expensive are on the exclusion list. Among 
these are; cosmetic surgery, drugs not listed on the NHIS drugs list (including antiretroviral 
drugs), assisted reproduction, organ transplantation, and private inpatient accommodation. 
 
1.5. Provider payment under the NHIS 
At the start of the NHIS, a fee for service type of provider payment mechanism was used for 
paying health care providers. But this was replaced with the Ghana Diagnostic Related 
Groupings (GDRGs) in April, 2008. The reason for the replacement was that the fee for each 
service was found to be low and hence unattractive, especially for private providers to 
participate, since the public providers were automatically accredited (Ankomah, 2009). 
Providers are encouraged to participate in the NHIS, in order to reduce congestions and 
delays for clients. With the fee for service, providers were also required to submit detailed 
information on all services and charges for claims submissions. It involved a lot of paperwork 
which providers were not happy with (Ankomah, 2009).  
 
Therefore the GDRGs were introduced to help remedy some of these issues. The tariff covers 
the full cost of the estimated direct consumables for direct patient care, anaesthesia and other 
investigations. The GDRGs also captures about 80% of the estimated overhead cost for 
public health facilities, comprising of building and equipment maintenance, housekeeping 
and utilities (Ankomah, 2009). It is expected that the new tariff will generate adequate revenue 
from the NHIS for providers to cover a significant portion of their cost of operation.  
 
1.6. Reimbursement process under the NHIS 
Regarding the process of reimbursement, providers were required to compile and submit their 
claims to a District Mutual Health Insurance Scheme (DMHIS) to which they have been 
accredited to. The claims are then vetted by the DMHIS. When satisfied, the DMHIS makes a 
submission to the National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) for funds to pay the 
providers. The NHIA pays providers by channelling the funds through the DMHIS.   
 
2.0. Problem statement 
In the era of the NHIS, the main financing mechanisms are; annual budgetary allocations 
from central government (that is, for public sector health care providers), reimbursements 
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from the NHIA and OOP payments from uninsured clients. Central government makes an 
annual budget allocation to the public sector health care providers for meeting some of their 
recurrent expenditure, for instance, water and electricity bills. But government will gradually 
reduce or stop this budgetary allocation to providers when the NHIS is successfully carried 
through. 
 
The other mechanism of financing for providers is the reimbursement from the NHIA. The 
NHIA which derives its funds from a 2.5% sales tax (VAT), 2.5% monthly payroll deduction 
from formal sector workers, contributions from the informal sector, government budgetary 
allocation and donor funding are used for the payment of providers to cover insured clients. 
But user fees are charged by providers for the provision of health care services to the 
uninsured. That is, the uninsured clients at the point of consumption of all health care 
services are required to make OOP payments. 
 
There is anecdotal evidence that providers are giving differential treatment to insured and 
uninsured clients in terms of waiting times, physical examination, quality of treatment and 
drugs. The uninsured are thought to be treated better by providers than the insured clients. 
This is seen as a threat to the achievement of the goal of the NHIS which is to make health 
care services accessible to all Ghanaians (Government of Ghana, 2003). 
 
The research question is whether there are any differences in the behaviour of health care 
providers towards the insured and uninsured and what reasons account for the differences 
under the NHIS. 
 
2.1. Rationale and justification for research 
Health care providers are the bedrock for the delivery of health care services. Their behaviour 
in relation to how clients are treated plays a significant role in determining whether the goals 
of a health system can be achieved or not, particularly with the implementation of the NHIS 
in Ghana.  
 
Provider payment types and reimbursement process are key determinants of providers’ 
behaviour in the provision of health care services (Kutzin & Barnum, 1992).  Since the 
inception of the NHIS in Ghana, few studies have been conducted, focussing on health care 
providers’ behaviour with regards to their treatment of insured and uninsured clients. It is 
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therefore important that a study is conducted to investigate whether the implementation of the 
NHIS, especially the reimbursement process has affected the behaviour of health care 
providers in the provision of health care services. The study will help improve current 
understanding on the behaviour of providers under social health insurance. This information 
will be important for Ghana and other countries that are planning to introduce the concept. 
 
3.0. Literature Review 
3.1. Introduction 
Health insurance is seen as an alternative financing mechanism for health care which has the 
ability to increase utilization and protect people against high health expenses (WHO, 2000). 
Health insurance serves three main functions: the pooling of health risk, the mobilization of 
health care resources, and the payment of health care providers (Liu, 2002). Through health 
insurance, individuals are able to share the risk of any large costs due to illness and to access 
health care services when in need and in good time (McIntyre, 2007). Hence insured persons 
are protected from paying high treatment costs in times of sickness.  
 
3.2. Types of health insurance 
The financing of health care through health insurance could either be voluntary or mandatory 
(McIntyre, 2007).  
 
3.2.1. Voluntary health insurance 
Voluntary health insurance is one that an individual or group can subscribe without a legal 
requirement to do so (McIntyre, 2007). It could be for profit or not for profit. The commercial 
health schemes are examples of voluntary health programmes that are run for profit. The 
Community-based health insurance schemes are also examples of voluntary health schemes 
that are not for profit. Poor individuals and households are not able to join the “for profit” 
type of voluntary health insurance. The “for profit” voluntary health insurance is mostly 
patronized by high socio-economic groups. The premium payment is based on individual risk 
assessment (Asenso-Okyere et al., 1997).  
 
3.2.2. Mandatory health insurance 
Mandatory health insurance may also be called national health insurance or social health 
insurance (McIntyre, 2007). The mandatory health insurance is generally supported by the 
government and membership tends to be compulsory for the intended group (Asenso-Okyere 
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et al., 1997). The mandatory or social health insurance is based on the principle of social 
solidarity. 
 
3.3. Health insurance and utilization of health care services 
Studies have shown that the introduction of health insurance is associated with increased 
health care service utilization. For instance, in Senegal a study showed that members of a 
Mutual Health Organization had a higher probability of using hospitalization services than 
individuals who were not insured (Jütting, 2003). A randomized trial in Ghana also indicated 
that insured children had higher utilization rates for insured services than their uninsured 
counterparts. The above findings might be explained by the fact that the introduction of 
health insurance makes possible for individuals to have access to health care services which 
they would not have had, if the health insurance programme was unavailable.  
 
In spite of the evidence of the association of health insurance with increased utilization of 
health care services, a study in Ghana showed that the introduction of the National Health 
Insurance Scheme did not increase the likelihood of the insured using maternal health care 
services. Prenatal care, skilled attendance at delivery, and caesarean-sections were unaffected 
by the implementation of the scheme (Hatt et al., 2009). The findings were explained by the 
fact that other direct cost of seeking health care services, for instance, costs of transportation, 
meals, costs for accompanying relatives, may have prevented the utilization of the maternal 
health care services. This signifies that health insurance coverage does not necessarily 
increase utilization in all settings. The findings for the higher utilization rates as reported in 
the other studies may be as a result of adverse selection and moral hazard on the part of the 
insured, which most studies do not report on. 
 
3.4. Health insurance and equity  
According to Lagarde & Palmer, the equity effects of a health insurance programme depend 
on its design and implementation process (Lagarde & Palmer, 2006). Some Community-
based Health Insurance Schemes and social/mandatory health insurance schemes have their 
core objective of promoting equity. That is, providing coverage to populations regardless of 
their socio-economic status, gender, age, race, and geographical location.  For example, 
Ranson et al found in India that the Vimo Self-employed Women's Association (SEWA) 
scheme was able to provide coverage for the poorest of the poor, with 32% located in rural 
areas and 40% found in urban areas, and from households below the 30th percentile (Ranson 
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et al., 2006). Also, the Community-based Health Insurance Schemes in Ethiopia had helped 
to mitigate the effects of health shock on poor rural households (Asfaw & Braun, 2004). The 
poor were able to access health care services as and when they needed them with the 
introduction of the Community-based Health Insurance Schemes. 
 
On the other hand, evidence has shown that some Community-based Health Schemes and 
social/mandatory health insurance schemes have proven to be relatively inequitable (Lagarde 
& Palmer, 2006). The introduction of some social health insurance schemes might help to 
deepen inequalities especially (Pannarunothai & Mills, 1997). In Indonesia, a study by 
Hidayat et al revealed that both the mandatory health insurance programme for civil servants 
(Askes) and the one for private employees (Jamsostek) had all failed to promote equity by not 
providing insurance coverage for the whole population (Hidayat et al., 2004). Another study 
in Senegal showed that the core poor were not covered due to their inability to afford 
premium payment, though the objective of the Community-based Health Insurance Scheme 
was to attract the poor and vulnerable (Jutting, 2003). In Ghana, findings indicated that the 
poorest of the poor were excluded from the Community-based Health Insurance Schemes 
introduced to cater for their health care needs (Osei-Akoto, 2003). 
 
3.5. Health insurance and health care expenditures (out-of-pocket payments) 
The introduction of health insurance is meant to reduce health care expenditures (out-of-
pocket payments) for consumers of health care services and to reduce health related 
impoverishment. Results from studies on the relationship between being enrolled in a health 
insurance programme and incurring further health expenditures are not clear (Levine, 2008). 
Some studies revealed that being insured helps to reduce health expenditure or out-of-pocket 
payments. In Senegal for instance, it was discovered that members of a Community-based 
Health Insurance Scheme pay far less when they seek health care services than those who 
were not insured (Jütting, 2003). 
 
Contrarily, some studies have found that out-of-pocket payments were unaffected by the 
introduction of health insurance or rather increased for the insured. In China, for example, a 
government subsidized voluntary health insurance scheme (the New Cooperative Medical 
Scheme) was found not to have had any impact on the average out-of-pocket payments for 
the insured population (Wagstaff et al., 2007). The investigators attributed their findings to 
the institutional set up of health care in China which promoted increased utilization and 
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substitution toward more expensive health care services and treatments (Levine, 2008). The 
fact also remains that it is not only the direct cost of health care services that constitute the 
total cost for health care seeking. There are other indirect costs like transportation, meals, and 
even unofficial fees for which all add up to the total cost of health seeking (out-of-pocket 
payments). This therefore may help to explain the findings of the study. 
 
In West Africa, a three country study evaluating the impact of Mutual Health Organizations 
have proven that membership to these organizations does have a less significant effect on out-
of-pocket payments for outpatient care (Chankova et al., 2008). The Mutual Health 
Organizations provided insurance coverage for only cases of hospitalization and hence 
insured outpatients would have to make out-of-pocket payments for the services. 
 
3.6. Provider payment mechanisms 
Provider payment mechanisms are important in the delivery of health care services. Provider 
payment mechanism is the process of managing, setting the benefit package and paying for 
health care services (Reaven & Rosenbloom, 2009). It may also refer to the allocation of 
health care resources to health care providers for the provision of health care services 
(Kutzin, 2000). Provider payment mechanisms are meant to cater for some aspects of the 
information asymmetry between health care providers and clients. This is done by defining 
rules in terms of the cost per patient or group of patients, the reimbursement costs, and the 
procedure for patient transfers or rejection (Maceira, 1998).  
 
Provider payment mechanisms may either be prospective or retrospective. When the payment 
for a package of health care service is negotiated and agreed upon before the treatment takes 
place, it is referred to as prospective payment. When the payment is selected during or after 
the service has been rendered, it is referred to as retrospective payment (Maceira, 1998, 
Jegers et al., 2002).  There are six main provider payment methods (Maceira, 1998). They 
include budgets, capitation, diagnostic related groupings (case-based payment), per diem/day, 
fee for service and salary (Lave & Frank, 1990).  
 
3.7. Implementation issues relating to the NHIS in Ghana 
As shown earlier, Ghana adopted the NHI Act in 2003, which led to the implementation of 
the NHIS in 2005. Since the introduction of the NHIS, studies have shown an increasing level 
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of registration and membership, a rise in the number of those who consult formal health care 
for general health conditions, an increased likelihood of women to receive prenatal care and 
deliver at a hospital, etc, (Sulzbach, 2008, Mensah et al., 2009, Witter & Garshong, 2009). 
But there are challenges which include an overburdened public health infrastructure, 
increasing workloads, short supply of health care providers, and unmotivated staff (Health 
Systems 20/20 Project and Research and Development Division of the Ghana Health Service, 
2009). In addition, there are problems in relation to the reimbursement process for health care 
providers. It showed that the introduction of the Ghana Diagnostic Related Groupings (a new 
tariff) in April, 2008 has resulted in the submission of huge amounts of claims by health care 
providers for payment. The National Health Insurance Authority therefore has to find extra 
funds to pay its health care providers (Sodzi-Tettey, 2010).   
 
3.8. Conclusion and knowledge gaps 
The behaviour of health care providers is considered as one of the key determinants in the 
provision of health care services to insured and uninsured clients. Several factors including 
providers’ payment type and the process of payment or reimbursement can influence the 
behaviour of health care providers. In Ghana, there is limited research on the behaviour of 
health care providers under the NHIS. Hence there is the need to conduct a study to fill this 
gap. The study will help give a better insight and understanding on issues driving the 
behaviour of health care providers in their treatment of insured and uninsured clients upon the 
implementation of the NHIS. 
 
4.0. Aim  
The aim of the study is to investigate the influence of the NHIS on the behaviour of providers 
in their treatment of insured and uninsured clients. 
 
4.1. Specific objectives 
The study focuses on: 
(1) Examining providers’ perceptions about the reimbursement process under the NHIS. 
(2) Assessing providers’ perceptions of the insured and uninsured clients. 
(3) Assessing the perceptions and experience of insured and uninsured clients. 
(4) Making policy recommendations to strengthen the implementation of the NHIS. 
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5.0. Methodology 
This section gives a description of the study area in which the study will be conducted. It also 
describes the methodology to be used for the study.   
 
5.1. Study Area 
The study will be carried out in the Upper East Region, which is one of the 10 regions of 
Ghana. The region has been selected because it is one of the three poorest regions in the 
country, where health care providers are reluctant to accept postings to. It has a surface area 
of 8,842 sq.km (about 3.7% of the country) and an estimated population of 961,246 (2004) 
and is largely rural (87%) (Upper East Regional Administration, 2009). The doctor patient 
ratio stands at 1:29,000 and nurse-patient ratio is 1 to 1,243 (Upper East Regional 
Administration, 2009).  The region has one hundred and forty-seven (147) health facilities 
(public and private) comprising of hospitals, clinics, maternity homes and health centres. The 
hospitals are located in Bolgatanga, Navrongo, Bawku, Sandema and Bongo, which are the 
major towns in the region. Out of the one thousand one hundred and thirty-four (1,134) 
accredited health care providers by the National Health Insurance Scheme in the country, 
fourteen (14) are located in the region. The study is seen as an opportunity to investigate the 
behaviour of health care providers in resource poor settings. 
 
5.2. Study Site 
The Upper East Region is divided into nine (9) administrative districts and forty-two (42) 
health sub-districts. The map below shows the districts in the upper east region. 
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Figure 1: Map of the Upper East Region showing the districts 
 
Source: (Upper East Regional Administration, 2009) 
 
However, the Kassena-Nankana district was recently divided into two districts, namely 
Kassena-Nankana East and Kassena-Nankana West. This has not been reflected in the map 
above. The districts selected as the study site are the Bolgatanga municipality and the Builsa 
district. The two districts have been purposively selected to reflect urban and rural settings. 
The Bolgatanga municipality is considered as urban and Builsa district as rural.  
 
5.2.1. Bolgatanga municipality 
The Bolgatanga municipal district is one of the nine districts in the Upper East Region. 
Bolgatanga serves as the capital of both the region and the Bolgatanga municipality. The 
municipality is located on latitudes 10°30’ and 1°55’ North and Longitudes 0°33’ and 1°00’ 
West. It has a land area of 1,620 km². The municipality is bordered to the North by the Bongo 
district, South and East by Talensi-Nabdam district and Kassena-Nankana district to the West 
(Bolgatanga Municipal Assembly, 2009). 
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5.2.1.1. Population characteristics 
The Bolgatanga municipality has a population of about 119,975 (2009 estimate) with a 
growth rate of 1.7%, compared with the national rate of 2.7%.  The population density is 
141.2 persons per sq. km. The distribution of the population is as follows: 0-15 years – 
47.7%; 15-65 years – 50.8%; 65 years and above - 1.5%. In terms of sex distribution, males 
are 49% and females are 51% (Bolgatanga Municipal Assembly, 2009).  
 
5.2.1.2. Ethnic composition 
The major language spoken in the municipality is Gruune which is the main language of the 
people in the municipality. But due to the cosmopolitan nature of the municipality, other 
languages such as  Dagaare, Ga, Ewe, Adanbge, Akans and Kassem are also spoken. 
 
5.2.1.3. Occupational distribution 
Agriculture accounts for about 57% of the labour force, trade and commerce takes 19%, 
manufacturing (mainly handicrafts) 11.92%, community/social services 7.4% and other 
miscellaneous activities take about 4.68% in the municipality (Bolgatanga Municipal 
Assembly, 2009). 
 
5.2.1.4. Health 
Life expectancy in the municipality is about 50 years; compared to the national figure of 58 
years (Bolgatanga Municipality Assembly, 2009). The commonest diseases in the 
municipality are malaria, respiratory tract infections (ARI), diarrhoeal diseases and skin 
diseases. 
 
5.2.1.5. Health facilities and personnel 
The major health institutions in the municipality are the Regional hospital (a referral facility) 
and a private clinic. There are other smaller clinics and health centres run by some non-
governmental organisations. The Community Health Integrated Planning Services (CHIPS) 
centres are also in operations in the municipality. All these institutions offer both curative and 
preventive services. The municipality has a total population of 5 medical doctors and 205 
nurses. The doctor/patient and nurse/patient ratios are 1:30,932 and 1:755 respectively, 
compared to the national doctor/patient ratio of 1:400 (Bolgatanga Municipal Assembly, 
2009). 
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5.2.2. Builsa district 
Builsa district is also one of the nine districts in the Upper East Region of Ghana. The capital 
of the district is Sandema. The district lies between longitudes 10 05’West and 10 35’ West 
and latitudes 100 20’ North and 100 50’ North. The district covers an area of 2,220 km2 and 
constitutes 25.1% of the total land area of the Upper East Region. It is bounded to the north 
and east by the Kassena-Nankana district, to the east by the Sissala district and to the south 
by the West Mamprusi district (Builsa District Assembly, 2009). 
 
5.2.2.1. Population characteristics 
The Builsa district has a population of about 84,069 (2009 estimate) with an annual growth 
rate of about 1%. The total population consists of 51.8% females and 48.2% males. The 
population density based on the land surface is presently about 33.94 r 34 persons per square 
kilometre (Builsa District Assembly, 2009). 
 
5.2.2.2. Ethnic composition 
The district is largely inhabited by the Builsa tribe constituting about 83%. However there are 
a few of other smaller groupings comprising of the Kantosi, Mamprusi, Sissala, Nankani and 
Mossi. 
 
5.2.2.3. Occupational distribution 
As it pertains in other districts in the region, the main occupation in the district is agriculture 
(comprising of farming, animal husbandry, forestry and related activities) accounting for 
about 67.4%. Other activities include production and transport equipment work (13.5%), 
sales work (8.6%), services work (4.5%), professional, technical and related work (3.8%), 
and other unclassified activities (2.2%) (Builsa District Assembly, 2009). 
 
5.2.2.4. Health 
Life expectancy in the district is about 50 years. The commonest diseases in the district are 
malaria, upper respiratory tract infections, diarrhoeal diseases, pneumonia, rheumatism, and 
anaemia. The district has a maternal mortality rate of 942 per 100,000 compared to the 
national average of 214 per 100,000 (Builsa District Assembly, 2009). 
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5.2.2.5. Health facilities 
The main health institution in the district is the District hospital, with a doctor patient ratio of 
1:84,069. There are smaller health centres and clinics located in some communities in the 
district. The district also has the Community Health Integrated Planning Services (CHIPS) 
centres (Builsa District Assembly, 2009). 
 
5.2.3. Study 
design 
The study will be a cross-sectional survey due to time and resource constraints. It will be 
carried out over a period of six (6) months. Both quantitative and qualitative methods of data 
collection will be used in order to enhance the validity of results through triangulation. 
Patient exit interviews, in-depth interviews and focus group discussions will be the 
techniques of data collection. Policy documents review will also be done for the study. 
 
5.2.3.1. Patient exit interviews 
The patient exit interviews will be held with outpatients exiting two public hospitals in the 
two selected districts after seeking health care. The aim is to assess patients’ perceptions and 
experience of providers’ behaviour in terms of, patients’ satisfaction with health care 
provision, health staff attitude towards patients, and any preferential treatment by providers. 
Other indicators to help determine providers’ behaviour are; time spent by patients at the 
health facility seeking health care, physical examination of patients, unofficial payments and 
drugs prescribed. The indicator “time spent by patients at the health facility seeking health 
care” is to record the entire time that the patient will spend at the health facility seeking 
health care. When patients arrive at the health facility, their time of arrival will be written on 
a slip and the slip given out to them (only sampled patients of insurance status, but all 
uninsured patients will be included in the study if they consented). When the patients are 
finally leaving the health facility, the time of exit will be recorded on the slip and transcribed 
to the questionnaire form.  
 
Structured questionnaire developed in English will be used to collect the data. The 
questionnaire will be translated by experts into the local dialects spoken in the two districts. 
There will be a back translation for all questions to ensure that their meanings are not lost out 
as a result of the translation.  
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5.2.3.2. Sample size calculation for patient exit interviews 
A sample size will be calculated for the patient exit interviews in the two public hospitals in 
the two districts (Bolgatanga municipality and the Builsa district). Insurance coverage for the 
two districts varied, 67% for Bolgatanga (BMMHIS, 2009) and 80% for Builsa (BMHIS, 
2009). But the study will use a 50% insurance coverage levels to calculate the sample size for 
each of the two districts. This will be done in order to obtain an equal sample size for the two 
districts to enable comparison between the two districts. A standard error of 10% at 95% 
confidence level will also be used. The sample size required for the study in the Bolgatanga 
district will be determined as follows;  
Sample size (n), for Bolgatanga district = Z²pq    = (1.96 x 1.96) x (0.5 x 0.5)   = 96                                         
                                                                   d²                          (0.1 x 0.1)                                                         
Where: 
             n = the sample size  
             Z = normal deviate (confidence limit) taken as 1.96 at 95% confidence level 
             p = proportion of population coverage for health insurance in the district 
            q = proportion of population not insured. 
            d = the acceptable degree of accuracy desired. 
The sample size for the Bolgatanga municipality will be 96 participants. But calculating a 5% 
non-response rate to be added, the total sample size for the district will be 100 participants. 
Likewise, sample size (n), for the Builsa district = Z²pq    = (1.96 x 1.96) x (0.5 x 0.5) = 96                                             
                                                                d²                            (0.1 x 0.1)                                                           
The sample size for the Builsa district will also be 96 participants. However, a non-response 
rate of 5% will also be calculated and added, giving a total sample size of 100. Overall, the 
sample size for the study will be 200 participants for the exit interviews. 
 
5.2.3.3. Sampling distribution for the patient exit interviews 
The sample will be distributed evenly among the insured and uninsured groups. This will be 
done in order to allow for comparison between the insured and uninsured groups. For the 
Bolgatanga district with a sample size of 100, 50 patient exit interviews will be conducted 
with insured clients and 50 will be conducted with uninsured clients. For the Builsa district 
with a sample size of 100, 50 patient exit interviews will be conducted with insured clients 
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and 50 will also be held with uninsured clients. Table 1 illustrates the distribution of 
participants for the two districts. 
 
Table 1: Distribution of participants 
District              Insurance status Total 
Insured Uninsured 
Bolgatamga 50 50 100 
Builsa 50 50 100 
Total 100 100 200 
 
Systematic random sampling will be adopted to identify insured clients at the health facilities 
for the exit interviews. On average, 120 patients visit the public hospital a day. The study 
seeks to recruit approximately 15 participants a day. This will generate a recruitment interval 
of 8 patients. The starting point will be the first patient/client to arrive at the health facility. 
For the uninsured, all clients will be interviewed because of their limited use of the health 
facilities due to the fact that they make out-of-pocket payments for health care services. The 
exit interviews will be conducted by the research assistants and supervised by the 
investigator, observing on average two or more per day. 
 
5.2.4. In-depth Interviews 
The in-depth interviews will be held with health care providers and the national health 
insurance scheme managers in the two districts. The health care providers to be interviewed 
include hospital administrators, accountants, pharmacists, medical doctors, and nurses. The 
health insurance managers and their claims officers will also be interviewed. Table 2 shows 
how the in-depth interviews will be distributed in the two districts. 
 
Table 2: Distribution of in-depth interviews 
Interviewee              In-depth interviews 
Bolgatanga municipality Builsa district 
Regional health insurance manager 1 - 
District health insurance 1 1 
District health insurance claims manager 1 1 
Hospital pharmacist 1 1 
Hospital administrator 1 1 
Medical doctor 1 1 
Hospital accountant 1 1 
Senior nurse 1 1 
Subtotal 8 7 
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Total                          15 
 
 
Semi-structured interview guide will be used for conducting the interviews, which will be in 
English. The essence of the in-depth interviews is to get an insight into providers’ perceptions 
of the NHIS, especially the reimbursement process, clients’ behaviours and challenges of the 
NHIS. The interviews will also seek to collect views of the health insurance managers about 
the behaviour of health care providers. All interviews will be recorded and later written out 
for data analysis. Field notes will also be written alongside as a complement. The in-depth 
interviews will be conducted by the investigator. 
 
5.2.5. Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) 
Eight (8) FGDs will be held with community members in the two districts. The discussions 
will be conducted with both insured and uninsured men and women, with an age range of 
between 18 and 60 years (both productive and reproductive ages). Figure 1 is a diagrammatic 
representation of the design for the discussions. 
 
Figure 2: Design for FGDs 
 
 
From figure 1, one community each from the two districts will be selected for the FGDs. The 
selection will be done according to the community’s location from the health facility. As the 
location of a community to a health facility is an important determinant to health seeking. A 
community that extends out from the health facility up to about 8 kilometres (kms) will be the 
criteria for its inclusion in the study. A community that extends about 8 kilometres from a 
facility includes households that are nearer to the facility (about 4kms within) and also 
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households that are far from the facility (about 4kms further). Four FGDs will be conducted 
in each community with two each to be held with insured and uninsured men and women. 
The selection of the participants for the FGDs will also be done taking account of their 
residential location to the health facilities in the two districts. The study will bring together 
participants who live nearer (about 4kms within) and those who live further (about 4kms 
further) from the health facilities for each of the discussions. The participants will be 
recruited with the assistance of the communities’ leaders or their representatives. Each focus 
group will comprise of a membership of between 8 to 12 members.   
 
An interview guide will be developed in English and translated into the local dialects for the 
discussions. The interview guide will contain issues on the perceptions and experience of 
community members about the NHIS and that of providers’ behaviour. The discussions will 
also be recorded and transcribed into English. The translation and transcription of the 
interview guide and the discussions will be carried out by people who are experts in the 
dialects spoken. All transcriptions will be done verbatim to r duce errors. Field notes as well 
as bodily expressions will also be taken, to complement the transcribed notes. The FGDs will 
be conducted by trained field assistants and supervised by the investigator to assure quality. 
 
5.2.6. Data analysis 
The data from the exit interviews will be entered into EpiData software (3.1) and transferred 
to STATA, (version 10.0) for analysis. The data will be entered twice as a form of validation 
check, to help detect errors and inconsistencies. The identification of outliers and other 
inconsistencies among the variables will be done through the running of frequencies and 
cross tabulations. Chi-square test will be used to test for differences in groups and t-test for 
differences in means. The in-depth interviews and FGDs will be recorded and transcribed. 
This data will be analysed manually using themes. The investigator will read through all the 
transcripts exhaustively and code them. The codes will be matched and generated into 
common themes and sub-themes for the write-up. All analysis will be carried out by the 
principal investigator, but assistance will be sought if the need arises. The analysis will take 
place in both Ghana and South Africa. 
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5.2.7. Training 
Two experienced undergraduate research assistants with a background in the social sciences 
will be recruited for the study (to be recruited from the Navrongo Health Research Centre). 
The research assistants must be fluent in the local dialects spoken in the respective districts. 
A three-day training session will be organized for them by the investigator on the purpose 
and objectives of the study, data collection techniques and tools to be used, translated 
questionnaire and interview guides, and ethical issues.  
 
5.2.8. Pre-testing 
The data collection tools will be pre-tested in other health facilities and communities other 
than those selected for the study to help validate them. Modification to the tools will be made 
if there is the need, before they are used in the actual data collection. 
 
5.2.9. Community entry 
Meetings will be held with community members in the selected communities in the two 
districts for the FGDs. The purpose of the meetings, among other things, will be to provide 
information on the objectives of the study and the operations of the NHIS. These meetings 
will be held in collaboration with the leaders of the communities. 
 
5.2.10. Dissemination of findings 
Findings will be shared with the appropriate bodies including the District Health 
Management Teams in the two districts, the NHIS and the communities in which the study 
took place. Other presentations will be made if the need arises. 
 
5.2.11. Ethical considerations  
The study will conform to the required ethical guidelines regarding the conduct of research. 
Ethical clearance will be sought from the Health Sciences Faculty Research Ethics 
Committee, University of Cape Town. Permission will also be sought from the Ghana Health 
Service Ethical Review Committee and the District Health Management Teams in the two 
districts that the study will be carried out.  
 
5.2.12. Potential risks/discomforts 
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This study will not involve any physical risks to participants. However, if at any point they 
become uncomfortable with any question, they can choose not to answer that or discontinue 
outright participation. The data collected will not be given out to any other person, except for 
the purpose of which the study covers.  
 
 
5.2.13. Benefits 
Participation in the study will allow participants to share their knowledge and perceptions on 
the operations of the NHIS, especially the reimbursement process, challenges facing the 
NHIS and ways of improving them. The results of the study will be used to inform policy, for 
the success of health care delivery in the country. Whatever information that is given, 
remains private and will not be linked to anyone. 
 
5.2.14. Confidentiality 
The interview will be conducted in a private place. It will be tape recorded and some notes 
also written out.   Names will not be written in the notes nor recorded on the tapes.  Nobody 
will be identified in any report or publication made on the study. All the information given 
for the interviews will be held private.  This information will be accessible only to research 
personnel, who will listen to the tapes, make written notes, and use the notes for the purpose 
of which the study is intended.  After the notes are written from the tapes, they will be 
destroyed.  Personal information obtained from participants will be kept in the strictest 
confidentiality. 
 
5.2.15. Voluntariness and right to withdraw 
Participation is completely voluntary. Questions can be asked on anything that is not 
understood. Participants have the right to terminate the interviews at anytime, or decline to 
answer questions without any penalty. 
 
Informed consent will be taken from all participants at the beginning of each interview or 
discussion, which will be in a language understood by each participant. Interviews and 
discussions will also be carried out in languages of choice by participants.  
 
 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Timeline 
 Months       
 December January  February March April May  June 
Activities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Instrument 
translation             
   
Training of 
research assistants              
   
Piloting                
Data collection                   
Data coding and 
transcription             
   
Data entry                
Data cleaning                
Analysis and 
presentation of 
results             
   
Thesis writing up                
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PART B: LITERATURE REVIEW 
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1.0. Introduction 
After independence many African countries introduced free or heavily subsidized health care 
services to their people (Arhinful, 2003). Consumers of health care services could access 
services for free or pay a minimal fee in public health facilities. This was funded through 
general tax. However, this became a problem in the 1970s and 1980s due to the economic and 
financial crisis around that era which led to reduced spending by governments on health and 
other social services like education (Arhnful, 2003). This trend adversely affected the quality 
of health care services in terms of equipment, supplies and tools and the morale of health care 
staff (Criel, 1998, Huber et al., 2002). Apart from these crisis, most countries in the sub-
Saharan region lacked robust tax base, low institutional capacity to collect taxes and weak tax 
laws compliance to have maintained the general tax funding of health care services (Carrin, 
2002, Huber et al., 2002). The inadequacy of donor funding could not also maintain the free 
health care programmes run by some of these countries (Criel, 1998). 
  
User fees were therefore prescribed by some international organizations as a remedy to the 
health crisis (Criel, 1998). Users of health care services were required to pay in part or in full, 
the cost at the point of service consumption (Ellis, 1987). The essence of the user fees was to 
help improve the quality and efficiency of health care services, contain cost (mitigate moral 
hazard) and to generate additional revenue for health care facilities (Gilson, 1988). The 
introduction of the user fees led to the availability of some essential drugs in health care 
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facilities (Waddington & Enyimayew, 1990, Nyonator & Kutzin, 1999, Litvack & Bodart, 
1993), but the overwhelming evidence showed that they constituted a strong barrier to health 
care seeking for many individuals and households trapped in poverty (McPake, 1993, Palmer 
et al., 2004, Ndiaye et al., 2007).  
 
This generated the debate to identify alternative mechanisms for health care financing (Huber 
et al., 2002, Mbengue, 2009). Hence, Community-based Health Insurance Schemes (CBHIS) 
were introduced as an alternative financing mechanism. Community-based Health Insurance 
Schemes were seen to be a promising attempt to improve access to health care, health 
outcomes and social protection against the cost of ill health, especially for the informal sector 
employees (Wiesmann & Jutting, 2000). The Community-based Health Insurance Schemes 
developed on the principles of social solidarity which are widely practiced in most parts of 
sub-Saharan Africa (Ndiaye et al., 2007). Some countries in sub-Saharan Africa are therefore 
utilizing the concept of Community-based Health Insurance to help achieve universal 
coverage for their populations (Chankova et al., 2008, Mbengue, 2009, Atim et al., 2009). For 
example, Ghana and Rwanda are using this strategy to achieve universal coverage for their 
citizens. Therefore, Ghana enacted the National health insurance Act (Act 650) in 2003, 
leading to the implementation of the National health Insurance Scheme in 2005. 
 
1.1. Structure of the review 
The review explores the background to the concept of health insurance, definitions and types 
of health insurance, how the mechanism of health insurance works, and the theory of demand 
and supply of health insurance. Furthermore, the review examines the empirical evidence 
available for the introduction of health insurance and the utilization of health care services, 
equity, and health care expenditures (out-of-pocket payments). Provider payment 
mechanisms and evidence of their impact on the behaviour of health care providers have been 
discussed as well. The design and implementation of the National Health Insurance Scheme 
in Ghana, and conclusion and knowledge gaps concludes the review. 
 
The objective for the analytical review is to identify the available empirical evidence on the 
effect of health insurance on health care providers and insured members. Specifically, the 
review focuses on the behaviour of health care providers under health insurance, especially 
on provider payment mechanisms and their influence on providers’ behaviour. 
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1.2. Search strategy 
An electronic search was conducted in databases like PubMed, MedLine, Inter-Science 
(Wiley), Science Direct (Elsevier), EBSCO (Academic search premier) to identify relevant 
studies in published peer-reviewed journals and unpublished papers and reports (grey 
literature). A combination of key words was made for the search. These key words were; 
national health insurance, mandatory health insurance, social health insurance, universal 
coverage, community-based health insurance schemes, health insurance in sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA), provider payment mechanisms, health care provider’s behaviour under health 
insurance, and patients’ health seeking behaviour under health insurance. Additional articles 
were retrieved from Bibliographies of selected articles. Besides these databases, searches 
were also made on the web pages of international organizations and donors, including the 
World Bank, the World Health Organization (WHO), International Labour Organization 
(ILO), United Nations International Children Educational Fund (UNICEF), German Agency 
for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID). In addition to these sources, reports and publications were also taken 
from health insurance managers from the study districts. 
 
1.3. Background to the concept of health insurance 
The concept of health insurance was first proposed in 1694 by Hugh the Elder Chamberlen 
from the Peter Chamberlen family (Kalyanasundaram, 2008). Germany was the first country 
to implement a policy of health insurance in 1883 (Ron et al., 1990). Health insurance is a 
risk pooling mechanism which permits access to health care services in times of illness. 
Several definitions have been given to the concept.  
 
1.4. Definitions of health insurance 
According to Schneider, health insurance is a risk sharing mechanism which makes possible 
for the sharing of health care costs among insured members (Schneider, 2004). Health 
insurance helps to reduce the out-of-pocket (OOP) payments for health care services at the 
time of consumption by insured members. It promotes access to health care services for the 
poor and vulnerable. In a similar manner, Arhin-Tenkorang defines the concept as the act of 
spreading the risk of incurring high health care costs over a group of individuals or 
households (Arhin-Tenkorang, 2001). Besides, health insurance is also a mechanism that 
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helps to raise additional funds for essential public health care services through risk sharing 
(Jowett et al., 2004).  
 
Hence health insurance is considered an alternative financing mechanism for health care 
which has the ability to increase utilization and protect people against high health expenses 
(WHO, 2000). Indeed from the definitions, health insurance serves three main functions: the 
pooling of health risk, the mobilization of health care resources, and the payment of health 
care providers (Liu, 2002). Through health insurance, individuals are able to share the risk of 
any large costs due to illness and to access health care services when in need and in good 
time (McIntyre, 2007). Insured persons are protected from paying high treatment costs in 
times of sickness. The concept is different from user fee or direct payment schemes in which 
the user has the sole responsibility of paying for the costs of his or her medical care (Carrin, 
2002). Health care resources are also mobilized through health insurance through the 
payment of premium by insured individuals and households. These funds or health resources 
are then used for the payment of health care providers in their provision of health care 
services for insured individuals or households. 
 
1.5. Types of health insurance 
The financing of health care through health insurance could either be voluntary or mandatory 
(McIntyre, 2007). The classification depended on whether individuals and households were 
required by law to be registered with the health insurance programme against the financial 
risk of falling ill. It is also based on the reason for initiating the health insurance programme. 
Mandatory health insurance is generally initiated to help promote universal coverage for a 
population or a section of a population. 
 
1.5.1. Voluntary health insurance 
The voluntary type of health insurance could be for profit or not for profit. Commercial 
health insurance schemes are examples of voluntary health insurance programmes that are 
run for profit. The Community-based Health Insurance Schemes are also examples of 
voluntary health schemes that are not for profit.  
 
McIntyre states that voluntary health insurance is one that an individual or group can 
subscribe without a legal requirement to do so (McIntyre, 2007). Poor individuals and 
households are not able to join the “for profit” type of voluntary health insurance. The “for 
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profit” voluntary health insurance is mostly patronized by high socio-economic groups. The 
premium payment is based on individual risk assessment (Asenso-Okyere et al., 1997). 
Individuals with higher risk of illness may pay higher premiums than individuals with lower 
risk of illness. For instance, people with chronic conditions or the elderly would pay a higher 
premium than people likely to require less costly health care services. Cross income and risk 
subsidization are therefore minimal or non-existent with the “for profit” voluntary health 
insurance (McIntyre, 2007).  
 
Community-based Health Insurance Schemes are a form of voluntary health insurance with 
very distinct features emphasizing on community ownership and empowerment (Mills, 2007). 
They are independent non-profit making institutions drawing on the solidarity of their 
members and are also directly responsible to them (Atim, 2000). Community-based Health 
Insurance Schemes have different names. They are referred to as Mutual Health 
Organizations (MHOs) in Anglophone countries and Mutuelles de Sante in Francophone 
countries (NCBA, 2007). The International Labour Organization (ILO) also calls them micro-
insurance schemes (Huber et al., 2002).  
 
Majority of the populations in sub-Saharan A rica are found in the informal sector (Atim, 
2009, Bennett et al., 1998). Thus Community-based Health Insurance Schemes are 
considered as tools which offer financial protection for this class of people, as well as helping 
to mobilize health care resources for health care delivery (Arhin-Tenkorang, 2001). So the 
difference between Community-based Health Insurance Schemes and other health insurance 
programmes is that, while they (Community-based Health Insurance Schemes) offer 
insurance coverage to rural and informal sector populations, the others especially the 
commercial health insurance schemes mostly provide coverage for the urban and formal 
sectors of the economy (Tabor, 2005). 
 
1.5.2. Mandatory health insurance 
Mandatory health insurance may also be called national health insurance or social health 
insurance, and are often used interchangeably (McIntyre, 2007). The mandatory health 
insurance is generally supported by the government and membership tends to be compulsory 
for the intended group (Asenso-Okyere et al., 1997). The mandatory or social health 
insurance is based on the principle of social solidarity and contributions are derived from the 
average expected cost of health care service use by the entire insured group (McIntyre, 2007). 
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Again with mandatory or social health insurance, the contributions could be from employees 
and their employers, civil servants and government (as their employer), and the self-
employed from the formal and informal sectors of the economy (Carrin et al., 2008). 
 
Social health insurance is seen as a promising method for granting the population access to 
health care services in an equitable way (Carrin, 2002), by lowering the out-of-pocket 
payments that the consumer must pay for the benefit package. Furthermore, social health 
insurance facilitates the flow of revenue to health care providers (Carrin, 2002). Through 
social health insurance, health care resources are mobilized through premium payments and 
government subsidies which are paid in bulk to health care providers for the provision of 
health care services. The concept is therefore a benefit to both the insured client and the 
health care provider.  
 
In terms of the provision of health care services for registered members, social health 
insurance may have their own health care provider networks, work with accredited public  
and private health care providers (for example, Ghana) or a combination of both (Carrin & 
James, 2005). 
 
A number of factors are necessary for the success of a social health insurance system. They 
include the employment rate in the formal and informal sectors, the costs of health care 
services, health care service infrastructure, and the level of contribution of the health 
insurance premium (Bayarsaikhan et al., 2005). A firm political will and effective 
administrative capacity is also required to be able to run a social health insurance programme 
(Kwon, 2002). These factors determine the success or otherwise of a social health insurance 
policy. For instance, Ghana had a strong political will that permitted the successful 
implementation of its National Health Insurance Scheme in 2005 (Assensoh & Wahab, 2008).  
 
1.6. How the mechanism of health insurance works 
The mechanism of health insurance whether it is voluntary or mandatory, involves three key 
stakeholders and processes (Conn & Walford, 1998). The stakeholders include individuals or 
employers, health care providers and health insurance institutions (or third parties which 
could be either government or private institutions). Figure 1 below depicts how the 
mechanism of health insurance operates. 
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Figure 1: How the mechanism of health insurance operates 
 
Source: Conn & Walford (1998) 
 
From figure 1, a consumer being either an individual or household (or even employer), make 
regular payments in the form of premium to third party institutions, that is government or 
private organizations (for profit or not for profit) that manages the funds for the consumer. 
The fund is then used to pay for the cost of the health care services that the contributor or 
beneficiary would receive from health care providers. The health care provider, being either 
government or a private organization is required to provide health care services to the 
contributor/consumer (individual/employer), in return for payment by the third party 
institutions. Health insurance therefore serves as an intermediary between health care 
providers and the consumers of health care services (Liu, 2002). 
 
1.7. The theory of demand and supply of health Insurance 
In theory, the introduction of a health insurance programme may affect the utilization of 
health care services in a variety of ways. According to Zweifel & Manning, the introduction 
of a health insurance programme may lead to the reduction of the price of health care services 
(or health costs subsidization) at the time of purchase. This may lead to an increase in the 
utilization of health care services (when price goes down, consumption goes up), referred to 
as ex post moral hazard (Zweifel & Manning, 2000). The situation might not have occurred if 
consumers were required to pay for the full costs of health care services.  
 
Secondly, the introduction of health insurance may lead to the reduction in the consumption 
of preventive care and other changes in lifestyle by those insured. The scenario may result in 
an increase in the probability of the individual falling ill, and experiencing a more severe 
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illness, often referred to ex ante moral hazard. The consequence is an increased in the 
consumption of health care services, possibly the use of more expensive services (Zweifel & 
Manning, 2000).  
 
However, Arrow preferred to use a less judgemental and more informative term, hidden 
action, in place of moral hazard (Arrow, 1985). It is argued that in situations where there is a 
huge unmet health care needs, especially in low income countries, then the increased 
consumption of health care services under health insurance is not considered to be a problem. 
Hence Arrow’s labelling is very appropriate. Again, Zweifel & Manning argued that the 
optimal amount of moral hazard is positive, and that health insurance can bring about 
efficiency gains in situations where, for instance, it leads to an increase in the consumption of 
cost effective services (Zweifel & Manning, 2000). 
 
An opponent of the use of moral hazard, referring to it as the abusive use of health care 
service, is Nyman. The purchase of an insurance cover is normally meant to help gain access 
to a necessary but otherwise unaffordable treatment. Therefore the use of health care services 
by the insured cannot be considered to be an abuse (Nyman, 1999). However, Cutler & 
Zeckhauser, suggested that in order to avert excessive utilization of health care services, 
insured persons should be made to pay a part of the costs of health care services at the point 
of consumption, which is called co-payments (Cutler & Zeckhauser, 2000). 
 
From the perspective of supply, the introduction of a health insurance programme might 
encourage health care providers to provide health care services which are unnecessary or not 
needed, to insured members and hence leading to over utilization (Cutler & Zeckhauser, 
1999, Liu & Mills, 1999). This is due to the fact health care providers are aware that the 
insurance programme will be responsible for paying for the cost of the health care services 
and hence will encourage the consumption of services which may not be needed or necessary. 
The use of the fee for service method of payment, for instance, encourages this kind of 
behaviour from health care providers.  
 
1.8. Health insurance and utilization of health care services 
Studies have shown that the introduction of health insurance is associated with increased 
health care service utilization. For example, a study in the United States of America revealed 
that elderly women who had coverage for some health care services (outpatients, inpatient 
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and medication prescription) were significantly more likely to use the particular covered 
service compared to women without coverage, with odds ratios ranging from 2.0  to 6.7 (Xu 
et al., 2006). In Taiwan, it was revealed that persons with different health insurance plans had 
a higher probability of visiting a medical doctor than their uninsured counterparts, with odds 
ratios ranging from 1.8 to 2.0 (Cheng & Chiang, 1998). Similarly, insured patients in 
Vietnam were more likely to use outpatient facilities as compared to uninsured patients 
(Jowett et al., 2004). 
 
In the settings of sub-Saharan Africa, a study in Senegal showed that members of a Mutual 
Health Organization had a higher probability of using hospitalization services than 
individuals who were not insured (Jütting, 2003). The utilization of outpatient health care 
services by registered members of the Community-based Health Insurance in Burkina Faso 
were also found to be higher (about 40% higher) than for the uninsured members (Gnawali et 
al., 2009). Still, a randomized trial in Ghana indicated that insured children had higher 
utilization rates for insured services than their uninsured counterparts (Ansah et al., 2009). 
The study however, found that insurance coverage did not impact on health outcomes. The 
above findings on increased utilization of health care services may be explained by the fact 
that the introduction of health insurance makes possible for individuals to have access to 
health care services which they would not have had, if the health insurance programme was 
unavailable. This is particularly true in developing countries with a huge unmet health care 
needs. 
 
In spite of the overwhelming evidence of the association of health insurance with increased 
utilization of health care services, a study in Ghana showed that the introduction of the 
National Health Insurance Scheme did not increase the likelihood of the insured using 
maternal health care services. Prenatal care, skilled attendance at delivery, caesarean-
sections, etc, were unaffected by the implementation of the National Health Insurance 
Scheme (Hatt et al., 2009). The findings were explained by the fact that other direct cost of 
seeking health care services, for instance, costs of transportation, meals, costs for 
accompanying relatives, may have prevented the utilization of the maternal health care 
services. This means that health insurance coverage does not necessarily increase utilization 
in all settings. A lot of other countless factors influence health care utilization including 
indirect cost, socio-cultural beliefs, attitude of health care staff, and so on. Again, the findings 
for the higher utilization rates as reported in the other studies may be as a result of adverse 
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selection, moral hazard on the part of the insured, etc, which most studies do not report on. 
The issue of adverse selection and moral hazard threatens the sustainability of insurance 
schemes in terms of cost escalation. 
 
Besides, it cannot be concluded that the higher utilization rates reported in the above studies 
have positive effects on health outcomes for the insured persons. Most of the studies on 
utilization did not measure health outcomes for insured and uninsured clients, which is the 
ultimate reason for health care delivery (but often very difficult to measure).  
 
Furthermore, individuals differ systematically in behaviours which have consequences on 
their health, for instance, lack of exercise, poor diet, and excessive alcohol consumption. 
Persons with these habits which may negatively impact on their health status will require 
more health care services than other individuals. This will lead to a higher utilization of 
health care services for those individuals and not as a result of the introduction of a health 
insurance programme. 
 
1.9. Health insurance and equity  
According to Lagarde & Palmer, the equity effects of a health insurance programme depend 
to a large extent, on its design and implementation process (Lagarde & Palmer, 2006). Health 
insurance programmes that are for profit, do not mostly consider issues of equity in their 
design and implementation. However, it is the “not for profit” ones that endeavour to promote 
equity. Community-based Health Insurance Schemes and social/mandatory health insurance 
schemes have their core objective of promoting equity, by providing insurance coverage to 
populations that would otherwise not have had coverage against the cost of ill health. In 
particular, social/mandatory health insurance seeks to achieve universal coverage for 
populations, by giving insurance coverage to all regardless of socio-economic status, gender, 
age, race, geographical location, and so on. It was found in India for example, that the Vimo 
Self-employed Women's Association (SEWA) scheme was able to provide coverage for the 
poorest of the poor, with 32% located in rural areas and 40% found in urban areas, and from 
households below the 30th percentile (Ranson et al., 2006) 
 
Similarly, the Askeskin programme in Indonesia was able to ensure coverage for the poor 
who were vulnerable to catastrophic health costs and those in the informal sector as well 
(Sparrow et al., 2010). In the settings of Africa, the Community-based Health Insurance 
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Schemes in Ethiopia had helped to mitigate the effects of health shock on poor rural 
households (Asfaw & Braun, 2004). The poor were able to access health care services as and 
when they needed them with the introduction of the Community-based Health Insurance 
Schemes. 
 
Studies have also shown that some Community-based Health Insurance Schemes and 
social/mandatory health insurance schemes have proven to be relatively inequitable (Lagarde 
& Palmer, 2006). The introduction of social health insurance schemes may help to deepen 
inequalities especially (Pannarunothai & Mills, 1997). Some social health insurance schemes 
start by providing coverage for a particular group or section of the population, for example, 
the formal sector. In Indonesia, a study by Hidayat et al revealed that both the mandatory 
health insurance programme for civil servants (Askes) and the one for private employees 
(Jamsostek) had all failed to promote equity by not providing insurance coverage for the 
whole population (Hidayat et al., 2004). 
 
A recent study on the Community-based Health Insurance Schemes in Armenia also showed 
that the schemes achieved a high level of equity in terms of social classification, gender and 
age, but the levels of registration was relatively low due to problems of premium 
affordability. The benefit package for the schemes was also found to be limited and does not 
include chronic diseases (Polonsky et al., 2008).  The findings suggest that majority of 
Armenians were not registered into the schemes and hence were not protected against the 
financial risk of ill health. Again, it means that Armenians who were chronically ill will 
continue to incur very high health costs which could lead to their impoverishment.  
 
Another study in Senegal showed that the core poor were not covered under the Community-
based Health Insurance Scheme due to their inability to pay the premium, though the 
objective of the scheme was to attract the poor and vulnerable (Jutting, 2003). In the context 
of Ghana, findings indicated that the poorest of the poor were excluded from the Community-
based Health Insurance Schemes introduced to cater for their health care needs (Osei-Akoto, 
2003). This was also as a result of the inability of the poor to pay for the premium. There is 
therefore the need to put interventions in place to cater for the needs of the poor, to allow 
them participate in social health insurance schemes. Wagstaff argued that in the absence of 
exemptions or reduced contributions for the poorest, contributions to social insurance 
schemes can be regressive (Wagstaff, 2007). High levels of co-payments may also negatively 
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impact on poorer households and thus widen the inequities in social health insurance 
programmes (Yang, 1991). 
 
Still inequity may arise in an insurance programme when there is an unequal geographical 
coverage of health care services, especially between urban and rural locations (Lagarde & 
Palmer, 2006). For example, Kutzin & Barnum demonstrated that as a result of geographical 
locations, inequalities arose in Brazil and in South Korea where members of the health 
insurance schemes in rural areas tend to have poorer access to health care services than their 
counterparts in urban locations (Kutzin & Barnum, 1992). This emphasizes the need for 
planners and policy makers of health insurance programmes to make special provisions to 
cater for the health care needs of geographically disadvantaged populations. This is 
particularly necessary in developing countries where health care facilities and staff are 
unevenly distributed between rural and urban areas. 
 
1.10. Health insurance and health care expenditures (out-of-pocket payments) 
Health insurance is meant to reduce health care expenditures for consumers of health care 
services and to help mitigate health related impoverishment. Findings from studies on the 
relationship between being enrolled in a health insurance programme and incurring further 
health care expenditures are not clear (Levine, 2008). Some studies revealed that being 
insured helps to reduce health expenditure or out-of-pocket payments. For instance, Yip & 
Berman in Egypt found that insured children under the School Health Insurance Programme 
incur less health costs compared to their colleagues who were not enrolled with the health 
insurance programme (Yip & Berman, 2001).   
 
In Senegal, it was discovered that members of a Community-based Health Insurance Scheme 
pay far less when they seek health care services than those who were not insured (Jütting, 
2003).  A baseline evaluation report on the National Health Insurance Scheme in Ghana 
showed that the overall out-of-pocket payments among outpatients in formal health care 
facilities reduced greatly from 21,293 cedis in 2004 to 13,748 cedis in 2007. The findings for 
the endline also indicated that the total out-of-pocket payments for insured patients were 
about 20 percent of the amount paid by the uninsured (Health Systems 20/20 Project and 
Research and Development Division of the Ghana Health Service, 2009). 
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Contrarily, some studies have found that out-of-pocket payments were unaffected by the 
introduction of health insurance or rather increased for the insured. In China, for example, a 
government subsidized voluntary health insurance scheme (the New Cooperative Medical 
Scheme) was found not to have had any impact on the average out-of-pocket payments for 
the insured population (Wagstaff et al., 2007). The investigators attributed their findings to 
the institutional set up of health care in China which promoted increased utilization and 
substitution toward more expensive health care services and treatments (Levine, 2008). The 
fact also remains that it is not only the direct cost of health care services that constitute the 
total cost for health care seeking. There are other indirect costs like transportation, meals, and 
even unofficial fees for which all add up to the total cost of health seeking (out-of-pocket 
payments). This therefore may also help to explain their findings from the study.  
 
A three country study in West Africa which evaluated the impact of Mutual Health 
Organizations proved that membership to these organizations does have a less significant 
effect on out-of-pocket payments for outpatient care (Chankova et al., 2008). The Mutual 
Health Organizations provide insurance coverage for only cases of hospitalization and hence 
insured outpatients would have to make out-of-pocket payments for the services.  
 
In conclusion, despite the above findings, the introduction of health insurance programmes 
help to reduce people’s expenditure for health care services in general. 
 
1.11. Provider payment mechanisms 
Provider payment mechanisms are important in the delivery of health care services. Provider 
payment mechanism is the process of managing, setting the benefit package and paying for 
health care services (Reaven & Rosenbloom, 2009). It may also refer to the allocation of 
health care resources to health care providers for the provision of health care services 
(Kutzin, 2000). Provider payment mechanisms are meant to cater for some aspects of the 
information asymmetry between health care providers and clients. This is done by defining 
rules in terms of the cost per patient or group of patients, the reimbursement costs, the 
procedure for patient transfers or rejection, etc, (Maceira, 1998). Provider payment 
mechanisms may either be prospective or retrospective. When the payment for a package of 
health care service is negotiated and agreed upon before the treatment takes place, it is 
referred to as prospective payment. When the payment is selected during or after the service 
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has been rendered, it is referred to as retrospective payment (Maceira, 1998, Jegers et al., 
2002).  
 
It is essential to state that provider payment mechanism to a large extent, determines how 
health care services are produced by health care providers (Barnum et al., 1995). The study of 
provider payments is necessary, particularly for developing countries, where the available 
resources for health care services are very limited (Maceira, 1998). 
 
1.12. Types of provider payment under health insurance 
As seen earlier, health care providers to a greater extent determine the consumption of health 
care services by clients. However, this is dependent on the type of provider payment 
mechanism adopted for paying them. It is therefore important to study and understand the 
various types of provider payment mechanisms used for paying health care providers.  
 
There are six main provider payment methods (Maceira, 1998). They include budgets, 
capitation, diagnostic related groupings (case-based payment), per diem/day, fee for service 
and salary (Lave & Frank, 1990). Table 1 is a detailed description of the various types of 
provider payments, their advantages and disadvantages 
 
Table 1: Methods for paying providers 
Type of payment Description Per unit service Advantages Disadvantages 
Diagnosis related 
Groupings 
(DRG)/Case or 
episode 
Case payment system 
that uses a schedule of 
diagnostic groups. Used 
mainly for hospital 
payments. The patient 
diagnosis will have to 
fall into a DRG. This is 
assigned after the 
discharge of the patient, 
which determines the fee 
(prospective system). 
Per diagnosis 
Grouping. 
 
-Risk shared: Provider bears 
risk that some diagnosis may 
cost more than predetermined 
fee; the scheme also has to 
ensure that cases are assigned 
to the right diagnostic groups 
by the facilities.   
-Patients are not unnecessarily 
transferred and the desired 
level of quality is achieved. 
-Providers will seek to 
reduce cost per diagnosis, 
and hence compromising 
quality. 
-Providers may also 
choose only illnesses 
having high costs and refer 
others. 
- Providers can also code 
patients into groups with 
higher costs in order to 
obtain high payments. 
 
-Complex setting up 
DRGs and operating them. 
-It is also not cheaper to 
administer like others e.g. 
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fee for service. 
-Require schemes to have 
good validation and claims 
management system. 
-Also require providers to 
collect large amount of 
information on patient 
characteristics, diagnosis 
and procedures. 
Budgets Payments made in 
advance to providers for 
total costs of service to 
members for a specific 
time period, e.g a year. 
(prospective systems) 
 
All services are paid 
for members for a 
defined period and 
prescription. 
 
-It is good for controlling 
costs. 
-It is easy to set up and 
operate. No claims processing 
involved but requires 
utilization management to 
ensure quality. 
-Difficult ensuring that 
quality is not 
compromised in trying to 
contain cost by providers. 
-Providers have the 
incentive to spend all 
remaining funds by the 
end of budget period. 
 
Capitation Providers are paid a 
fixed agreed amount per 
member for all members. 
This covers a month, a 
quarter or year 
(prospective system). 
Provider required to 
provide all the defined 
care for members in need 
without extra cost  
Payments made per 
member per year or 
other agreed period 
of time. 
 
- Effective in controlling cost. 
-Ensures that providers do not 
stand to gain by providing 
unnecessary services so 
helping to keep costs down.  
-May also promote efficiency 
by encouraging providers to 
engage in prevention and 
promotion activities to 
maximize revenue. 
-Administrative costs could be 
low. 
-Providers assume all financial 
risks; schemes/payers face 
little risk. 
-Improves/ensures continuity 
of care for members for the 
period under consideration. 
 
-Management can be 
complex where quality 
control mechanisms are to 
be enforced, if skills of 
providers and schemes are 
not high. 
-Administrative cost 
increases when members 
change providers. 
-There is a big task of 
ensuring that quality is up 
to standard. 
-Where no competition 
exists, it will require 
adequate quality control 
mechanisms. 
-Also constant monitoring 
is required to prevent 
under servicing of 
members.  
-Providers may also 
undertake crème 
skimming of members. 
Salary Providers are paid a 
fixed amount for a fixed 
number of hours work. 
The salary is fixed for 
Payment per month 
or annum. 
 -Providers have no incentive 
to refuse treatment to 
members, since compensation 
-Providers have the 
incentive to serve few 
patients as possible. 
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either a month or year. 
The amount is fixed 
according to 
qualification, experience 
and in relation to other 
jobs (prospective 
system). 
 
 is fixed. 
-Providers have no benefit to 
provide excessive treatment. 
- Financial planning for health 
care services becomes easier. 
-Administrative costs also 
become low compared to other 
modes of payment. 
-Providers also may leave 
work early or practice 
absenteeism. 
-Providers have no urge to 
build any relationship with 
clients, since payment is 
fixed. 
-Providers may not also 
provide adequate attention 
to clients; hence quality 
and quantity may be 
affected. 
- May lower the morale of 
providers who work hard. 
- Providers not encouraged 
to work in the public 
sector. 
Per diem/day It is used within hospital 
setting. The fee charged 
covers all services and 
cost per patient in a day 
including the treatment, 
drugs, tests, 
accommodation and 
feeding (prospective 
system). 
Per patient day 
 
-Can help save cost, since fee 
is fixed. 
-This is very easy to 
administer. No technicalities 
involved in terms of fee 
schedules or detailed lists of 
prices. The average per diem 
rate is easy and quick to 
calculate and implement. 
-Risk is shared between 
providers and schemes/payers.  
-Providers have the 
incentive to reduce care or 
services per day. 
-Providers might also 
prolong hospital stay, 
increase bed occupancy 
and capacity and shifting 
outpatient and other 
services to the hospital 
setting in order to 
maximize income.  
Fee for service A fee charged for  each 
service or treatment 
rendered (retrospective 
payment system). 
Each unit of service 
or treatment. 
- It can easily be developed 
and implemented, with little 
capacity required. 
- Providers are encouraged to 
work longer hours and/or 
provide more services. 
 
- Helps to improve access and 
utilization for underserved 
areas. 
 
-The effect on quality is 
relatively good. Payment is 
related to nature/type of case 
or service rendered. 
-Providers are tempted to 
provide many unnecessary 
services. 
-Provide expensive 
services which might not 
be needed. 
-No risk sharing between 
providers and the schemes. 
The schemes bear all the 
risk involved. 
Source: (Lave & Frank, 1990, Maceira, 1998, Atim, 2000) 
 
From the table, it will be realized that the precise method by which a health insurance scheme 
pays its health care providers is important because the payment method has an impact on the: 
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quality of health care services provided, costs and efficiency, equity, complexity of 
administrative and management information systems, and risk management (Camilo et al., 
2008, Ellis & Miller, 2008). The impact prevails mostly in developing countries where there 
are weak or no regulation and control mechanisms, no professional self-regulation or where 
the public health sector is under resourced (Yip & Eggleston, 2004). 
 
1.13. Provider payments and the behaviour of health care providers 
Provider payment mechanisms determine the behaviour of health care providers in terms of 
cost containment, efficiency and quality of health care services (Qingyue, 2005). The 
different provider payment mechanisms generate different incentives/disincentives which 
affect the behaviour of health care providers (Dor & Farley, 1996).  For example, with the 
introduction of the diagnosis-related grouping (case-based hospital payment system) in the 
U.S. Medicare system that provided health care services to elderly people, health care 
providers saw no incentive to prolong hospital admissions any more. Hence it led to a 
reduction in the average length of hospital stay by 15 percent within a period of three years 
(Lave & Frank, 1990). This emphasizes the need to consider the incentive that comes with 
the introduction of each payment method for health care providers.  
 
Similarly, health care providers under the Korean Social Health Insurance Scheme who were 
paid through the fee for service mechanism had the incentive to overprescribe drugs for 
insured clients. This resulted in the escalation of costs and depleted funds from the National 
Insurance Fund (Kwon, 2009). Thus demonstrating the vulnerability of social/national health 
insurance systems to the type of provider payment adopted for paying health care providers.  
 
A recent study by Quimbo et al also discovered that not only national level accreditation with 
the Philippines National Health Insurance system influences the behaviour of public and 
private providers, but health insurance payments affected their provision of paediatric health 
care service as well. The health insurance payments in the form of monthly salary for public 
care providers and fee for service for private providers motivated providers to provide higher 
quality of clinical care than the non-accredited providers (Quimbo et al., 2008). This was 
explained by the fact, in order to be paid by the health insurance scheme, providers must 
provide health care services to a certain required standard. 
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Therefore when making a choice for a provider payment system, policy makers/purchasers 
must decide on the policy objective that is desired. Whether it is increased revenues, 
efficiency of health care service delivery, cost-containment, access, quality, administrative 
simplicity, or a combination of these that they seek to achieve (Langenbrunner et al., 2009). 
 
In addition, it is suggested that in order to achieve an optimum level of behaviour from health 
care providers, policy makers/health insurance schemes should operate a mix of provider 
payment methods (Camilo et al., 2008). Mix provider payment methods involve the use of 
more than one payment mechanism for paying health care providers. For instance, China 
introduced a mix of payment methods for paying health care providers in its health insurance 
programme which led to the reduction of cost (Qingyue, 2005).  
 
 
 
 
 
2.0. The National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in Ghana 
2.1. Background 
Ghana is among the few African countries that promulgated a National Health Insurance 
(NHI) Act (650). Hitherto, the country provided free health care services for her citizens after 
independence in 1957. This was possible due to the small population size (about 8 million) at 
the time and a flourishing economy (Assensoh & Wahab, 2008). The free health care service 
could not be sustained because of the economic crisis in the 1970s and early 1980s which 
adversely affected all sectors of the economy leading to budget cuts on social spending 
including health and education. Little money was available for the health sector and this led 
to widespread shortages of essential medicines, supplies and equipment. Therefore the quality 
of health care services was greatly affected (Agyepong & Adjei, 2008).  
 
To forestall these problems, cost recovery or user fees (popularly called “cash and carry”) 
were introduced in the late 1980s in all government health care facilities. Patients were made 
to pay for the full cost of medication and care. The argument for the user fees was to generate 
revenue and to discourage frivolous use of health care services. The introduction of the user 
fee saw an improvement in the availability of drugs in the health care facilities (Arhin-
Tenkorang, 2001). However, the policy affected the utilization of health care services by 
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Ghanaians. The poor especially, were undertaking self-medication and also reporting late to 
health care facilities for treatment (Arhin-Tenkorang, 2001, Arhinful, 2003). Hence it 
prompted the need to look for other alternatives of health care financing, which led to the 
introduction of some Community-based Health Insurance Schemes in the early 1990s. As at 
2003, such Community-based Health Insurance Schemes covered only about 1% of the 
country’s population (19 million), leaving many Ghanaians uncovered against high health 
care costs (Sulzbach et al., 2005).  In order to promote universal coverage and equity, the 
government of Ghana then adopted the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in 2003, 
which was fully implemented in 2005.  
 
2.2. Design of the National Health Insurance Scheme 
The implementation of the scheme drew experience from several years of the successful 
operations of the Community-based Health Insurance Schemes (McIntyre et al., 2005). The 
National Health Insurance Scheme combines both the voluntary and mandatory health 
insurance systems. Members are required, but free to join an insurance scheme of their 
choice.  The National Health Insurance Scheme is also designed to incorporate those in the 
informal and formal employment sectors into a single insurance system in an attempt to 
promote universal coverage. This is in contrast to the status quo, where most countries start 
with the coverage for the formal sectors first (Carrin et al., 2005). 
 
The National Health Insurance Act of 2003 permits the following types of health insurance 
schemes: First, the District Mutual Health Insurance schemes (Community-based) to be set 
up in all the 145 districts in the country. The design of the schemes at the district level is the 
same but the operatio s and coverage at the various district levels and between urban and 
rural areas may differ for each geographic location. Residents are required to be members of 
the scheme in their district of residence. Second, private mutual health insurance schemes are 
also allowed to operate. Any group of people are allowed to form a mutual health insurance 
scheme, but most of these schemes were already in existence and were mostly mission-based 
and hence not for profit. The third type of insurance schemes was the private commercial 
health insurance schemes. They are “for profit” companies and are not restricted to a 
particular location in the country. Membership here is also opened to all Ghanaians.  
 
The National Health Insurance Council (NHIC) was established by the NHI Act to serve as a 
regulatory body for the National Health Insurance Scheme. In fact, the National Health 
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Insurance Council is to ensure the successfully implementation of the National Health 
Insurance Scheme. The Council is supported by a secretariat. Figure 2 illustrates the design 
and set-up of the National Health Insurance Scheme including the functions and 
responsibilities of the National Health Insurance Council.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The design and set-up of the National Health Insurance Scheme in Ghana 
Source: (Boateng, 2008) 
 
From figure 2, The National Health Insurance Council is the hub of the National Health 
Insurance scheme. Some of its responsibilities include the registration, licensing, and 
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regulation of the health insurance schemes; the accreditation and monitoring of health care 
providers providing health care under the various schemes; education of the public in relation 
to health insurance issues; and resolution of complaints arising from the health insurance 
schemes, among several other functions. The Council also has the sole responsibility for 
managing the National Health Insurance Fund (NIHF) and for determining premiums. But a 
body called the National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) set up under the National 
Health Insurance Council is solely responsible for managing and disbursing the National 
Health Insurance Fund.  
 
As stated earlier, Ghanaians are permitted by the NHI Act to make a choice and join any type 
of health insurance scheme. The Act stipulates that it is compulsory for anyone living in 
Ghana to belong to a health insurance scheme (Government of Ghana, 2003). However, the 
government of Ghana will only support the District Mutual Health Insurance Schemes 
(DMHIS) through the provision of subsidies. This is to help create a strong motivation for 
people to join the District Mutual Health Insurance Schem  instead of the other schemes, 
especially the private ones. 
 
The policy objective of the National Health Insurance Scheme is that, every citizen of Ghana 
shall belong to a health insurance scheme that adequately covers him/her against the need to 
make out-of-pocket payments at the point of service consumption (Government of Ghana, 
2003). Targets set for the National Health Insurance Scheme include achieving coverage of 
30-40% of the population by 2010 and 50-60 % by 2015-20 (Government of Ghana, 2003). 
 
2.3. Composition of staff for the District Mutual Health Schemes 
Each District Mutual Health Insurance Scheme has a core staff consisting of the Scheme 
Manager, the Claims Officer, the Accountant, Public Relations Officer, Management 
Information Systems Officer and some Data Entry Clerks. 
 
2.4. Financing of the National Health Insurance Scheme 
The National Health Insurance Fund is being financed by the national insurance levy of 2.5% 
on specific goods and services. There is also a 2.5 % payroll deduction from the contributions 
of formal sector employees to the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) 
fund, government budgetary allocations to the health sector (from general tax and other 
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sources) and donor support. Figure 3 shows the sources of funds for the financing of the 
National Health Insurance Scheme in Ghana.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Source of funding for the National Health Insurance Scheme 
 
Source: (McIntyre et al, 2005) 
 
Another source of funding is the contributions of individuals in the informal sector who are 
not classified as core poor. They are required to pay an annual membership premium to a 
scheme of their choice in a district. In fact, an entire household is required to register for the 
scheme so as to avoid the risk of adverse selection. 
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2.5. Classification of individuals in the informal sector 
Table 2 consist of the various classifications of Ghanaians in the informal sector and the 
amount of premium to be contributed to the National Health Insurance Scheme. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Type of social group and the minimum contribution required 
SOCIAL 
GROUP 
WHO THEY ARE MINIMUM 
CONTRIBUTION 
Core poor (A) Adults who are unemployed and do not receive any identifiable and constant 
support from elsewhere for survival. 
Free 
Very poor (B) Adults who are unemployed, but receive identifiable and consistent financial 
support from sources of low income. 
GH¢7.20 
Poor (C) Adults who are employed, but receive low returns for their efforts and are unable to 
meet their basic needs. 
GH¢7.20 
Middle income (D) Adults, who are employed and able to meet their basic needs. GH¢18.00 
Rich (E) Adults, who are able to meet their basic needs and some of their wants. GH¢48.00 
Very rich(F) Adults, who are able to meet their needs and most of their wants. GH¢48.00 
Source: NHIA, 2009 
 
From table 2, Ghanaians have been classified into six different groups based on their socio-
economic background, ranging from the core poor to the very rich. The core poor (indigent 
and in category A) are exempted from the payment of premium. The exemption process is 
carried out in conjunction with the community health insurance committees located in the 
various communities. These committees help to identify poor individuals and households to 
be exempted from paying the premium. But it is a big challenge identifying people who are 
poor for exemption, since the policy was not clear on the exemption procedure/criteria and 
hence if the core poor will be represented in the NHIS (Aikins & Ahinful, 2006).  
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The very poor and poor (category B and C) pay a minimum of GH¢7.20 for registration into 
the NHIS. On the other hand, the very rich are required to make a minimum contribution of 
GH¢48.00. But most people in Ghana do not agree to be classified as being rich or very rich 
and to contribute a higher amount than what other people are contributing. This resulted in 
the payment of a flat amount of GH¢7.20 by almost all contributors to the scheme, since the 
inception of the National Health Insurance Scheme. This attitude works against income 
subsidization for the successful operation of the scheme. Again, it questions the issue of 
social solidarity among Ghanaians. It is therefore not surprising that the health sector review 
report in 2007 found the contributions from the informal sector to the National Health 
Insurance Scheme to be just 0.01%, for the period 2006 (Atim et al., 2009). Table 3 depicts 
the percentage contributions of the various sources of funding to the scheme in 2006.  
 
 
 
Table 3: Contribution of the various funding sources of the NHIS in 2006 
Sources of NHIF income % of NHIF income in 2006 
National Health Insurance levy (VAT) 76% 
Social security contributions of formal sector workers  24% 
Premium paid by informal sector members 0.01% (estimate) 
Source: Government of Ghana, 2007 
 
From table 3, the highest proportion of the funding in 2006 came from the national health 
insurance levy (76%). This raises concerns about the sustainability of the scheme, since taxes 
in sub-Saharan Africa countries are less reliable and administratively expensive to collect 
(Carrin, 2002). 
 
The National Health Insurance Authority uses the pooled funds in the National Health 
Insurance Fund for the following purposes; allocation to each District Mutual Health 
Insurance Scheme to cover the contributions of formal sector workers (drawn from the Social 
Security and National Insurance Trust payroll deductions), partially subsidize the 
contributions of low-income households, and subsidize in full the contributions for the 
indigent. These funds are also used for risk equalization and reinsurance for the various 
District Mutual Health Insurance Schemes. 
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2.6. Exemptions under the National Health Insurance Scheme 
Apart from the exemption of the indigent from the payment of the insurance premium, there 
are other categories of persons who enjoy some exemptions too. But these categories of 
persons will have to pay registration fees before they can be enrolled into the District Mutual 
Health Insurance Schemes, whereas with the indigent, they are not required to pay any 
registration fee. The persons exempted from paying premium are; children less than 18 years 
of age whose parents or guardians are contributors, children less than 18 years of age whose 
parents or guardians are proven by the NHIS to be single parents, and pensioners under the 
Social Security and National Insurance Trust. Individuals who are over 70 years of age and 
pregnant women are also exempted from the premium payment. 
 
2.7. Benefit Package of the National Health Insurance Scheme  
The National Health Insurance Scheme provides a minimum benefit package for which all 
members are entitled to, irrespective of their socio-economic background. Most diseases 
(95%) afflicting Ghanaians have been covered by the National Health Insurance Scheme. 
Table 4 shows the benefit package for registered members of the National Health Insurance 
Scheme. 
 
Table 4: Benefit package of the National Health Insurance Scheme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: NHIA, 2009 
 
From the table above, it will be seen that the benefit package covers the necessary basic drugs 
and services required. Diseases and services considered to be of public health interest 
including; in-patient and out-patient treatment of mental illness, treatment of tuberculosis, 
onchocerciasis, buruli ulcer, and trachoma are also captured under the National Health 
Insurance Scheme’s benefit package. Other benefits provided for free under the National 
Health Insurance Scheme are; confirmatory HIV test on AIDS patients, family planning 
Outpatient Benefits  Inpatient Benefits 
1.Consultations, including reviews 
2.Requested investigations 
3.Medications 
4.Outpatients/Day surgical operations 
5.Outpatients physiotherapy 
6.Oral health services 
7.Eye care 
8.Maternity care 
 
9.General and specialized inpatient care 
10.Requested investigations 
11.Medication 
12.Surgical operations 
13.Inpatient physiotherapy 
14.Accommodation 
15.Feeding where available 
16.Emergencies 
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services, ante-natal and post-natal services and immunizations. The policy is also flexible 
allowing districts to upgrade the minimum health care benefit package if they have the 
financial capacity. However, this move must be approved by the National Health Insurance 
Council. From the above, it has been argued that the benefit package is too comprehensive to 
be sustainable in the long term (Atim et al., 2009).   
 
2.8. Exclusion list for services and drugs 
Drugs and other services which are considered to be very expensive have been excluded from 
the benefit package for members. Table 5 shows these drugs and services. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Exclusion list for services and drugs 
1.Rehabilitation other physiotherapy 
2.Appliances and prostheses 
3.Cosmetic surgeries 
4.Replacement therapy 
5.Echocardiography 
6.Angiographies 
7.Orthoptics 
8.Dialysis for chronic renal failure 
9.All drugs not listed on the NHIS drug list 
10.Heart and brain surgery 
11.Mortuary services 
Source: NHIA, 2009 
 
2.9. Accessing Services under the National Health Insurance Scheme 
The first point of call, except in cases of emergency, will be a primary health care facility, 
which includes Community-based Health Planning and Services (CHIPS), Health Centres, 
District Hospitals, Polyclinics or Sub-metro Hospitals, Quasi Public Hospitals, Private 
Hospitals, Clinics and Maternity Homes.  In localities where the only health facility is a 
Regional Hospital, the General Outpatient Department will be considered a primary health 
care facility. Active, registered members of the schemes are allowed to access health care 
services outside their district schemes if the need arises and a transfer letter is required. 
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However, when the national ID card for the National Health Insurance Scheme is fully 
implemented, there will not be the need for a transfer letter from one district or scheme to 
another. 
 
2.10. Membership coverage of the National Health Insurance Scheme 
There is a rapid increase in membership (67% of Ghana’s total population as at June, 2009 
were registered with the National Health Insurance Scheme (Asenso-Boadi, 2009). This 
phenomenon is due mainly to the subsidized groups. For instance, about 48.89% of the 
members of the scheme as at June, 2009, were children less than 18 years of age. This is 
depicted in table 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Membership under the National Health Insurance Scheme as at June, 2009 
Schemes in operation 145  
Total Registered 13,840,198 67% 
                         Category of members 
Informal Adult 4,065,483 29.38% 
Aged (Over 70 years) 942,320 6.81% 
Under 18 years 6,896,633 48.89% 
SSNIT Contributors 857,842 6.20% 
SSNIT Pensioners 73,407 0.53% 
Indigents 331,426 2.40% 
Pregnant Women 669,163 4.84% 
Source: Asenso-Boadi, 2009 
 
The composition of the membership again raises questions of sustainability, as most of those 
covered are not making health insurance contributions because they are considered the 
exempt group. 
 
2.11. Provider payment under the National Health Insurance Scheme  
At the start of the National Health Insurance Scheme, a fee for service type of provider 
payment was adopted for paying health care providers. But this was replaced with the Ghana 
Diagnostic Related Groupings (GDRGs) in April, 2008. The reason for the replacement was 
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that the fee for each service was found to be low and hence unattractive, especially for the 
private providers to participate, since the public providers were automatically accredited 
(Ankomah, 2009). Providers are encouraged to participate in the NHIS, in order to reduce 
congestions and delays for clients. With the fee for service, providers were also required to 
submit detailed information on all services and charges for claims submissions. This involves 
a lot of paperwork which providers were not happy with (Ankomah, 2009).  
 
Therefore the Ghana Diagnostic Related Groupings were introduced to help remedy some of 
these issues. The tariff covers the full cost of the estimated direct consumables for direct 
patient care, anaesthesia and other investigations. The Ghana Diagnostic Related Groupings 
also captures about 80% of the estimated overhead cost for public health facilities, 
comprising of building and equipment maintenance, housekeeping and utilities (Ankomah, 
2009). It is expected that the new tariff will generate adequate revenue from the National Health 
Insurance Scheme for health care providers to cover a significant portion of their cost of 
operation.  
 
2.12. Reimbursement process under the National Health Insurance Scheme 
Regarding the process of reimbursement, providers are required to compile and submit their 
claims to a District Mutual Health Insurance Scheme (DMHIS) to which they have been 
accredited to. The claims are then vetted by the District Mutual Health Insurance Scheme. 
When satisfied, the District Mutual Health Insurance Scheme makes a submission to the 
National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) for funds to pay the providers. The National 
Health Insurance Authority pays providers by channelling the funds through the District 
Mutual Health Insurance Scheme.   
 
2.13. Implementation issues relating to the National Health Insurance Scheme 
Since the introduction of the National Health Insurance Scheme, studies have shown an 
increasing level of registration and membership, a rise in the number of those who consult 
formal health care for general health conditions, an increased likelihood of women to receive 
prenatal care, deliver at a hospital, have their deliveries attended by trained health 
professionals, and experience less birth complications (Sulzbach, 2008, Mensah et al., 2009, 
Witter & Garshong, 2009).  
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
73 
 
But these benefits come with some challenges. These include an overburdened public health 
infrastructure, increased workloads for health care providers, short supply of providers, and 
unmotivated staff (Health Systems 20/20 Project and Research and Development Division of 
the Ghana Health Service, 2009).  There are also problems in relation to the reimbursement 
of health care providers. It is argued that the introduction of the Ghana Diagnostic Related 
Groupings (a new tariff) in April, 2008 has resulted in the submission of huge amounts of 
claims by health care providers for payment. The new tariff has a higher remuneration rate 
for health care providers than the previously fee for service.  The National Health Insurance 
Authority therefore has to find extra funds to pay its health care providers (Sodzi-Tettey, 
2010).  
 
3.0. Conclusion and knowledge gaps 
The behaviour of health care providers is considered as one of the key determinants in the 
provision of health care services to insured and uninsured clients. Several factors including 
providers’ payment types and the process of payment or r imbursement can influence the 
behaviour of health care providers. In Ghana, there is limited research on the behaviour of 
health care providers under the National Health Insurance Scheme. Hence there is the need to 
conduct a study to fill this gap. The study will help give a better insight and understanding on 
issues driving the behaviour of health care providers in their treatment of insured and 
uninsured clients upon the implementation of the National Health Insurance Scheme. These 
findings will be important for Ghana and other countries that are planning to introduce 
social/mandatory health insurance. 
 
                                                                                                     {Word count: 9560 words} 
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Abstract 
Background: Prepayments and risk pooling through social health insurance has been 
advocated by international development organizations. Social health insurance is seen as a 
mechanism that helps mobilize resources for health, pool risk, and provide more access to 
health care services for the poor. Hence Ghana implemented the National Health Insurance 
Scheme (NHIS) to help promote access to health care services for Ghanaians. Objective: The 
study examined the influence of the NHIS on the behaviour of health care providers in their 
treatment of insured and uninsured clients. 
 
Methods: The study took place in Bolgatanga (urban) and Builsa (rural) districts in Ghana. 
Data was collected through exit survey with 200 insured and uninsured clients, 15 in-depth 
interviews with health care providers and health insurance managers, and 8 focus group 
discussions with insured and uninsured community members.  
 
Results: The NHIS promoted access for insured and mobilized revenue for health care 
providers. Both insured and uninsured were satisfied with care, according to the survey. 
However, increased utilization of health care services by the insured leading to increased 
workloads for providers influenced their behaviour towards the insured. Most of the insured 
perceived and experienced long waiting times, verbal abuse, not being physically examined 
and discrimination in favour of the affluent and uninsured. The insured attributed their 
experience to the fact that they were not making immediate payments for services. A core 
challenge of the NHIS was a delay in reimbursement which affected the operations of health 
facilities and hence influenced providers’ behaviour as well. Providers preferred clients who 
would make instant payments for health care services. Few of the uninsured were utilizing 
health facilities and visit only in critical conditions. This is a consequence of the increased 
cost of health care services under the NHIS. 
 
Conclusion: The NHIS is beneficial for promoting access to health care services, but there is 
the urgent need to streamline the reimbursement process in order to sustain the NHIS. 
Improving the capacity of health facilities and personnel for the provision of quality care also 
requires immediate action. 
 
                                                                                                    (Word count: 337 words) 
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1.0.  BACKGROUND 
Health care financing continues to stir debates around the world. Many low and middle 
income countries especially, keep on exploring different ways of financing their health 
systems. This is due to the fact that their health systems are chronically under-funded [1]. 
User fees were initially introduced at the point of service delivery in some of these countries 
in order to generate revenue for the running of their health systems. In some contexts, the 
introduction of user fees led to improvement in the quality of health services [2]. However, 
the overwhelming evidence suggests that user fees constitute a strong barrier to the utilization 
of health services, as well as preventing adherence to long term treatment among poor and 
vulnerable groups [1,3]. These problems led to yet another debate to look for other 
alternatives of health care financing.  
 
But prepayment and risk pooling through social health insurance (SHI) and taxation are 
found to provide protection against some of the undesirable effects of user fees [4]. The 
international community is therefore paying more attention to SHI as one of the promising 
financing mechanisms for providing coverage to populations against high health service costs 
[5]. SHI is seen as helping to pool health risks, prevent health related impoverishment and 
improvement in efficiency and quality of health services [4,6,7]. It also provides access to 
health services for the poor and helps mobilize revenue for providers [4]. Nonetheless, the 
implementation of SHI programmes are challenged in terms of high administrative cost, lack 
of managerial skills, problems of cost containment and ensuring national coverage [2]. Due to 
these, there are still few examples of SHI schemes operating at large scale in developing 
countries [7]. 
 
Ghana is among the few African countries that promulgated a National Health Insurance 
(NHI) Act (650). Hitherto, the country had been providing free health services for her citizens 
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after independence in 1957. This was possible due to the small population size (about 8 
million) at the time and a flourishing economy [8]. However, the free health services could 
not be sustained because of the economic crisis in the 1970s and early 1980s which adversely 
affected all sectors of the economy leading to budget cuts on social spending including health 
and education. Thus, little money was available for the health sector and this led to 
widespread shortages of essential medicines, supplies and equipment which adversely 
affected the quality of care [9].  
 
To forestall these problems, cost recovery or user fees (popularly called “cash and carry”) 
was introduced in the late 1980s in all government facilities. Patients were made to pay for 
the full cost of medication and care. The argument for the user fees was to generate revenue 
and to discourage frivolous use of health services. However, the user fees policy affected the 
utilization of health services by Ghanaians. The poor especially, were undertaking self-
medication and also reporting late to health facilities for treatment [10,11]. This prompted the 
need to look for other alternatives of health care financing, which led to the introduction of 
some Community-based Health Insurance Schemes (CBHIS) in the early 1990s. As at 2003, 
such CBHIS covered only about 1% of the country’s population (19 million), leaving many 
Ghanaians uncovered against high health service costs [12].   
 
1.1. Design and set up of the NHIS 
In order to promote universal coverage and equity, the government of Ghana adopted the 
National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in 2003, which was fully implemented in 2005. 
The NHIS aims to assure equitable and universal access for all residents of Ghana to an 
acceptable quality package of essential health services without OOP payment being required 
at the point of use [13]. The NHIS is based on District Mutual Health Insurance Schemes 
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(DMHIS), which operates in all 145 districts of the country. The NHIS covers both the 
formal and informal sectors of the economy. According to McIntyre et al, the implementation 
of the NHIS draws experience from the operations of the CBHIS [14]. The NHIS had a 
membership of about 67% as at June, 2009 [15].   
 
1.2. Sources of funding for the NHIS 
The sources of funding for the NHIS include 2.5% sales tax, 2.5% monthly payroll deduction 
for formal sector workers as part of their contribution to the Social Security and National 
Insurance Trust (SSNIT) fund and government budgetary allocation. In addition, there is a 
minimum and maximum premium payment of GH7.20 ($8) and 47.70 ($53) per adult 
respectively, from the informal sector [13]. Children under 18, adults over 70 years, pregnant 
women and the indigent are exempted from paying the premium.  
 
1.3. Benefit package under the NHIS 
The benefit package consists of basic health services, including outpatient consultations, 
essential drugs, inpatient care and shared accommodation, maternity care (normal and 
caesarean delivery), eye care, dental care, and emergency care. About 95% of the diseases in 
Ghana are covered under the NHIS. All public facilities are accredited to participate in the 
NHIS, while private facilities have to apply for accreditation and participation.  
 
1.4. Provider payment mechanism under the NHIS 
At the start of the NHIS, a fee for service type of provider payment mechanism was used for 
paying health care providers. But this was replaced with the Ghana Diagnostic Related 
Groupings (GDRGs) in April, 2008. The reason for the replacement was that the fee for each 
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service was found to be low and hence unattractive, especially for the private providers to 
participate. Providers are encouraged to participate in the NHIS, in order to reduce 
congestions and delays for clients when seeking health services. With the fee for service, 
providers were also required to submit detailed information on all services and charges for 
claims submissions. This involves a lot of paperwork which providers were not happy with 
[16].   
 
Therefore the GDRGs were introduced to help remedy some of these issues. The tariff covers 
the full cost of the estimated direct consumables for direct patient care, anaesthesia and other 
investigations. The GDRGs also captures about 80% of the estimated overhead cost for 
public health facilities, comprising of building and equipment maintenance, housekeeping 
and utilities [16]. It is expected that the new tariff will generate adequate revenue from the 
NHIS for providers to cover a significant portion of their cost of operation.  
 
1.5. Reimbursement process under the NHIS 
Regarding the process of reimbursement, providers were required to compile and submit their 
claims to a DMHIS to which they have been accredited to. The claims are then vetted by the 
DMHIS. When satisfied, the DMHIS makes a submission to the National Health Insurance 
Authority (NHIA) for funds to pay the providers. The NHIA pays providers by channelling 
the funds through the DMHIS.   
 
1.6. Implementation issues relating to the NHIS 
Since the introduction of the NHIS, studies have shown an increasing level of registration and 
membership, a rise in the number of those who consult formal health care for general health 
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conditions, an increased likelihood of women to receive prenatal care, deliver at a hospital, 
have their deliveries attended by trained health professionals, and experience less birth 
complications [17,18,19]. But these benefits come with some challenges. They include an 
overburdened public health infrastructure, increased workloads for providers, short supply of 
providers, and unmotivated staff [20]. There are also problems in relation to the 
reimbursement of providers. It is argued that the introduction of the Ghana Diagnostic Related 
Groupings in April, 2008 has resulted in the submission of huge amounts of claims by 
providers. The new tariff has higher remuneration rates than the previous payment type.  The 
NHIA therefore has to find extra funds to pay its providers [21].  
 
There is limited knowledge on the influence of the NHIS on the behaviour of providers, who 
are at the core of service provision. Providers form an important segment of health care 
delivery. Their behaviour plays a significant role in determining whether the goals of a health 
system can be achieved. The aim of the study was to examine the effect of the NHIS on the 
behaviour of providers. Specifically, the study examined the perceptions of providers about 
the reimbursement process and about insured and uninsured clients. The perceptions and 
experience of insured and uninsured clients, and insurance managers was also studied and 
presented here. 
 
2.0. METHODS  
 
2.1. Study area and site 
The study was carried out in the Upper East Region of Ghana, considered as one of the three 
poorest regions in the country, with the least number of health workers. Two districts were 
purposively selected (out of nine districts in the region) for the study, to reflect urban and 
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rural settings. The selected districts were the Bolgatanga municipality and capital town of the 
region (urban setting) and the Builsa district (rural setting where not much studies have been 
carried out). Table 1 is a summary of some characteristics of the two districts. 
 
Table 1: Some characteristics of the districts 
 Bolgatanga Builsa 
Total land area 1,620 km². 2,220sq km 
Total Population 119,975 (2009 estimate) 84,069 (2009 estimate) 
Number of hospitals  1 (Regional hospital) 1 (District hospital) 
Total doctor population 5 1 
Total nurse population 205 Not available 
Doctor/patient ratio 1:30,932 1: 84,069 
Nurse/patient ratio 1:755 Not available 
 
Source: Bolgatanga Municipal Assembly [22]  
             Builsa District Assembly [23] 
 
2.2. Study design 
The study was cross-sectional and data collection was carried out between December, 2009 
and February, 2010. Both qualitative and quantitative methods were used in order to enhance 
the validity of results through triangulation. Patient exit interviews were used in the 
quantitative methods and the qualitative approach used in-depth interviews and Focus Group 
Discussions (FGDs). The patient exit interviews were conducted with patients who were 
exiting the two main public hospitals in the two districts after seeking health care. Time and 
financial constraints did not allow for private health facilities to be included in the study. The 
in-depth interviews were held with health care providers, health insurance managers at the 
district level and their claims officers, and the FGDs with community members. Some policy 
documents were reviewed as well for the study. 
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2.3. Sampling for the patient exit interviews 
A sample size was calculated for the patient exit interviews in the two public hospitals in the 
two districts (Bolgatanga municipality and the Builsa district). Health insurance coverage for 
the two districts varied, 67% for Bolgatanga [24] and 80% for Builsa [25]. But the study used 
a 50% insurance coverage levels to calculate the sample size for each of the two districts. 
This was done in order to obtain an equal sample size for the two districts to enable 
comparison between the two districts. A standard error of 10% with a 95% confidence level 
was also used. Table 2 shows the calculated sample size and distribution. The calculated 
sample size for each district was distributed equally between the insured and the uninsured 
population. This was done to allow for comparison between the insured and uninsured 
groups. 
 
Table 2: Sample distribution for the patient exit interviews 
District              Insurance status Total 
Insured Uninsured 
Bolgatamga 50 50 100 
Builsa 50 50 100 
Total 100 100 200 
 
Systematic random sampling was used to recruit insured clients at the health facilities for the 
exit interviews. On average 15 participants were recruited a day, using a recruitment interval 
of 8 patients, starting with the arrival of the first patient. All uninsured clients who presented 
at the health facilities during recruitment and consented were interviewed. This was done due 
to their (uninsured) limited use of health care as a result of the OOP payments. It must be 
noted here that the original intent of the study was to recruit only outpatients; however, it 
became difficult getting the uninsured clients, especially in the Bolgatanga municipality when 
the study commenced. It was realized that most of the uninsured visit the facilities as 
inpatients. Therefore the recruitment was extended to include inpatients in that municipality, 
to allow for the required sample size to be obtained.  
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Structured questionnaire were used to collect the required data. The questionnaire were 
developed in English and translated into the local dialects spoken in the two districts by 
language experts. There was a back translation for all questions to ensure that their meanings 
were not lost out as a result of the translation. The main aim of the exit interviews was to 
gather data on patients’ perceptions and experience in the facilities. Questions were based on 
perceptions of differential treatment of the insured and uninsured, physical examination at the 
consultation rooms, waiting times, satisfaction with health care provision, ranking of 
providers’ behaviour and OOP payments made at the facilities. Two well trained field 
assistants fluent in the dialects spoken in the chosen districts were responsible for conducting 
the interviews. Quality was monitored by the investigator who observed on average two 
interviews a day. 
 
2.4. In-depth Interviews 
Fifteen (15) In-depth interviews were conducted with providers and insurance managers in 
the two districts. Table 3 demonstrates the distribution of the in-depth interviews in the two 
districts.  
 
Table 3: Distribution of in-depth interviews 
Interviewee              In-depth interviews 
Bolgatanga municipality Builsa district 
Regional health insurance manager 1 - 
District health insurance 1 1 
District health insurance claims manager 1 1 
Hospital pharmacist 1 1 
Hospital administrator 1 1 
Medical doctor 1 1 
Hospital accountant 1 1 
Senior nurse 1 1 
Subtotal 8 7 
Total                          15 
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The essence of the in-depth interviews was to get an insightful data on providers’ perceptions 
of the NHIS and that of clients. The interviews were also meant to collect insurance 
managers’ views about the NHIS, providers and clients. Semi-structured interview guide was 
used for conducting the interviews, which was in English because all the participants could 
speak English fluently.  The interviews covered the reimbursement process, the response of 
providers to the reimbursement process, providers’ treatment of insured clients and 
challenges facing the NHIS. These interviews were recorded with an Olympus Digital Voice 
Recorder. The recordings were listened to and transcribed for the data analysis. Field notes 
were also taken alongside as a complement. All the in-depth interviews were carried out by 
the investigator. 
 
2.5. Focus Group discussions (FGDs) 
Eight (8) FGDs were held with community members in the two districts. The discussions 
were conducted with both insured and uninsured men and women between ages 18 and 60 
years (both productive and reproductive ages). Figure 1 is a diagrammatic representation of 
the design for the discussions. 
 
Figure 1: Design for the FGDs 
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From figure 1, one community each from the two districts was selected for the FGDs. This 
selection was done according to the community’s location from the facility because the 
location of a community to a facility can determine the health seeking behaviour of its 
residents. A community that extended out from the facility up to about 8 kilometres (kms) 
was the criteria for its inclusion in the study. A community that extends about 8kms from a 
facility includes households that are nearer to the facility (about 4kms within) and also 
households that are far from the facility (about 4kms further). Zaare in Bolgatanga and 
Tankonsa in Builsa were the communities selected and used for the discussions. Four (4) 
FGDs was conducted in each community with two each held with insured and uninsured men 
and women. The selection of the participants for the FGDs was also done taking into account 
their residential location to the facilities in the two districts. The study brought together 
participants who live nearer (about 4kms within) and those who live further (about 4kms 
further) from the facilities for the discussions. The participants were recruited with the 
assistance of the communities’ leaders or their representatives. Each group had a membership 
of 8 to 12 members.   
 
An interview guide was developed and used for the discussions, which was carried out in the 
local dialects. The interview guide contained issues on the perceptions and experience of 
community members about the NHIS and that of providers’ behaviour. The discussions were 
recorded in the local dialects and transcribed into English. The translation and transcription of 
the interview guide and the discussions was carried out by people who were experts in the 
dialects spoken. All transcriptions were done verbatim to reduce errors. Field notes as well as 
bodily expressions were also taken, to complement the transcribed notes. The FGDs were 
also conducted by the trained field assistants and supervised by the investigator to assure 
quality. 
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2.6. Data analysis 
The data from the exit interviews were entered into EpiData software (3.1) and later 
transferred to STATA, (version 10.0) for analysis. The data was entered twice as a form of 
validation check, to help detect errors and inconsistencies. The identification of outliers and 
other inconsistencies among the variables was done through the running of frequencies and 
cross tabulations. Chi-square test was used to test for differences in groups and t-test for 
differences in means. The in-depth interviews and FGDs were recorded and transcribed. This 
data was analysed manually using themes. The investigator read through all the transcripts 
exhaustively and coded them. The codes were matched and generated into common themes 
and sub-themes for the write-up. 
 
2.7. Ethical considerations  
Ethical approval was granted for the study by the Faculty of Health Sciences’ Ethics 
Committee, University of Cape Town, South Africa, and by the Ghana Health Service Ethical 
Review Committee, Ghana. Permission for the research was also obtained from hospital 
management and all participants gave informed written consent to be interviewed or 
surveyed. 
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3.0. RESULTS 
 
3.1. Results from the exit survey 
A total of 200 respondents were recruited for the survey comprising of 100 participants each 
in two public facilities in the Bolgatanga and Builsa districts. The 100 respondents in each 
district were stratified equally into insured and uninsured positions.  
 
3.1.1. Characteristics of respondents 
Table 4 is a composition of the characteristics of the respondents.  About 51% of the 
respondents were in the age range of 21-60 years who were uninsured while 49% were in the 
0-20 age range and were insured. 
 
Table 4: Characteristics of respondents 
                       
Characteristics 
      Bolgatanga municipality            Builsa district                    Total 
 Insured Uninsured Insured  Uninsured Insured Uninsured 
 
Age(years) 
Freq 
(50) 
% Freq 
(50) 
% Freq 
(50) 
% Freq 
(50) 
% Freq 
(100) 
% Freq 
(100) 
% 
0-20 20 40 21 42 29 58 24 48 49 49 45 45 
21-60 29 58 28 56 16 32 23 46 45 45 51 51 
61+ 1 2 1 2 5 10 3 6 6 6 4 4 
 Sex             
Male 23       46     24 48 20 40 21 42 43 43 45 45 
Female 27       54 26 52 30 60 29 58 57 57 55 55 
Type of patient                
Inpatient 15       30 31 62 - - - - 15 15 31 31 
Outpatient 35       70 19 38 50 100 50 100 85 85 69 69 
 
 
Females were more than the male respondents, with 57% being insured and 55% being 
uninsured. Outpatients who were insured were 85% while the uninsured were 69%. Insured 
and uninsured inpatient respondents were 15% and 31% respectively (Note: the inpatients 
came from the Bolgatanga municipality only). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
100 
 
 
3.1.2. Diagnosis 
Causes of outpatient attendance and hospitalizations are presented in table 5. Malaria tops the 
list and accounts for 55% of the insured and 60% of the uninsured attendance. In the 
Bolgatanga municipality, malaria was responsible for 33.3% insured and 67.8% uninsured 
inpatient hospitalization. It also caused 60% and 58% insured and uninsured outpatients 
attendance in the Builsa district. 
 
Table 5: Diagnosis  
Diagnosis            Bolgatanga municipality                  Builsa district Total 
               Insured            Uninsured    Insured Uninsured   Insured Uninsured 
Inpatients Outpatients Inpatients         Outpatients Outpatients Outpatients   
Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % 
Malaria 5 33.3 20 57.1 21 67.8 10 52.6 30 60 29 58 55 55 60 60 
URI 1 6.7 4 11.4 1 3.2 3 15.8 5 10 6 12 10 10 10 10 
Anaemia 2 13.3 3 8.6 - - 2 10.5 4 8 5 10 9 9 7 7 
Others 7 46.7 8 22.9 9 29 4 21.1 11 22 10 20 26 26 23 23 
Total 15 100 35 100 31 100 19 100 50 100 50 100 100 100 100 100 
 
 
3.1.3. Patients’ perception about health care providers 
Respondents’ satisfaction with health service provision, perception of waiting times and 
differential treatment of the insured and uninsured clients by providers were collected. 
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3.1.3.1. Satisfaction with health care provided 
Table 6 shows the level of satisfaction of respondents with health service provision in the two 
districts and facilities. Overall, there was no difference (p-value = 0.177) in response with 
regards to satisfaction with health service provision between the insured and the uninsured. 
About 76% of the insured and 82% of the uninsured were satisfied with the health care 
provided them. The same pattern had been observed between inpatients of insured and 
uninsured positions (p-value = 0.734) as well as outpatients who are insured and uninsured 
(p-value = 0.240) in the Bolgatanga municipality. Equally, the Builsa district saw no 
difference in response for the insured and uninsured outpatients (p-value of 0.292).  
 
Table 6: Satisfaction with health care provided 
Satisfa
ction 
with 
health 
care? 
Bolgatanga municipality Builsa district Total 
Inpatients Outpatients Outpatients 
Insured Uninsure
d 
 Insured Uninsure
d 
 Insured Uninsure
d 
 Insured Uninsure
d 
 
Fr
eq 
% Fr
eq 
% P-
value* 
Fr
eq 
% Fr
eq 
% P-
value* 
Fr
eq 
% Fr
eq 
% P-
value* 
Fr
eq 
% Fr
eq 
% P-
value* 
Satisfie
d 
10 31.
25 
23 67.
65 
0.734 22 68.
75 
11 32.
35 
0.240 44 88 48 96 0.292 76 76 82 82 0.177 
A little 
satisfie
d 
4 25 8 50 12 75 8 50 5 10 2 4 21 21 18 18 
Dissati
sfied 
1 50 - - 1 50 - - 1 2 0 0 3 3 0 0 
Total 15 30 31 62 35 70 19 38 50 10
0 
50 10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
*Chi-square test to compare proportions for insured and uninsured respondents 
 
3.1.3.2. Perception of waiting times at the health facility 
Respondents’ perception of waiting times in the facilities is captured in table 7. While no 
difference was observed for inpatients of insured and uninsured status in the Bolgatanga 
municipality (p-value = 0.345), there was a difference between outpatients who are insured 
and those who are uninsured (p-value = 0.003). About 76% of outpatients who are insured 
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compared to about 63.16% uninsured perceived the waiting times to be too long. In the 
Builsa district, the insured (68%) regarded waiting times to be too long in the district (p-value 
= 0.000). A further difference (p-value = 0.001) had been found for the combined result from 
the two districts between the insured and uninsured. About 59% of insured respondents 
viewed the waiting times to be too long compared to only 35% of the uninsured.  
 
Table 7: Perception of waiting times at the health facility 
Wait
ing 
time
s? 
Bolgatanga municipality Builsa district Total 
Inpatients Outpatients Outpatients 
Insured Uninsure
d 
 Insured Uninsure
d 
 Insured Unisured  Insured Uninsured  
Fr
eq 
% Fr
eq 
% P-
value* 
Fr
eq 
% Fr
eq 
% P-
value* 
Fr
eq 
% Fr
eq 
% P-
value* 
Fr
eq 
% Fr
eq 
% P-
value* 
Too 
long 
6 24 7 36.
84 
0.345 19 76 12 63.
16 
0.003 34    68 16 32 0.000 59 59 35 35 0.001 
Ok 9 36 24 77.
42 
16 64 7 16.
22 
16    32 34 68 41 41 65 65 
Total 15 30 31 62 35 62 19 38 50 10
0 
50 10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
100 
* Chi-square test to compare proportions for insured and uninsured respondents 
 
3.1.3.3. Perceived differences in treatment of insured and 
uninsured clients 
The insured and uninsured did not perceive that insured clients were treated better than 
uninsured.  This is shown in table 8, where the total responses of the insured (88%) and 
uninsured (85%) were not different (p-value = 0.535). This trend reflected in the Bolgatanga 
municipality too, between insured and uninsured inpatients and for the insured and uninsured 
outpatients as well with p-values of 0.321 and 0.151 respectively.  But a difference however, 
was recorded for the responses in Builsa between insured and uninsured outpatients (p-value 
= 0.041), where all the uninsured (100%) and 92% of the insured responded that the insured 
was not treated better than the uninsured clients. 
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Table 8: Perception of insured being treated better than uninsured clients by health 
providers 
Is 
insure
d 
treated 
better? 
Bolgatanga municipality Builsa district Total 
Inpatients Outpatients Outpatients 
Insured Uninsure
d 
 Insured Uninsure
d 
 Insured Uninsure
d 
 Insured Uninsure
d 
 
Fr
eq 
% Fr
eq 
% P-
value* 
Fr
eq 
% Fr
eq 
% P-
value* 
Fr
eq 
% Fr
eq 
% P-
value* 
Fr
eq 
% Fr
eq 
% P-
value* 
Yes 1 12.
50 
7 46.
67 
0.321 7 87.
50 
8 53.
33 
0.151 4 8 0 0 0.041 12 12 15 15 0.535 
 
No 14 33.
33 
24 68.
51 
28 66.
67 
11 31.
43 
46 92 50    10
0 
88 88 85 85 
Total 15 30 31 62 35 70 19 38 50 10
0 
50 10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
*Chi-square test to compare proportions for insured and uninsured respondents 
 
Likewise, respondents in the two districts did not perceive the uninsured to be treated better 
than the insured. From table 9, about 85% of the insured and 86% of the uninsured perceived 
that the uninsured was not treated better compared to the insured (p-value = 0.841). In the 
districts, the same observation was made for insured and uninsured outpatients in Builsa 
(0.461) and between insured and uninsured inpatients (p-value = 0.352) in Bolgatanga. But a 
significant difference was seen between insured and uninsured outpatients in Bolgatanga, 
given a p-value of 0.051. Approximately 83.33% of insured outpatients compared to about 
66.67% of the uninsured outpatients view the uninsured to be treated better than the insured. 
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Table 9: Perception of uninsured being treated better than insured clients by health 
care providers 
Is 
uninsu
red 
treated 
better? 
Bolgatanga municipality Builsa district Total 
Inpatients Outpatients Outpatients 
Insured Uninsure
d 
 Insured Uninsure
d 
 Insured Uninsure
d 
 Insured Uninsure
d 
 
Fr
eq 
% Fr
eq 
% P-
value* 
Fr
eq 
% Fr
eq 
% P-
value* 
Fr
eq 
% Fr
eq 
% P-
value* 
Fr
eq 
% Fr
eq 
% P-
value* 
Yes 2 16.
67 
3 33.
33 
0.352 10 83.
33 
6 66.
67 
0.051 3      6 5 10 0.461 15 15 14 14 0.841 
No 13 34.
12 
28 68.
29 
25 65.
79 
13 31.
71 
47    94 45 90 85 85 86 86 
Total 15 30 31 62 35 70 19 38 50 10
0 
50 10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
*Chi-square test to compare proportions for insured and uninsured respondents 
 
3.1.4. Actual experience of respondents at the health facilities 
The study also examined the actual experience of respondents at the facilities through the use 
of physical examination by providers, amount of time spent at the facilities seeking health 
service and direct OOP payments. 
 
3.1.4.1. Physical examination of insured and uninsured 
clients 
Table 10 consist of the responses on whether respondents had been physically examined in 
the consultation room by providers. Except for the insured and uninsured outpatients in the 
Bolgatanga municipality (p-value = 0.263), the rest of the results indicated a significant 
difference between the responses for the two groups. More of the uninsured reported having 
been physically examined than the insured. About 94% of the uninsured outpatients in the 
Builsa district responded “yes” to being physically examined by providers compared to 78% 
of the insured outpatients (p-value = 0.021). This pattern was also observed for the total 
responses between the two groups, where 81% of the uninsured reported having been 
physically examined compared to 68% of the insured respondents (p-value = 0.035). 
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Table 10: Physical examination by health care provider 
Physicall
y 
examine
d? 
Bolgatanga municipality Builsa district Total 
Inpatients Outpatients Outpatients 
Insured Uninsure
d 
 Insured Uninsure
d 
 Insured Uninsure
d 
 Insured Uninsure
d 
 
Fr
eq 
% Fr
eq 
% P-
value* 
Fr
eq 
% Fr
eq 
% P-
value* 
Fr
eq 
% Fr
eq 
% P-
value* 
Fr
eq 
% Fr
eq 
% P-
value* 
Yes 12 41.
38 
23 67.
65 
0.040 17 58.
62 
11 32.
35 
0.263 39    78  47 94 0.021 68 68 81 81 0.035 
No 3 14.
29 
8 50 18 85.
71 
8 50 11    22   3 6 32 32 19 19 
Total 15 30 31 62 35 70 19 38 50 10
0 
50 10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
*Chi-square test for comparing proportions for insured and uninsured respondents 
 
3.1.4.2. Time spent at the health facility 
Time spent at the facilities by respondents is captured in table 11. The overall result from the 
two districts showed a difference (p-value = 0.0274) in time spent by the insured and 
uninsured outpatient respondents. The insured outpatients spent a mean time of 236.8 minutes 
while the uninsured outpatient respondents spent a mean time of 203.0 minutes seeking 
health services. A similar observation was made in the Builsa district, where the insured 
outpatient respondents spent a significant mean time of 238.1 minutes seeking health care 
likened to a mean time of 199.6 minutes spent by the uninsured (p-value = 0.0096). No mean 
time difference was observed for insured and uninsured inpatients (p-value = 0.0890) and 
outpatients (p-value = 0.5238) in the Bolgatanga municipality.  
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Table 11: Time spent at the health facility 
Bolgatanga 
municipality 
             Inpatient (days)              Outpatient (minutes) 
 Obs Mean Std dev P-value Obs Mean Std dev P-value 
Insured 15 2.533333 1.302013  
0.0890 
35 234.8857 122.8059  
0.5238 Uninsured 31 3.677419 2.371878 19 212.1053 127.7684 
Builsa district Insured - - -  
- 
50 238.1 47.92607  
0.0096 Uninsured - - - 50 199.56 91.35894 
Total Insured 15 2.533333    1.302013  
0.0890 
85 236.7765    86.2944  
0.0274 Uninsured 31 3.677419 2.371878 69 203.0145 101.8208 
*t-test to compare mean time spent by insured and uninsured respondents 
 
3.1.4.3. Direct payments for health services 
The uninsured and some insured patients made direct OOP payments at the facilities for 
drugs and services. Table 12 is a compilation of these payments. The mean OOP payments 
for insured (8) and uninsured respondents (50) in Bolgatanga was GH¢ 7.625 (USD 5.37) 
and GH¢ 23.74 (USD 16.63) respectively (regardless of patient type). Also, the mean OOP 
payments for inpatients (35) and outpatients (23) in the municipality was GH¢ 24.91429 
(USD* 17.545) and GH¢21.24685 (USD* 14.962) in the given order (irrespective of 
insurance status). Uninsured outpatient respondents in Builsa district made a mean OOP 
payments of GH¢23.5 (USD 17.96) for health services. But insured outpatient respondents 
made no OOP payments in th  district. The overall result from the two districts showed a 
mean OOP payment of GH¢23.62 (USD*16.63) for the uninsured (100) and GH¢7.625 
(USD*5.37) for the insured (8). 
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Table 12: Payments for drugs and services by respondents 
 
Bolgatanga 
municipality 
 Obs Mean 
(GH) 
Std dev 
(GH) 
  Insurance status not 
considered 
Obs Mean 
(GH) 
Std dev 
(GH) 
Insured 8 7.625 9.164177 Inpatient 35 24.91429 12.97593 
Uninsured 50 23.74 11.34579 Outpatient 23 16.34783 9.398301 
Builsa district Insured - - - Inpatient - - - 
Uninsured 50 23.5 14.16124 Outpatient 50 23.5 14.16124 
Total Insured 8 7.625 9.164177 Inpatient 35 24.91429    12.97593 
Uninsured 100 23.62 12.76658 Outpatient 73 21.24658 13.21592 
*Exchange rate: GH¢1 .42 = USD 1 
 
3.1.5. Conclusion 
The results of the exit survey suggest no difference in perception on respondents’ satisfaction 
with health care provision and differential treatment among the two groups. The insured and 
uninsured indicated that they were satisfied with the health care given and that no group was 
treated better than the other by providers. But a difference in perception of waiting times for 
the two groups was observed in Builsa and for the overall result. The insured perceived 
waiting times to be long while the uninsured think waiting times were ok. 
 
The findings on respondents’ actual experience in the facilities showed a significant 
difference for the two groups for the combined results and in Builsa as well. More of the 
uninsured reported having been physically examined than the insured. The insured also spent 
more time at the facilities than the uninsured. The overall mean for direct OOP payments for 
the uninsured was GH¢23.62 (USD*16.63). Some insured (8) in the Bolgatanga municipality 
also made direct OOP payments for health services (mean of GH¢7.625 (USD*5.37). 
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3.2. Results from the FGDs and in-depth interviews 
 
3.2.1. Health care providers’ views about the NHIS 
Health care providers in the two districts indicated that the NHIS made health services 
accessible to the insured without any payment at the point of consumption. This was reflected 
in the high attendance by the insured. They attested to a phenomenal increase in attendance 
compared to the period when the NHIS was not in operation.  
 
The NHIS assisted in health care delivery. The insured are able to access health services all 
the time (In-depth interview, hospital accountant-Bolgatanga). 
 
The NHIS also enabled providers to get funds in bulk to carry out their operations and 
undertake minor infrastructural developments in their facilities. However, there was the 
problem of delay in reimbursement. Providers were not paid for over six (6) months in both 
districts.   
 
For almost six (6) months, the insurance has not paid the hospital (In-depth interview, 
hospital administrator-Builsa).           
 
The main reason for the delay in payment was the inability of the National Health Insurance 
Authority (NHIA) to provide funds for payment.  
 
The insurance office is telling us that they are still waiting for money from Accra (the 
nation’s capital) in order to pay us (In-depth interview, hospital administrator-Bolgatanga). 
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Providers reported that inadequate and incompetent staff in the facilities responsible for the 
submission of claims to the DMHIS could also cause delays in the payment. For instance, 
some staff lacked knowledge of the computer software used for submitting claims to the 
DMHIS. Contentious claims between the facilities and the DMHIS could result in delays as 
well. 
 
On several occasions, we providers and the DMHIS have disagreed on submitted claims (In-
depth interview, hospital accountant-Bolgatnga). 
 
Due to the delay in reimbursement, providers were unable to procure drug and non-drug 
supplies.  
 
The delay affects our work, because if you don’t have the logistics to work with.....tell me, 
assuming that you have run out of drugs, they have not paid you, where will you get the 
money to buy the drugs? (In-depth interview, hospital administrator-Builsa).   
 
Providers were compelled to issue prescriptions for clients to buy drugs out of the facilities. 
The facilities were not also able to pay casual employees, for example, cleaners, whose 
names were not on government’s payroll. These type of employees are usually paid from 
Internally Generated Funds (IGFs) mobilized by the facilities.  
 
3.2.2. Health care providers’ views about insured clients 
Providers in both districts thought that there was an increased attendance by insured clients, 
which some visits were unnecessary. Providers claimed that some insured clients could visit 
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the facilities for over 5 or 6 times within a week/month or visit different facilities on different 
days conservatively for the same condition without taking the drugs prescribed.  
 
Some people can come to the hospital ten times in a week. There is an abuse (In-depth 
interview, hospital accountant-Bolgatanga). 
 
Besides, some insured clients could fake themselves as being ill to collect drugs from 
facilities for their uninsured relatives and friends. This could only be revealed if they 
(“supposed patients”) were required to take an instant treatment, like an injection.  
 
Some of the insured come here pretending to be ill so that they can collect drugs for their sick 
relatives (In-depth interview, medical doctor-Bolgatanga).  
 
Furthermore, some insured clients also hire out their insurance IDs for a fee to some 
uninsured patients to come to the hospital for treatment.  
 
Some insured clients do give their insurance cards to some uninsured patients to come to the 
hospital. There are some cases where a fee is charged in order that an insurance card can be 
used by an uninsured person (In-depth interview, medical doctor-Builsa). 
 
As a result of the high attendance, a lot of workload pressure was generated for providers. 
The staff experience long working hours with little or no break times.  
 
....in some days when the attendance is so high, we could work here from morning to very late 
in the evening without any break (In-depth interview, senior nurse-Builsa). 
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Their salaries and allowances have not been upgraded to commensurate with these loads of 
work. Providers then suggested for a form of compensation either by increasing their salaries 
or allowances.  
 
Government has to find a way of motivating us to work (In-depth interview, hospital 
administrator-Bolgatanga). 
 
3.2.3. Health care providers’ views about uninsured clients 
The interviews with providers further revealed that few of the uninsured were visiting the 
facilities and that it was mostly the core poor who could not afford registration with the 
NHIS.  
 
We have realized that with the uninsured, unless they are seriously ill they don’t report early 
to the facilities. Some of them just come to die (In-depth interview, medical doctor-Builsa). 
 
Secondly, the insurance had made the cost of services to rise and hence a challenge for the 
uninsured to access services. The uninsured pay the same service charges as agreed by the 
NHIS for paying its providers.  
 
Persons who are not registered with the insurance will have to pay the same cost for a 
service as agreed by the NHIS which is quite high for them (In-depth interview, surgical 
nurse-Bolgatanga). 
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On preferential treatment for uninsured, providers stated that they did not prefer the 
uninsured to the insured. However, providers reported that it was possible for some of them 
to prefer payment that would be instant to enable them run the facilities, since they were not 
paid for a very long time by the NHIS. So if there was any preference for the uninsured, it 
was because they would make cash payment to the facilities.  
 
Some facilities in the South of the country have turned away people who are insured. It is true 
that some facilities and pharmacies would prefer people who will pay in cash to those with 
insurance, due to the delay in reimbursement (In-depth interview, hospital accountant-
Bolgatanga). 
 
3.2.4. Insurance managers’ views about the NHIS 
Insurance managers think that the NHIS is one of the best social interventions that enabled 
clients to have access to health services as and when needed.  
 
As at now, insured members are accessing health service without the problem of having to 
pay at the point of use (In-depth interview, insurance manager-Builsa). 
 
3.2.5. Insurance managers’ views about health care providers 
Insurance managers reported that providers were happy with the operations of the NHIS, if 
they were paid early. However, the delay in reimbursement does not make them happy.  
 
If we pay our providers early, they are happy (In-depth interview, insurance manager-
Bolgatanga). 
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Managers said they had completed the necessary procedure for reimbursement and were only 
waiting for funds from the NHIA. The NHIA was yet to make funds available for payments. 
 
We here have finalized everything; we are now waiting for funds from Accra (the NHIA) (In-
depth interview, insurance claims manager-Builsa).   
 
Inadequate number of staff on the part of the DMHIS for the vetting of claims was sometimes 
responsible for the delay in payment of providers.  
 
We have only one claims officer for the whole municipality. It is difficult vetting all the claims 
that come in good time (In-depth interview, insurance manager-Bolgatanga).  
 
Some providers were perceived by the managers to put up bad attitude towards clients of the 
NHIS. For instance, providers could make some insured clients to spend a whole day seeking 
health service through delays at the facilities. Some providers could also shout at insured 
clients without any provocation.  
 
Some attitudes of our providers are not good. Some could shout at our clients for no apparent 
reason. Indeed, they (providers) could tell them (insured) that they frequent the facility too 
much with minor complaints (In-depth interview, insurance manager-Bolgatanga).  
 
Managers added that these complaints were usually discussed during their quarterly meetings 
with providers or when emergency meetings were held. 
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3.2.6. Insurance managers’ views about insured members 
Managers saw insured clients to be happy with the operations of the NHIS. Insured clients, 
for instance, were able to access “free” health services with their valid insurance ID cards at 
any time.  
 
Generally, people are happy with the insurance because they don’t have to wait till their 
sicknesses get worse before they attend the facilities (In-depth interview, insurance manager-
Builsa). 
 
But some insured clients tend to abuse the services offered under the NHIS. Managers stated 
that they do come across instances of insured clients attending different facilities for the same 
illness within a given period. The multiple attendance increases the indebtedness of the NHIS 
to providers. 
 
 During the vetting, it is very common to see our clients utilizing different facilities with the 
same condition within a given short period (In-depth interview, insurance manager-
Bolgatanga).  
 
Under the NHIS, insured clients were allowed to attend any accredited facility of their choice 
within the district. They (insured) could even attend facilities in other districts with a transfer 
letter from the DMHIS where they were registered.  
 
On what to do to help curb these problems, the managers declared that they were finding 
ways of educating their clients.  
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I think that with the right education, these issues (abuse of services) can be brought to a 
minimal (In-depth interview, insurance manager-Bolgatanga). 
 
3.2.7. Insured clients’ views about the NHIS 
The insured discussants all agreed that the NHIS was very useful. It made access to health 
service very easy. This was due to the fact that one was not required to pay for services at the 
point of consumption.  
 
It is good because we in this community are farmers and poor, when you are sick, at once you 
cannot sell a fowl to be able to go to the hospital. But with the insurance, we are safe now 
(FGD, insured men-Builsa). 
 
But the insured clients were not happy with high premium payment for registration, the delay 
in processing the insurance ID cards after registration, and the yearly renewal of the ID cards.  
 
........ you have to register (with the DMHIS) which is very high, but there are no jobs for us 
to get money (FGD, insured men-Bolgatanga). 
 
3.2.8. Insured clients’ views about health care providers 
Most insured clients in both districts perceived that providers were discriminatory against 
them in terms of verbal attacks for no reason, long waiting times for obtaining their hospital 
folders and that of drugs, and the issuance of prescription forms to buy drugs outside the 
facilities. 
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Some of the staff are too discriminatory. When you come without insurance, very quickly they 
will attend to you (FGD, insured men-Builsa).  
 
Furthermore, some insured discussants thought that providers did not take their time to 
physically examine them (insured) before prescribing drugs for them.  
 
....after my complaints, the doctor just wrote some drugs for me, he did not touch any part of 
my body (FGD, insured women-Builsa). 
 
It was also reported by the insured that providers tend to give preferential treatment to the 
rich, who were well dressed and attended the facilities in cars. They (insured) contended that 
the rich were attended to quickly than the poor, but discussants did not indicate whether these 
rich people were insured or uninsured clients.  
 
They have their own people who are well dressed and good looking, but not poor people like 
me (FGD, insured women-Builsa).  
 
The insured therefore concluded that it was because they were not making instant payment 
for health services, they were being discriminated against by the providers. 
 
3.2.9. Uninsured clients’ views about the NHIS 
The uninsured clients also recognized the usefulness of the NHIS. They reported that they 
had seen insured clients accessing health services without any payment, even with free 
feeding for those hospitalized.  
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The insurance helps in the sense that when you are admitted in the hospital it is free, you get 
everything for free, even the food and the bed free (FGD, uninsured men-Bolgatanga).  
 
But the uninsured clients thought that the premium payment was high for them and hence 
they were unable to register with the NHIS.  
 
Most of us in this community are farmers, with our income being unreliable. It is very 
difficult getting that amount of money to join the insurance (FGD, uninsured women-
Bolgatanga). 
 
They (uninsured) advanced other problems of the NHIS which included; the delay in getting 
the insurance ID cards after registration and their yearly renewal.  
 
The bad aspect of the insurance is the period it takes for one to receive his card after 
registration and the renewal as well. It takes several months (FGD, uninsured men-Builsa).  
 
Perceived limited benefit package and unreliable insurance agents contracted by the NHIS to 
help register members were other issues that the uninsured were not happy with in both 
districts. The insurance agents were accused of causing delays in the processing of the ID 
cards. The above issues therefore did not motivate them (uninsured) to subscribe to the NHIS.  
 
The uninsured clients viewed the NHIS as being responsible for the increased cost associated 
with health services. Health services were not so expensive when the NHIS was not in 
operation. The new increased charges implemented by the NHIS for payment to providers for 
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their diagnosis and treatment were the same charges that the uninsured would have to pay 
when they visit the facilities.   
 
These days when you are admitted in the hospital for only 2 to 3 days, they may charge you 
an amount of GH¢ 300 to GH¢ 400 (US $ 263.15 to US $ 350.88). It wasn’t like that (FGD, 
uninsured women-Builsa). 
 
3.2.10. Uninsured clients’ views about health care providers 
The uninsured reported that they could not utilize the facilities like the insured. The main 
reason was the high charges for health services under the NHIS. So they have resorted to the 
use of local herbs and to buying drugs from drug stores for treatment at home.  
 
It doesn’t mean we don’t want to attend the hospital. It is because we don’t have the money. 
But if you see that you can get to the drugs store and get yourself some drugs, it will help 
(FGD, uninsured women-Bolgatanga). 
 
Again the uninsured thought that providers discriminated against the insured. This was done 
by making them experience delays when they (insured) come for their hospital folders 
(records) and prescribing drugs that cannot be obtained at the pharmacy shops, as well as 
providing low quality drugs for them 
 
Sometime, people even complain to my hearing that if you don’t have insurance, it is better. If 
you go to the hospital with your own money, they (providers) give you special attention than 
when you have the insurance card (FGD, uninsured men-Builsa). 
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3.2. Conclusion 
Providers perceived the NHIS to have promoted access and enabled them to obtain funds in 
bulk for their operations. But there was a delay in reimbursement. The NHIA had not yet 
made funds available for their payment. Other reasons which providers thought could cause 
delays in reimbursement was the inadequate and incompetent staff responsible for vetting and 
submission of claims for both the facilities and the DMHIS, and disagreements over 
submitted claims between the two parties (facilities and the DMHIS). The delay in payment 
made providers not to be able to procure drugs and non-drug supplies. They (providers) 
resorted to issuing prescription forms for clients to buy drugs outside the facilities. Casual 
workers in the facilities could not also be paid as a result of the delay in payment.  Providers 
saw an increased in attendance by insured clients, but some visits were unnecessary. The 
increased attendance by the insured generated lots of workload for providers, but their 
salaries and allowances were not upgraded to compensate them. Providers observed that the 
uninsured were not utilizing the facilities due to the increased cost of health services under 
the NHIS. Providers also reported that they do not prefer the uninsured to the insured, but the 
delay in payment could make some of them to do that. 
 
The NHIS managers at the district level considered the NHIS to be one of the best social 
interventions for health services. Managers said providers were pleased with the NHIS, 
except the delay in reimbursement. In addition, managers reported that the insured were also 
pleased with the NHIS, but some of them were abusing the services under the NHIS. 
 
The views of the insured showed that they were equally happy with the NHIS, given the fact 
that they were able to access health services without immediate payment. However, high 
premiums, delays in the processing of insurance ID cards, their yearly renewal were some of 
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the issues they were not happy with. The insured viewed providers to be discriminatory 
against them by verbally abusing them, causing delays for them, issuing prescription forms 
for them to obtain drugs outside the facilities, and not physically examining them. 
Furthermore, the insured perceived providers were giving preferential treatment to the 
uninsured and the affluent. The insured think they experience these behaviours by providers 
because they were not making instant payments for services.  
 
The uninsured too perceived the NHIS to be beneficial for registered clients. They had seen 
the insured accessing health services without payment for them. But the uninsured saw 
premiums payments for the NHIS to be high. Other problems of the NHIS enumerated by the 
uninsured were the delays in getting insurance ID cards when registering, the annual renewal 
of the cards, and a limited benefit package. The uninsured also think that the cost of health 
services had risen in the era of the NHIS and hence could not utilize the facilities. Some of 
them reported that they resorted to treating at home.  Furthermore, providers were perceived 
by the uninsured to discriminate against the insured by causing long waiting times for them, 
prescribing low quality drugs and drugs that cannot be obtained in the facilities.  
 
The results therefore showed providers and managers perceiving the insured to be abusing the 
services under the NHIS. The insured and uninsured on the other hand thought that the 
insured was verbally abused, experienced long waiting times and discrimination as a result of 
the fact that they were not making instant payments for services. 
 
4.0. DISCUSSION 
The study found that the NHIS was working, promoting access for the insured and mobilizing 
revenue for providers. Both the insured and uninsured were satisfied with care provided. 
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However, most insured clients had reported long waiting times, verbal abuse, not being 
physically examined and discrimination. Providers perceived that the insured were abusing 
their services and generating lots of workloads for them. The uninsured were found not to be 
utilizing the facilities.  
 
The study answered the study question by uncovering the fact that the delay in 
reimbursement and the perceived opportunistic behaviour of the insured by providers was 
responsible for the differences in the behaviour of providers towards the insured and 
uninsured. The remaining unanswered question arising from the study was why the general 
dissatisfaction with health services delivery under the NHIS. Further investigation is required 
in this direction. 
 
4.1. Views about utilization of health services under the NHIS 
Managers and providers said utilization rates for health services for insured clients had 
increased more than twofold. The finding was confirmed by baseline and endline studies on 
the NHIS. The studies found an increase in utilization of health services from 37% in 2004 to 
70% in 2008 under the NHIS [20]. Similarly, the Ministry of Health reported that the use of 
outpatient and inpatient services under the NHIS almost doubled between 2005 and 
September 2007 [26]. The finding on increased utilization could be explained by some unmet 
health care needs prior to the introduction of the NHIS, especially when the “cash and carry” 
was in operation.  It could also be explained by an abuse on the part of insured clients. 
 
However, managers and providers indicated that there was a delay in reimbursement by the 
NHIS. Providers had not been paid for almost six (6) months and this was affecting the 
delivery of services to clients of the NHIS. Various news items had been put up by 
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Ghanaweb.com in Ghana showing some providers refusing to offer services to some insured 
clients unless they were ready to make instant payments. For instance, it was reported by the 
Ghana News Agency that the Ho Municipal Hospital had turned away insured clients unless 
they were ready to pay for the services [27].  
 
This finding of the delay in reimbursement by the NHIA is one of the underlying reasons for 
the differences in the behaviour of providers towards the insured and uninsured. It requires 
action by policy makers to address the issue in order to promote the sustainability of the 
NHIS and to attain universal coverage as well. 
 
4.2. Satisfaction with health care provided 
The results from the exit interviews showed that the insured and uninsured in both districts 
were satisfied with health care provision under the NHIS.  However, the FGDs with 
community members revealed that the insured were less satisfied with the provision of health 
care. This finding underscores the fact that some consumers of health services, especially the 
insured are not happy with the services rendered them in the era of the NHIS. This requires 
further investigation as to why there is dissatisfaction with service delivery which this study 
failed to address. The NHIA should also endeavour to provide monitoring and evaluation of 
the services provided by providers to ensure confidence and satisfaction.  
 
4.3. Perception of waiting times and actual time spent at the health facility 
Findings for the exit survey for the two districts and that of Builsa alone revealed that the 
insured perceived waiting times to be long. The same trend was observed when the actual 
time spent at the facilities was determined for both insured and uninsured. Insured outpatients 
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spent more time in the facilities than the uninsured. This was further confirmed by the in-
depth interviews and FGDs held with providers and community members respectively. The 
reason for the difference in waiting times between the two districts could be attributed to the 
availability of more medical staff in Bolgatanga than in Builsa. For instance, the Bolgatanga 
Regional hospital had 5 medical doctors, while Builsa had just one.  But the core reason for 
the long waiting times for insured clients in both districts had been revealed by the study. 
Providers stated that it was due to the processes that the insured goes through in terms of 
documentation, and given their high attendance rates, waiting times were quite high for them. 
The finding of long waiting times for the insured is in consonance with what De Allegri et al 
discovered, that insured respondents with a Mutual Health Insurance Scheme in Burkina Faso 
complained of long waiting times when accessing health services [28]. 
 
It would therefore be appropriate if the NHIS or policy makers are able to put measures in 
place to reduce the documentation process for the insured and help bring down their waiting 
times.   
 
4.4. Perceived differences in treatment of insured and uninsured clients 
The exit survey results revealed no difference in perception of differential treatment for either 
the insured or uninsured. However, the FGDs showed differences in perception of differential 
treatment which was in favour of the uninsured and affluent. The finding is in line with what 
De Allegri et al had in Burkina Faso. The insured and uninsured were not happy with 
differences in treatment based on patients’ socio-economic status [28]. Similarly, Arhinful 
found respondents doubting whether with the introduction of a Community-based Health 
Insurance, providers would sincerely give equal treatment to clients. It was perceived that the 
uninsured and affluent may pay bribes and get preferential treatment from nurses [10].  
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The study however, could not substantiate this finding due to the fact that it had not collected 
data on the socio-economic status of respondents to make a comparison with their 
perceptions. This therefore requires further enquiry. 
 
4.5. Physical examination of insured and uninsured clients 
Overall, the findings from the exit survey proved that more of the uninsured than the insured 
reported having been physically examined by providers. The FGDs also confirmed the exit 
survey. This could be explained by the high attendance of the insured, creating more pressure 
on providers, thus making physical examination a time-consuming exercise. With this 
finding, it is required that a continuous monitoring of the provision of health services is 
undertaken to ensure that services rendered to insured clients are of the required standard. 
This is due to the fact that the finding runs contrarily to what Bassili et al found in Egypt, a 
similar setting. Insured children had a significantly higher frequency of physical examination, 
investigations and diabetes education compared to their uninsured counterparts [29]. 
 
4.6. Direct payments for health services 
The overall mean for direct OOP payments for drugs and services for the uninsured was 
GH¢23.62 (USD16.63). Proportionally, the payment would be 1.2% to the average annual 
household expenditure of GH¢ 1,918.00 (USD 1,350) in Ghana [30]. Indirect costs was not 
included, but are known to be quite significant when seeking health services in Ghana [31]. A 
direct cost of GH¢23.62 (USD16.63) for one episode of illness could therefore be considered 
high. Besides, the FGDs showed that most of the uninsured were the poorest and hence that 
payment would have a significant negative impact on them. In fact, the literature on health 
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insurance in Africa have shown that the poorest were not represented among the insured 
[28,32,33], and could adversely be affected by direct OOP payments. Special efforts were 
required to include this class of people. It must be stated here that the insured who made OOP 
payments were for services or drugs not covered by the benefit package of the NHIS. 
 
4.7. Limitations of the study 
The study was conducted in only two of Ghana’s 145 districts, which may limit the 
generalizability of the results. In addition, the study was carried out in two public facilities, 
despite the visible existence of the private sector. About 1,277 private health facilities have 
been accredited, providing about 10% of health services [34]. This therefore affects the 
representativeness of the facilities surveyed. A study in only two public facilities would not 
be enough to represent both the public and private facilities.  
 
Also, the inclusion of inpatients in the Bolgatanga municipality to make up for the required 
number of respondent introduces a weakness in the sampling strategy for the quantitative 
aspect of the study. This limits the consistency of the analysis (as planned initially to compare 
insured and uninsured outpatients). Besides, it does not permit comparison to be made 
between the two districts, as it is inappropriate to compare the results of outpatients and 
inpatients as they receive different types of health services. Lastly, it restricts the conclusions 
that can be made about the results from the two districts. Hence the interpretation of the 
results should be made with caution. 
 
In addition, non-medical costs such as cost of meals, transportation, etc, were not considered 
by the study and hence the cost captured here would be an under-estimation of the total OOP 
payments.  
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4.8. Further research 
There is the need for further research to cover a lot more of the districts and in more public 
and private facilities to help determine the influence of the NHIS on the behaviour of 
providers. It would particularly be interesting to study the behaviour of providers in the 
private sector since they are profit-oriented. Further research should also be carried out to 
determine if non-medical costs in terms of transportation, meals, etc, affect health seeking 
among the population, apart from removing payments at the point of service use. 
 
4.9. Policy recommendations 
The immediate policy required would be on the issue of the delay in reimbursement by the 
NHIS. There is an urgent need for action to streamline the reimbursement procedure in order 
to maintain providers’ confidence in the NHIS. Central government and the management of 
the NHIA should search for an effective and permanent way of addressing the issue, if not the 
success and sustainability of the NHIS would be affected.  
 
Another issue is the high cost of health services in the era of the NHIS. The introduction of 
the new tariff in April 2008 (Ghana Diagnostic Related Groupings) has led to an increase in 
the cost of health services [16]. This has affected the utilization of health services by the 
uninsured. Other issues included high premium payment leading to the exclusion of the 
poorest, long waiting periods for the issuance of insurance ID cards, required annual renewal 
of the ID cards, limited benefit package, and issuance of prescription forms for clients to buy 
drugs out of the facilities. The unacceptable behaviour of some insurance agents contracted 
by the NHIS to register members was another challenge. The above problems require action 
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to ensure the success of the NHIS in providing health services to the population, particularly 
mapping out strategies to include the very poor, in order to attain universal coverage. On the 
part of the facilities, more professional staff are required. The staff should also be motivated 
to carry out their duties efficiently due to the heavy workloads. 
 
5.0. CONCLUSION 
 The study set out to examine the behaviour of providers under the NHIS. This was achieved 
by assessing the views of providers, insurance managers, and insured and uninsured clients. 
The findings demonstrated that the NHIS was seen by all participants of the study to be 
beneficial. It led to an increase in the utilization of health services for the insured and 
mobilized health resources for facilities. The insured and uninsured were satisfied with the 
care given them, according to the exit survey. However, most insured clients reported verbal 
abuse, long waiting times, not being physically examined and discrimination in favour of the 
uninsured and the rich. Providers also think that the insured were abusing their services by 
frequenting the facilities, and sometimes faking illness to collect drugs for their uninsured 
relatives. This has affected significantly the behaviour of providers towards the insured. 
 
One of the biggest challenges was the delay in reimbursement. Managers and providers 
agreed that the NHIA had not reimbursed providers for almost six (6) months. As a result, 
providers were not able to purchase drugs and non-drug supplies and hence were prescribing 
drugs for the insured especially, to purchase outside the facilities. The delay also affected 
providers’ ability to pay their casual employees who were not on government’s payroll. This 
again, influenced the behaviour of providers where some of them preferred clients who would 
make instant payments for care. 
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The study showed that both insured and uninsured perceive differences in the behaviour of 
providers towards insured and uninsured clients. Providers’ perception of the opportunistic 
behaviour of the insured and the delay in reimbursement was responsible for the differences 
in their behaviour towards the insured and uninsured.       
 
 
                                                                                                        {Word count: 9113 words}
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FGDs                         Focus Group Discussions 
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Figures 
Figure 1  ‐ Sample figure title 
Figure legend text 
Figure 2  ‐ Another sample figure title 
Figure legend text. 
Tables 
Table 1  ‐ Sample table title 
Table legend text. 
Table 2  ‐ Another sample table title 
Table legend text. 
Additional files 
Additional file 1 – Sample additional file title 
Additional file descriptions text (including details of how to view the file, if it is in a non‐standard format). 
Additional file 2 – Another sample additional file title 
Additional file descriptions text (including details of how to view the file, if it is in a non‐standard format). 
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Appendix 3: Instruction to Authors 
BMC Health Services Research is an open access journal publishing original peer‐reviewed research 
articles in all aspects of health services research, including delivery of care, management of health 
services, assessment of healthcare needs, measurement of outcomes, allocation of healthcare resources, 
evaluation of different health markets and health services organizations, international comparative 
analysis of health systems, health economics and the impact of health policies and regulations. 
Preparing main manuscript text  
File formats  
 
The following word processor file formats are acceptable for the main manuscript document:  
 Microsoft Word (version 2 and above)  
 Rich text format (RTF)  
 Portable document format (PDF)  
 TeX/LaTeX (use BioMed Central's TeX template)  
 DeVice Independent format (DVI)  
 Publicon Document (NB)  
Users of other word processing packages should save or convert their files to RTF before 
uploading. Many free tools are available which ease this process. 
TeX/LaTeX users: We recommend using BioMed Central's TeX template and BibTeX stylefile. If 
you use this standard format, you can submit your manuscript in TeX format (after you submit 
your TEX file, you will be prompted to submit your BBL file). If you have used another template 
for your manuscript, or if you do not wish to use BibTeX, then please submit your manuscript as a 
DVI file. We do not recommend converting to RTF.  
Note that figures must be submitted as separate image files, not as part of the submitted DOC/ 
PDF/TEX/DVI file.  
Article types  
When submitting your manuscript, you will be asked to assign one of the following types to your article:  
Research article  
Case report  
Database  
Debate  
Software  
Study protocol  
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Technical advance  
Please read the descriptions of each of the article types, choose which is appropriate for your 
article and structure it accordingly. If in doubt, your manuscript should be classified as a Research 
article, the structure for which is described below.  
Manuscript sections for Research articles  
 
Manuscripts for Research articles submitted to BMC Health Services Research should be divided 
into the following sections:  
 Title page  
 Abstract  
 Background  
 Methods  
 Results  
 Discussion  
 Conclusions  
 List of abbreviations used (if any)  
 Competing interests  
 Authors' contributions  
 Authors' information (if any)  
 Acknowledgements  
 References  
 Figure legends (if any)  
 Tables and captions (if any)  
 Description of additional data files (if any)  
You can download a template (compatible with Mac and Windows Word 97/98/2000/2003/2007) 
for your article. For instructions on use, see below.  
The Accession Numbers of any nucleic acid sequences, protein sequences or atomic coordinates 
cited in the manuscript should be provided, in square brackets and include the corresponding 
database name; for example, [EMBL:AB026295, EMBL:AC137000, DDBJ:AE000812, 
GenBank:U49845, PDB:1BFM, Swiss-Prot:Q96KQ7, PIR:S66116]. 
The databases for which we can provide direct links are: EMBL Nucleotide Sequence Database 
(EMBL), DNA Data Bank of Japan (DDBJ ), GenBank at the NCBI (GenBank), Protein Data 
Bank (PDB), Protein Information Resource (PIR) and the Swiss-Prot Protein Database (Swiss-
Prot). 
Title page  
This should list the title of the article. The title should include the study design, for example:  
A versus B in the treatment of C: a randomized controlled trial  
X is a risk factor for Y: a case control study
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The full names, institutional addresses, and e-mail addresses for all authors must be included on 
the title page. The corresponding author should also be indicated.  
 
Abstract  
 
The abstract of the manuscript should not exceed 350 words and must be structured into separate 
sections: Background, the context and purpose of the study; Methods, how the study was 
performed and statistical tests used; Results, the main findings; Conclusions, brief summary and 
potential implications. Please minimize the use of abbreviations and do not cite references in the 
abstract; Trial registration, if your research article reports the results of a controlled health care 
intervention, please list your trial registry, along with the unique identifying number, e.g. Trial 
registration: Current Controlled Trials ISRCTN73824458. Please note that there should be no 
space between the letters and numbers of your trial registration number.  
Background  
 
The background section should be written from the standpoint of researchers without specialist 
knowledge in that area and must clearly state - and, if helpful, illustrate - the background to the 
research and its aims. Reports of clinical research should, where appropriate, include a summary 
of a search of the literature to indicate why this study was necessary and what it aimed to 
contribute to the field. The section should end with a very brief statement of what is being 
reported in the article.  
Methods  
 
This should include the design of the study, the setting, the type of participants or materials 
involved, a clear description of all interventions and comparisons, and the type of analysis used, 
including a power calculation if appropriate.  
Results and Discussion  
 
The Results and Discussion may be combined into a single section or presented separately. 
Results of statistical analysis should include, where appropriate, relative and absolute risks or risk 
reductions, and confidence intervals. The results and discussion sections may also be broken into 
subsections with short, informative headings. 
Conclusions  
 
This should state clearly the main conclusions of the research and give a clear explanation of their 
importance and relevance. Summary illustrations may be included. 
List of abbreviations  
 
If abbreviations are used in the text, either they should be defined in the text where first used, or a 
list of abbreviations can be provided, which should precede the competing interests and authors' 
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contributions.  
Competing interests  
 
A competing interest exists when your interpretation of data or presentation of information may 
be influenced by your personal or financial relationship with other people or organizations. 
Authors should disclose any financial competing interests but also any non-financial competing 
interests that may cause them embarrassment were they to become public after the publication of 
the manuscript.  
Authors are required to complete a declaration of competing interests. All competing interests that 
are declared will be listed at the end of published articles. Where an author gives no competing 
interests, the listing will read 'The author(s) declare that they have no competing interests'.  
When completing your declaration, please consider the following questions:  
Financial competing interests  
 In the past five years have you received reimbursements, fees, funding, or salary from an 
organization that may in any way gain or lose financially from the publication of this manuscript, 
either now or in the future? Is such an organization financing this manuscript (including the 
article‐processing charge)? If so, please specify.  
 Do you hold any stocks or shares in an organization that may in any way gain or lose financially 
from the publication of this manuscript, either now or in the future? If so, please specify.  
 Do you hold or are you currently applying for any patents relating to the content of the 
manuscript? Have you received reimbursements, fees, funding, or salary from an organization 
that holds or has applied for patents relating to the content of the manuscript? If so, please 
specify.  
 Do you have any other financial competing interests? If so, please specify.  
Non-financial competing interests  
Are there any non-financial competing interests (political, personal, religious, ideological, 
academic, intellectual, commercial or any other) to declare in relation to this manuscript? If so, 
please specify. 
If you are unsure as to whether you or one of your co-authors has a competing interest, please 
discuss it with the editorial office.  
Authors' contributions  
 
In order to give appropriate credit to each author of a paper, the individual contributions of 
authors to the manuscript should be specified in this section. 
An "author" is generally considered to be someone who has made substantive intellectual 
contributions to a published study. To qualify as an author one should 1) have made substantial 
contributions to conception and design, or acquisition of data, or analysis and interpretation of 
data; 2) have been involved in drafting the manuscript or revising it critically for important 
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intellectual content; and 3) have given final approval of the version to be published. Each author 
should have participated sufficiently in the work to take public responsibility for appropriate 
portions of the content. Acquisition of funding, collection of data, or general supervision of the 
research group, alone, does not justify authorship. 
We suggest the following kind of format (please use initials to refer to each author's contribution): 
AB carried out the molecular genetic studies, participated in the sequence alignment and drafted 
the manuscript. JY carried out the immunoassays. MT participated in the sequence alignment. ES 
participated in the design of the study and performed the statistical analysis. FG conceived of the 
study, and participated in its design and coordination and helped to draft the manuscript. All 
authors read and approved the final manuscript. 
All contributors who do not meet the criteria for authorship should be listed in an 
acknowledgements section. Examples of those who might be acknowledged include a person who 
provided purely technical help, writing assistance, or a department chair who provided only 
general support. 
Authors' information  
 
You may choose to use this section to include any relevant information about the author(s) that 
may aid the reader’s interpretation of the article, and understand the standpoint of the author(s). 
This may include details about the authors' qualifications, current positions they hold at 
institutions or societies, or any other relevant background information. Please refer to authors 
using their initials. Note this section should not be used to describe any competing interests.  
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who was involved in drafting the manuscript or revising it critically for important intellectual 
content, but who does not meet the criteria for authorship. Please also include their source(s) of 
funding. Please also acknowledge anyone who contributed materials essential for the study. 
The role of a medical writer must be included in the acknowledgements section, including their 
source(s) of funding. 
Authors should obtain permission to acknowledge from all those mentioned in the 
Acknowledgements. 
Please list the source(s) of funding for the study, for each author, and for the manuscript 
preparation in the acknowledgements section. Authors must describe the role of the funding body, 
if any, in study design; in the collection, analysis, and interpretation of data; in the writing of the 
manuscript; and in the decision to submit the manuscript for publication.  
References  
All references must be numbered consecutively, in square brackets, in the order in which they are 
cited in the text, followed by any in tables or legends. Reference citations should not appear in 
titles or headings. Each reference must have an individual reference number. Please avoid 
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excessive referencing. If automatic numbering systems are used, the reference numbers must be 
finalized and the bibliography must be fully formatted before submission.  
Only articles and abstracts that have been published or are in press, or are available through public 
e-print/preprint servers, may be cited; unpublished abstracts, unpublished data and personal 
communications should not be included in the reference list, but may be included in the text. 
Notes/footnotes are not allowed. Obtaining permission to quote personal communications and 
unpublished data from the cited author(s) is the responsibility of the author. Journal abbreviations 
follow Index Medicus/MEDLINE. Citations in the reference list should contain all named authors, 
regardless of how many there are.  
Examples of the BMC Health Services Research reference style are shown below. Please take care 
to follow the reference style precisely; references not in the correct style may be retyped, 
necessitating tedious proofreading.  
Links  
Web links and URLs should be included in the reference list. They should be provided in full, 
including both the title of the site and the URL, in the following format: The Mouse Tumor 
Biology Database [http://tumor.informatics.jax.org/mtbwi/index.do]  
BMC Health Services Research reference style  
Style files are available for use with popular bibliographic management software: 
 BibTeX  
 EndNote style file (also suitable for Zotero users)  
 Reference Manager  
 
Article within a journal  
1. Koonin EV, Altschul SF, Bork P: BRCA1 protein products: functional motifs. Nat Genet 
1996, 13:266-267.  
 
Article within a journal supplement  
2. Orengo CA, Bray JE, Hubbard T, LoConte L, Sillitoe I: Analysis and assessment of ab initio 
three-dimensional prediction, secondary structure, and contacts prediction. Proteins 1999, 
43(Suppl 3):149-170.  
 
In press article  
3. Kharitonov SA, Barnes PJ: Clinical aspects of exhaled nitric oxide. Eur Respir J, in press.  
 
Published abstract  
4. Zvaifler NJ, Burger JA, Marinova-Mutafchieva L, Taylor P, Maini RN: Mesenchymal cells, 
stromal derived factor-1 and rheumatoid arthritis [abstract]. Arthritis Rheum 1999, 42:s250.  
Article within conference proceedings  
 
5. Jones X: Zeolites and synthetic mechanisms. In Proceedings of the First National Conference 
on Porous Sieves: 27-30 June 1996; Baltimore. Edited by Smith Y. Stoneham: Butterworth-
Heinemann; 1996:16-27.  
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Book chapter, or article within a book  
6. Schnepf E: From prey via endosymbiont to plastids: comparative studies in 
dinoflagellates. In Origins of Plastids. Volume 2. 2nd edition. Edited by Lewin RA. New York: 
Chapman and Hall; 1993:53-76.  
 
Whole issue of journal  
7. Ponder B, Johnston S, Chodosh L (Eds): Innovative oncology. In Breast Cancer Res 1998, 
10:1-72.  
 
Whole conference proceedings  
8. Smith Y (Ed): Proceedings of the First National Conference on Porous Sieves: 27-30 June 
1996; Baltimore. Stoneham: Butterworth-Heinemann; 1996.  
 
Complete book  
9. Margulis L: Origin of Eukaryotic Cells. New Haven: Yale University Press; 1970.  
 
Monograph or book in a series  
10. Hunninghake GW, Gadek JE: The alveolar macrophage. In Cultured Human Cells and 
Tissues. Edited by Harris TJR. New York: Academic Press; 1995:54-56. [Stoner G (Series 
Editor): Methods and Perspectives in Cell Biology, vol 1.]  
 
Book with institutional author  
11. Advisory Committee on Genetic Modification: Annual Report. London; 1999.  
 
PhD thesis  
12. Kohavi R: Wrappers for performance enhancement and oblivious decision graphs. PhD 
thesis. Stanford University, Computer Science Department; 1995.  
Link / URL  
 
13. The Mouse Tumor Biology Database [http://tumor.informatics.jax.org/mtbwi/index.do]  
Microsoft Word template  
Although we can accept manuscripts prepared as Microsoft Word, RTF or PDF files, we have 
designed a Microsoft Word template that can be used to generate a standard style and format for 
your article. It can be used if you have not yet started to write your paper, or if it is already written 
and needs to be put into BMC Health Services Research style. 
Preparing illustrations and figures  
Figures should be provided as separate files. Each figure should comprise only a single file. There is 
no charge for the use of color.  
Please read our figure preparation guidelines for detailed instructions on maximising the quality of 
your figures,  
Formats  
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The following file formats can be accepted:  
 EPS (preferred format for diagrams)  
 PDF (also especially suitable for diagrams)  
 PNG (preferred format for photos or images)  
 Microsoft Word (figures must be a single page)  
 PowerPoint (figures must be a single page)  
 TIFF  
 JPEG  
 BMP  
 CDX (ChemDraw)  
 TGF (ISIS/Draw)  
 
Figure legends  
The legends should be included in the main manuscript text file immediately following the 
references, rather than being a part of the figure file. For each figure, the following information 
should be provided: Figure number (in sequence, using Arabic numerals - i.e. Figure 1, 2, 3 etc); 
short title of figure (maximum 15 words); detailed legend, up to 300 words.  
Please note that it is the responsibility of the author(s) to obtain permission from the copyright 
holder to reproduce figures or tables that have previously been published elsewhere.  
Preparing tables  
Each table should be numbered in sequence using Arabic numerals (i.e. Table 1, 2, 3 etc.). Tables 
should also have a title that summarizes the whole table, maximum 15 words. Detailed legends may 
then follow, but should be concise. 
Smaller tables considered to be integral to the manuscript can be pasted into the end of the document 
text file, in portrait format (note that tables on a landscape page must be reformatted onto a portrait 
page or submitted as additional files). These will be typeset and displayed in the final published form 
of the article. Such tables should be formatted using the 'Table object' in a word processing program 
to ensure that columns of data are kept aligned when the file is sent electronically for review; this 
will not always be the case if columns are generated by simply using tabs to separate text. Commas 
should not be used to indicate numerical values. Color and shading should not be used.  
Larger datasets can be uploaded separately as additional files. Additional files will not be displayed 
in the final, published form of the article, but a link will be provided to the files as supplied by the 
author. Tabular data provided as additional files can be uploaded as an Excel spreadsheet (.xls) or 
comma separated values (.csv). As with all files, please use the standard file extensions. 
Preparing additional files  
Although BMC Health Services Research does not restrict the length and quantity of data in a paper, there 
may still be occasions where an author wishes to provide data sets, tables, movie files, or other information 
as additional information. These files can be uploaded using the 'Additional Material files' button in the 
manuscript submission process.  
The maximum file size for additional files is 20 MB each, and files will be virus-scanned on 
submission. Any additional files will be linked into the final published article in the form supplied by 
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the author, but will not be displayed within the paper. They will be made available in exactly the 
same form as originally provided. If additional material is provided, please list the following 
information in a separate section of the manuscript text, immediately following the tables (if any): 
 File name  
 File format (including name and a URL of an appropriate viewer if format is unusual)  
 Title of data  
 Description of data  
Additional data files should be referenced explicitly by file name within the body of the article, e.g. 
'See additional file 1: Movie1 for the original data used to perform this analysis'. 
Style and language  
General  
Currently, BMC Health Services Research can only accept manuscripts written in English. Spelling should be 
US English or British English, but not a mixture.  
Gene names should be in italic, but protein products should be in plain type. 
There is no explicit limit on the length of articles submitted, but authors are encouraged to be 
concise. There is no restriction on the number of figures, tables or additional files that can be 
included with each article online. Figures and tables should be sequentially referenced. Authors 
should include all relevant supporting data with each article.  
BMC Health Services Research will not edit submitted manuscripts for style or language; reviewers 
may advise rejection of a manuscript if it is compromised by grammatical errors. Authors are advised 
to write clearly and simply, and to have their article checked by colleagues before submission. In-
house copyediting will be minimal. Non-native speakers of English may choose to make use of a 
copyediting service.  
Abbreviations  
Abbreviations should be used as sparingly as possible. They can be defined when first used or a list 
of abbreviations can be provided preceding the acknowledgements and references.  
Typography  
 Please use double line spacing.  
 Type the text unjustified, without hyphenating words at line breaks.  
 Use hard returns only to end headings and paragraphs, not to rearrange lines.  
 Capitalize only the first word, and proper nouns, in the title.  
 All pages should be numbered.  
 Use the BMC Health Services Research reference format.  
 Footnotes to text should not be used.  
Greek and other special characters may be included. If you are unable to reproduce a particular special 
character, please type out the name of the symbol in full.  
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Appendix 4: Summary of data collection activities 
Objective 1 : To examine the perception of the providers about the reimbursement process 
Data/Information to be 
collected 
Data Collection method Data Issues Study Population 
Reimbursement  process. (1)Policy documents 
review 
 
(2)In-Depth Interviews 
(Semi-structured 
interviews) 
 
Help understand the 
reimbursement process.  
 
 
-Health care Providers 
in public health facilities 
from two districts. 
 
Urban district 
(Bolgatanga) 
Regional hospital: 5 
interviews; with 
Administrator, Doctor, 
Pharmacist, Accountant, 
and a Nurse. 
 
Rural district (Builsa) 
District hospital: 5 
interviews; with 
Administrator, Doctor, 
Pharmacist, Accountant 
and a Nurse. 
 
1 Interview will be held 
with the Regional health 
insurance manager of 
the region. 
2 Interviews; with the 
district health insurance 
manager in the urban 
district and the claims 
manager. 
2 Interviews; with the 
district health insurance 
manager in the rural 
district and the claims 
manager as well. 
Objective 2: Assess health care providers’ perceptions about insured and uninsured clients. 
Data/Information to be 
collected 
Data Collection method Data Issues Study Population 
Perceptions of health care 
providers about insured 
and uninsured clients. 
In-Depth Interviews 
(Semi-structured 
interviews) 
 
 
 
Help to explore 
participants perceptions 
about insured and 
uninsured clients. 
-Health care Providers 
in public health facilities 
from two districts. 
 
Urban district 
(Bolgatanga) 
Regional hospital: 5 
interviews; with 
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Administrator, Doctor, 
Pharmacist, Accountant, 
and a Nurse. 
Rural district (Builsa) 
District hospital: 5 
interviews; with 
Administrator, Doctor, 
Pharmacist, Accountant 
and a Nurse. 
Objective 3:  Assess perceptions and experience of insured and uninsured clients. 
Data/Information to be 
collected 
Data Collection method Data Issues Study Population 
Perceptions of insured and 
non-insured clients about 
the behaviour of providers 
and quality of care 
(satisfaction with attitude 
of health staff, satisfaction 
with health care provided, 
and preferential treatment). 
Using other indicators like 
waiting times, physical 
examination of patients, 
drugs prescribed, unofficial 
payments etc to measure 
providers’behaviour. 
 
 
Perceptions of community 
members about the 
operations of the national 
health insurance scheme 
and providers’ behaviour.  
 
 
(1)Patient Exit Interviews 
(Structured questionnaire) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(2)Focus Group 
Discussions with 
community members. 
Responses from 
participants.  
(1)Patients who have 
visited public health 
facilities to seek health 
care. 
Urban district 
(Bolgatanga): 
Public health facility:  
50 insured patients 
50 non-insured patients 
 
Rural district (Builsa) 
Public health facility: 
50 insured patients 
50 non-insured patients 
 
 
Community 
members(FGDs) 
Urban district 
(Bolgatanga):  
2 FGDs with insured 
members (men and 
women of productive 
age 18yrs-60yrs). 
 2 FGDs with non-
insured members (men 
and women of 
productive age 18yrs-
60yrs) 
 
Rural district (Builsa) 
2 FGDs with insured 
members (men and 
women of productive 
age 18yrs-60yrs). 
 2 FGDs with non-
insured members (men 
and women of 
productive age 18yrs-
60yrs) 
Objective 4: Make policy recommendations for the successful operation of the national health insurance. 
Data/Information to be 
collected 
Data Collection method Data Issues Study Population 
Suggestions from health 
care providers, health 
insurance managers and 
Based on responses from 
participants of the study 
that recommendations will 
Responses from 
participants. 
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community members. 
 
be made. 
Total:  15 Interviews, 200 patient exit interviews and 8 FGDs.  
Appendix 5 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM FOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS 
THE IMPACT OF THE NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE ON THE INTERACTIONS 
BETWEEN HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS AND CLIENTS 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
This is a study being conducted by a student of the University of Cape Town, South Africa under the
School of Public Health and Family Medicine. 
The purpose of this research is to gain knowledge on the behaviour of health care providers in the era
of the operations of the national health insurance. Health care providers play a crucial role in the
successful implementation of the health insurance scheme. It will therefore be proper to study and 
understand those factors influencing their behaviour. The information obtained from this study will 
be used to make appropriate policy recommendations for the goals of the scheme to be achieved. 
The overall aim of the study is to contribute to the success of health care delivery in the country. You 
have been asked to take part because you are a health care provider who provides health care services
under the national health insurance. The duration for the study is six (6) months. 
PROCEDURE 
If you agree to take part, we will ask you about how you feel on issues on cost sharing mechanisms, 
utilization rates, the reimbursement procedures, your perceptions about the reimbursement system
and the challenges of your work under the national health insurance. We will ask you several 
questions about these issues and record your responses on paper and with a tape recorder as well. 
Your participation in this study will last for approximately 45 minutes.  There is no right or wrong
answers to any of these questions. You can choose not to answer any question you do not want to. 
POTENTIAL RISKS/DISCOMFORTS. 
This study will not involve any physical risks to you for participating. However, if at any point you 
become uncomfortable with any question, you can choose not to answer that question or discontinue
participation in the interview. The information you may give out here will not be given out to any
other person, except for the purpose of which this study covers. We assure you that we will keep the 
information as secured as possible under lock. 
BENEFITS 
Participation in this study will allow you to share your knowledge and perceptions on the operations
of the national health insurance, especially the reimbursement process, challenges and ways of 
improving them. The results of the study will be used to inform policy, for the success of the health 
care delivery in this country. Whatever information that you will give remains private and will not be 
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linked to you. 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
The interview will be conducted in a private place. We will tape record the interview and also write 
some notes to help us remember all that was discussed.   Your name will not be written in the notes 
nor recorded on the tapes.  You will not be identified in any report or publication made on this study. 
All the information you give us from this interview will be held private.  This information will be
accessible only to research personnel, who will listen to the tapes, make written notes, and use the
notes for research purposes only.  After the notes are taken from the tapes, the tapes will be
destroyed.  You are assured that personal information we obtain from you will be kept in the strictest
confidence. 
VOLUNTARINESS AND RIGHT TO WITHDRAW 
Your participation is completely voluntary. You can ask questions on anything that you don’t
understand. You have the right to terminate the interview at anytime, or to decline to answer any
question without penalty.  
This research has been approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee in the Health Sciences 
Faculty, University of Cape Town, South Africa. Issues concerning your rights and welfare can be
channelled to Professor Marc Blockman through this email address: Marc.Blockman@uct.ac.za. 
You can also contact Mr Paul Andoh on 0244275103 or e-mail to furnstyle2@yahoo.com for any 
clarification on this study. 
 
Consent form to be signed by interviewee 
Participant’s Agreement 
I have read the information provided above, or it has been read and explained to me by the 
interviewer in the language that I fully understand.  I have had the opportunity to ask questions about 
it and any questions I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction.  I consent voluntarily to 
participate as a participant in this study and understand that I have the right to withdraw from the 
study at any time.  
Name of participant:                               Name of investigator: 
Signature/Thumb print:                             Signature: 
Date:                                                           Date: 
Name of witness (in case of an illiterate participant):                                                                                         
Signature:                                                                          
Date:                                                                                   
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Appendix 6 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM FOR PATIENT EXIT INTERVIEW 
THE IMPACT OF THE NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE ON THE 
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS AND CLIENTS 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
We are inviting you to take part in a study, which is being conducted by a student of the 
school of Public Health and Family Medicine, of the University of Cape Town. 
The purpose of this research is to help understand the behaviour of health care providers with 
the implementation of the national health insurance in the country. Health care providers play 
a big role in providing health care services to patients. It is appropriate to study and 
understand how you perceive the behaviour of health care provider under the national health 
insurance.  
The information obtained from this study will be used to make appropriate policy 
recommendations for the goals of the national health scheme to be achieved. 
The overall aim of the study is to contribute to the success of health care delivery in the 
country. You have been asked to take part because you are a patient who has just accessed 
health care services in this facility. The duration for the study is six (6) months. 
PROCEDURE 
If you agree to take part, we will ask you questions about how on your insurance status, 
treatment given out to you, payments for the health care services, attitude of staff, satisfaction 
with quality of care, etc. We will ask you several questions about these issues and record your 
responses on the questionnaire form. 
Your participation in this study will last for approximately 30 minutes.  There is no right or 
wrong answers to any of these questions. You can choose not to answer any question you do 
not want to. 
POTENTIAL RISKS/DISCOMFORTS. 
This study will not involve any physical risks to you for participating. However, if at any 
point you become uncomfortable with any question, you can choose not to answer that 
question or discontinue participation in the interview. The information you may give out here 
will not be given out to any other person, except for the purpose of which this study covers. 
We assure you that we will keep the information as secured as possible under lock. 
BENEFITS 
Participation in this study will allow you to share your knowledge and perceptions on the 
behaviour of health care providers towards you, in the course of delivery of health care 
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services. The results of the study will be used to inform policy, for the success of the national 
health insurance in the country. Whatever information that you will give remains private and 
will not be linked to you. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
The interview will be conducted in a private place. We will record your responses on the 
questionnaire form. You will not be identified in any report or publication made on this 
study. All the information you give us from this interview will be held private.  This 
information will be accessible only to the research team, who will make data entry your 
responses. You are assured that personal information we obtain from you will be kept in the 
strictest confidence. 
VOLUNTARINESS AND RIGHT TO WITHDRAW 
Your participation is completely voluntary. You can ask questions on anything that you don’t 
understand. You have the right to terminate the interview at anytime, or to decline to answer 
any question without penalty. If you decide not to take part in this study, your refusal to 
participate will not affect or influence the subsequent care that you will receive from any 
facility.  
This research has been approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee in the Health 
Sciences Faculty, University of Cape Town, South Africa. Issues concerning your rights and 
welfare can be channelled to Professor Marc Blockman through this email address: 
Marc.Blockman@uct.ac.za. 
You can also contact Mr Paul Andoh on 0244275103 or e-mail to furnstyle2@yahoo.com for 
any clarification on this study. 
Consent form to be signed by interviewee 
Participant’s Agreement 
I have read the information provided above, or it has been read and explained to me by the 
interviewer in the language that I fully understand.  I have had the opportunity to ask 
questions about it and any questions I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction.  I 
consent voluntarily to participate as a participant in this study and understand that I have the 
right to withdraw from the study at any time.  
Name of participant:                                        Name of investigator: 
Signature/Thumb print:                                       Signature: 
Date:                                                                     Date: 
Name of witness (in case of an illiterate participant): 
Signature:                                                             
Date:                                                                     
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Appendix 7 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM FOR FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION WITH 
COMMUNITY MEMBERS 
THE IMPACT OF THE NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE ON THE 
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS AND CLIENTS 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
This is a study being conducted by a student of the University of Cape Town, South Africa 
under the School of Public Health and Family Medicine. 
The purpose of this research is to gain knowledge on the behaviour of health care providers in 
the era of the operations of the national health insurance. Health care providers play a crucial 
role in the successful implementation of the national health insurance scheme. It will 
therefore be proper to study and understand those factors influencing their behaviour. The 
information obtained from this study will be used to make appropriate policy 
recommendations for the goals of the national health insurance scheme to be achieved. 
The overall aim of the study is to help contribute to the success of health care delivery in the 
country. You have been asked to take part because you are a member of this selected 
community. The duration for the study is six (6) months. 
PROCEDURE 
If you agree to take part, we will ask you about your health insurance status, whether you 
have utilized health care services under the national health insurance, staff attitude towards 
you etc. We will ask you several questions about these issues and record your responses on 
paper and with a tape recorder as well. 
Your participation in this study will last for approximately 30 minutes.  There is no right or 
wrong answers to any of these questions. You can choose not to answer any question you do 
not want to. 
POTENTIAL RISKS/DISCOMFORTS. 
This study will not involve any physical risks to you for participating. However, if at any 
point you become uncomfortable with any question, you can choose not to answer that 
question or discontinue participation in the interview. The information you may give out here 
will not be given out to any other person, except for the purpose of which this study covers. 
We assure you that we will keep the information as secured as possible under lock. 
BENEFITS 
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Participation in this study will help you share your knowledge on the behaviour of health care 
providers towards you in the era of the national health insurance. The results of the study will 
be used to inform policy, for the success of the health care delivery in this country. Whatever 
information that you will give remains private and will not be linked to you. 
 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
The interview will be conducted in a private quite place. We will tape record the interview 
and also write some notes to help us remember all that was discussed.   Your name will not 
be written in the notes nor recorded on the tapes.  You will not be identified in any report or 
publication made on this study. All the information you give us from this interview will be 
held private.  This information will be accessible only to the research team, who will listen to 
the tapes, make written notes, and use the notes for the purpose of the research.  After the 
notes are written from the tapes, the tapes will be destroyed.  You are assured that personal 
information we obtain from you will be kept in the strictest confidence. We will also like 
members of this group discussion to respect each other’s confidentiality and not to discuss 
outside issues that were raised during this meeting.  
VOLUNTARINESS AND RIGHT TO WITHDRAW 
Your participation is completely voluntary. You can ask questions on anything that you don’t 
understand. You have the right to terminate the interview at anytime, or to decline to answer 
any question without penalty. If you decide not to take part in this study, your refusal to 
participate will not affect or influence the subsequent care that you will receive from any 
health facility. 
This research has been approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee in the Health 
Sciences Faculty, University of Cape Town, South Africa. Issues concerning your rights and 
welfare can be channelled to Professor Marc Blockman through this email address: 
Marc.Blockman@uct.ac.za. 
You can also contact Mr Paul Andoh on 0244275103 or e-mail to furnstyle2@yahoo.com for 
any clarification on this study. 
 
Consent form to be signed by interviewee 
Participant’s Agreement 
I have read the information provided above, or it has been read and explained to me by the 
interviewer in the language that I fully understand.  I have had the opportunity to ask 
questions about it and any questions I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction.  I 
consent voluntarily to participate as a participant in this study and understand that I have the 
right to withdraw from the study at any time.  
Name of participant:                                                Name of investigator: 
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Signature/Thumb print:                                              Signature: 
Date:                                                                           Date: 
Name of witness (in case of an illiterate participant): 
Signature:                                                                 
Date:                                                                          
 
Appendix 8 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM FOR HEALTH INSURANCE MANAGERS 
THE IMPACT OF THE NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE ON THE 
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS AND CLIENTS 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
This is a study being conducted by a student of the University of Cape Town, South Africa 
under the School of Public Health and Family Medicine. 
The purpose of this research is to gain knowledge on the behaviour of health care providers in 
the era of the operations of the national health insurance. Health care providers play a crucial 
role in the successful implementation of the insurance scheme. It will therefore be proper to 
study and understand those factors influencing their behaviour. The information obtained 
from this study will be used to make appropriate policy recommendations for the goals of the 
scheme to be achieved. 
The overall aim of the study is to contribute to the success of health care delivery in the 
country. You have been asked to take part because you are a stakeholder in the national 
health insurance scheme. The duration for the study is six (6) months. 
PROCEDURE 
If you agree to take part, we will ask you about how you feel on issues on cost sharing 
mechanisms, utilization rates, the reimbursement process, your perceptions about the 
reimbursement process and the challenges of your work under the national health insurance. 
We will ask you several questions about these issues and record your responses on paper and 
with a tape recorder as well. 
Your participation in this study will last for approximately 30 minutes.  There is no right or 
wrong answers to any of these questions. You can choose not to answer any question you do 
not want to. 
POTENTIAL RISKS/DISCOMFORTS. 
This study will not involve any physical risks to you for participating. However, if at any 
point you become uncomfortable with any question, you can choose not to answer that 
question or discontinue participation in the interview. The information you may give out here 
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will not be given out to any other person, except for the purpose of which this study covers. 
We assure you that we will keep the information as secured as possible under lock. 
BENEFITS 
Participation in this study will allow you to share your knowledge and perceptions on the 
operations of the national health insurance especially, the reimbursement procedures, ways of 
improving the system if any, and other challenges. The results of the study will be used to 
inform policy, for the success of the health care delivery in this country. Whatever 
information that you will give remains private and will not be linked to you. 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
The interview will be conducted in a private place. We will tape record the interview and also 
write some notes to help us remember all that was discussed.   Your name will not be written 
in the notes nor recorded on the tapes.  You will not be identified in any report or publication 
made on this study. All the information you give us from this interview will be held private.  
This information will be accessible only to research personnel, who will listen to the tapes, 
make written notes, and use the notes for research purposes only.  After the notes are taken 
from the tapes, the tapes will be destroyed.  You are assured that personal information we 
obtain from you will be kept in the strictest confidence. 
VOLUNTARINESS AND RIGHT TO WITHDRAW 
Your participation is completely voluntary. You can ask questions on anything that you don’t 
understand. You have the right to terminate the interview at anytime, or to decline to answer 
any question without penalty.  
This research has been approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee in the Health 
Sciences Faculty, University of Cape Town, South Africa. Issues concerning your rights and 
welfare can be channelled to Professor Marc Blockman through this email address: 
Marc.Blockman@uct.ac.za. 
You can also contact Mr Paul Andoh on 0244275103 or e-mail to furnstyle2@yahoo.com for 
any clarification on this study. 
 
Consent form to be signed by interviewee 
Participant’s Agreement 
I have read the information provided above, or it has been read and explained to me by the 
interviewer in the language that I fully understand.  I have had the opportunity to ask 
questions about it and any questions I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction.  I 
consent voluntarily to participate as a participant in this study and understand that I have the 
right to withdraw from the study at any time. 
Name of participant:                                            Name of investigator: 
Signature/Thumb print:                                          Signature: 
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Date:                                                                       Date: 
 
Name of witness (in case of an illiterate participant): 
Signature: 
 Date:                                                    
 
 
 
Appendix 9 
 
IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR PROVIDERS 
Introduction 
This is a study being conducted by a student of the University of Cape Town, South Africa 
under the School of Public Health and Family Medicine. 
The purpose of this research is to gain an insight into the operations of the national health 
insurance scheme and also to get your opinion about the scheme.  
 
Date of interview: 
District:                                                    Name of facility:                                                                    
Position of respondent:  
Q1. When did this facility join the district health insurance scheme? 
Q2. What do you have to say about the district health insurance scheme? 
Q3. What ways of payments for health care are used in this facility? 
Q4. Which people make payments out of pocket for health services in this facility? 
Q5. Do patients under the district health insurance still make out-of-pocket payment? 
Q6. How do you see facility attendance in the era of district health insurance for? 
a) Insured patients 
b)Uninsured patients 
Q7. How are you reimbursed for services rendered to clients of the district health insurance? 
Q8. How often does the reimbursement take place?   
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Q9. Do you have problems with reimbursement? 
Q10.What was the last time you got reimbursed for insured clients? 
Q11. Does any delay in receiving reimbursement have any impact on your ability as a facility 
to continue providing service to clients?  
Q12. If yes, how does the delay affect your ability as a facility to continue to provide service 
to clients in terms of drugs, equipment and other accessories? 
Q13. Generally, what do you think about this reimbursement mechanism? 
Q14. Generally, what do you think about insured patients behaviour in the era of district 
health insurance? 
Q15. Have you ever been involved in the care of a patient who received preferential treatment 
in terms of shortened waiting time, laboratory testing, drugs, and X-Rays, apart from 
emergencies? 
Q16. Was the patient insured or not insured? 
Q17. What made you to give the preferential treatment? 
Q18. What constraints do you face in your operations in this era of district health insurance? 
Q19. What suggestions do you have for solving some of the challenges/problems that you 
face? 
 
 
 
THANK YOU 
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Appendix 10 
INDEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR MANAGERS OF HEALTH INSURANCE 
SCHEMES 
Introduction 
This is a study being conducted by a student of the University of Cape Town, South Africa 
under the School of Public Health and Family Medicine. 
The purpose of this research is to gain an insight into the operations of the national health 
insurance scheme and also to get your opinion about the scheme. 
     
Date of interview:                         Name of district:            Position of respondent:       
Q1. When did you start operating as a health insurance scheme?     
Q2. What do you have to say about the district health insurance scheme? 
Q3. What are your tasks in relation to the district health insurance implementation? 
Q4. How often do you meet with providers? 
Q5. What is it like to be an intermediary between government and providers? 
Q6. How many people have been covered by your scheme? 
Q7. What ways are used for reimbursing providers? 
Q8. How long does it take to reimburse providers? 
Q9. What was the last time you reimbursed providers? 
Q10. Do you think providers are happy with the current arrangement of reimbursement?  
Q11. Why are they happy or why are they not happy? 
Q12. What do you think can be done if providers are not happy?  
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Q13. Do you think patients are happy with the operations of the district health insurance? 
Q14. Why are they happy or why are they not happy? 
Q15. What do you think can be done about the situation? 
Q16. How do you see the quality of health care provided under the district health insurance? 
Q17. Is there any difference in the treatment of insured and non-insured by health care 
providers? 
Q18. What is the scheme’s role in ensuring the provision of good health services? 
Q19. How do you ensure that this role is fulfilled? 
Q20. How often do you get grants from the NHIS headquarters for reimbursement?  
Q21. What key challenges are you facing in your operations as a health insurance scheme? 
Q22. What suggestions do you have for improving your operations? 
 
 
 
THANK YOU 
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Appendix 11 
FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE 
Introduction 
This is a study being conducted by a student of the University of Cape Town, South Africa 
under the School of Public Health and Family Medicine. 
The purpose of this research is to gain an insight into the operations of the national health 
insurance scheme and also to get your opinion about the scheme. 
 
Date of Interview:                                    District:                                 Community:            
Q1.Have you heard of the district health insurance scheme? 
Q2. Why did you register or not with the district health insurance scheme? 
Q3. How do you see quality of care provided under the district health insurance scheme? 
Q4. In making a choice for seeking health care, what type of health facility will you prefer to 
utilize (public versus private)? 
Q5.  What has led you to make that choice? 
Q6. How do you see the behaviour of the staff at the health facility? 
Q7. What is good about the district health insurance? 
Q8. What is bad about the district health insurance? 
Q9. What do you think can be done to improve the operations of the district health insurance?     
 
 
THANK YOU 
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Appendix 12 
EXIT INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PATIENTS 
Introduction 
This is a study being conducted by a student of the University of Cape Town, South Africa 
under the School of Public Health and Family Medicine. 
The purpose of this research is to assist gain an insight into the operations of the national 
health insurance scheme and also to get your opinion about the scheme. 
 
Name of Interviewer:                                         Date of Interview:                            
District:                                                               Name of facility:                   
Background information 
Patient Identification: 1) Child 2) Care giver 3) Adult 4) Other (Specify).......................... 
Age (in years): 1) 0-10     2) 11-20       3) 21-30      4) 31-40         5)41-50          6)51-60       
7)61+                
 Gender: 1) Male 2) Female                
Marital status: 1) Married 2) Not married 3) Divorced           
Educational level: 1) None   2) Primary/JHS   3) SHS/Technical    4) Tertiary    
5) Other (Specify)..........................................                       
Occupation: 1) Farmer/Fisherman 2) Student 3) Government worker 4) Trader 5) Artisan 
7) Unemployed   8) Other (Specify)............................................                
 
Q1. Are you a registered member of the the district health insurance scheme with a valid ID 
card? 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
164 
 
1) Yes            2) No  
Q2. If  yes, for how long? 
1)Since its inception  2) Three years  3) Two years  4) One year  5) Six months  
Q3. If no, why are you not a member? 
1) Cannot afford premium payment  2) Perceived not to be good   3) Waiting to see what will 
happen 
4) Don’t usually fall sick     5) Don’t know    6) Other (Specify).............................................    
Q4. If former member, why have you not renewed your membership? 
1) Not satisfied with healthcare provided    2) Long waiting time at health facilities     3) High 
premium   4) Other (Specify)   …………………….. 
Q5. What complaint /illness brought you to this facility? 
1) Malaria    2)  ARI       3) Diarrhoea         4) Skin disease    5) Don’t know   
6) Other (Specify ............................................... 
Q6. In the consultation room, were you physically examined by the doctor/nurse?.  
 1) Yes       2) No 
Q7. Did you pay for the consultation?  
  1) Yes    2) No 
Q8. If yes, how much did you pay? 
(Please record amount here)   GH    .................................. 
Q9. If no, why did you not have to pay for the service? 
1)  Exempted     2) Could not afford       3) Covered by health insurance     4) Don’t Know        
5) Other (Specify).................................................. 
Q10.  Did you pay for the cost of drugs given to you at this health facility? 
1) Yes         2) No 
Q11. If yes, how much did you pay? 
(Please record amount here)   GH    .................................. 
Q12. If no, why did you not have to pay for the drugs? 
1)  Exempted     2) Could not afford       3) Covered by health insurance     4) Don’t Know        
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
165 
 
5) Other (Specify).............................................. 
Q13. Did you get all the drugs prescribed for you from the health facility for this sickness? 
1) Yes          2) No 
 
 
(Skip question 14 and 15, if response to question 13 is “Yes”) 
Q14. If no, did you have to BUY drugs outside the health facility for this sickness?   
1) Yes           2) No 
Q15. If you BOUGHT drugs, how much did it cost you to buy the drugs?  
(Please record amount here)   GH    .................................. 
Q16. If you did not buy the drugs that you could not get from the health facility, what did you 
do? 
1) Did nothing   2) Used traditional medicine   3) Other (Specify)...................................  
Q17. If yes, how much did you pay?  
(Please record amount here)   GH    .................................. 
Q18. Do you think insured patients are treated better than non-insured patients? 
1) Yes    2) No 
(Skip question 19, if response to question 18 is “No”). 
Q19. If yes, what makes you think so? 
................................................................................................................................................... 
Q20. Do you think non-insured patients are treated better than insured patients? 
1) Yes     2) No 
(Skip question 21, if response to question 20 is “No”). 
Q21. If yes, what makes you think so? 
................................................................................................................................................. 
Q22. Did you make any unofficial payments at this facility, with the exception of the official 
fees for consultation, drugs, laboratory tests, and X- ray? 
1) Yes        2) No 
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(Skip question 23 and 24, if response to Q22 is “No”)  
Q23. If yes, how much did you pay?  
(Please record amount here)   GH    .................................. 
 
 
Q24. What level did you make the payment?   
1) Records unit   2) Consultation room       3) Laboratory      4) Dispensary 5) X-ray unit 
6) Other (Specify)........................................... 
Q25. Have you been asked to come back for a review for your illness? 
1) Yes   2) No 
Q26. How would you rank the attitude of health care providers in this facility? 
1) Very good         2) Good     3) Satisfactory      3) Fair       4) Poor        
 5) Other (specify)………………………… 
Q27. Why do you think so? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Q28. How do you see the waiting period?  
1) Is too long    2) Is OK   
Q29. Why do you think so?  
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Q30. Would you visit this health facility again in case of an illness like the one that brought 
you here today? 
1) Yes    2) No 
Q31. Why did you choose that response? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
Q32. How satisfied are you with your care in this facility for this sickness? 
1) Satisfied     2) A little satisfied    3) A little dissatisfied      4) Very dissatisfied     
 5) Other (specify) …………………. 
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Q33. What things would you like to be done about the district health insurance? 
1) Allow Installment payment of premium    2) More education 3) Reduction of waiting 
period    4) Other (Specify)   …………………. 
Q34. What are your suggestions for improving health care in this facility under the district 
health insurance? 
 ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 
(Please record time for patient below) 
Patient time of arrival at health facility: ……………………………………. 
Patient time of leaving health facility: ……………………………………...  
(Please complete the table below) 
Disease diagnosed Drugs prescribed 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
THANK YOU 
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THE NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEME IN GHANA: CHALLENGES 
AND THE WAY FORWARD 
This brief is based on the findings of a study conducted in two districts of Bolgatanga and 
Builsa in the Upper East Region of Ghana, between the period of December, 2009 and 
February, 2010. It is directed to actors involved in the implementation of the NHIS; 
especially central government and management of the National Health Insurance Authority 
(NHIA) who are responsible for the accreditation and reimbursement of health care 
providers. 
 
1.0. Introduction 
Prepayment and risk pooling through social health insurance and taxation are found to 
provide protection against the financial risks of ill health (Xu et al., 2005). Due to this, the 
international community is paying more attention to social/mandatory health insurance as one 
of the promising health financing mechanisms which will help provide coverage to 
populations against catastrophic health care costs (Hsiao & Shaw, 2007). Social health 
insurance is seen as a way of pooling health risks, assisting in the prevention of health related 
impoverishment, and the improvement in efficiency and quality of health care services 
(WHO, 2005). The programme also offers the opportunity for providing access to health care 
for the poor and further helps to mobilize revenue for health care providers (Carrin, 2002). 
 
1.1. Background 
Ghana enacted the National Health Insurance (NHI) Act (650) in 2003, leading to the 
implementation of the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS). This was after user fees 
which were instituted in the late 1980s had proven to have affected the utilization of health 
care services. The imposition of the user fees resulted in individuals undertaking self-
medication and also reporting late to health facilities for treatment (Arhin-Tenkorang, 2001, 
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Arhinful, 2003). Hence the NHIS was introduced to help assure equitable and universal 
access for all Ghanaians to an acceptable quality package of essential health care services 
(Government of Ghana, 2003). Registered Ghanaians are required not to make any out-of-
pocket (OOP) payments for the use of health care services under the NHIS. The NHIS is 
based on District Mutual Health Insurance schemes (DMHIS), which operates in all 145 
districts of the country, covering both formal and informal sectors of the economy.  
 
The sources of funding for the NHIS include 2.5% sales tax, 2.5% monthly payroll deduction 
from formal sector workers as part of their contribution to the Social Security and National 
Insurance Trust (SSNIT) fund and government budgetary allocation. In addition, there is a 
minimum and maximum premium payment of GH7.20 ($8) and 47.70 ($53) per adult 
respectively, from the informal sector. The benefit package consists of basic health care 
services, including outpatient consultations, essential drugs, inpatient care and shared 
accommodation, maternity care (normal and caesarean delivery), eye care, dental care, and 
emergency care. About 95% of the diseases in Ghana are cov red under the NHIS. Registered 
members of the schemes receive health care services from accredited health care providers 
including government health facilities, quasi-government, mission and private health 
facilities.  
 
As of June 2009, membership of the NHIS stood at about 67% of the total population of 
Ghana after four years of inception (Asenso-Boadi, 2009). Similarly, the Ministry of Health 
reported that the use of outpatient and inpatient department services by the insured had 
almost doubled between 2005 and September 2007, under the NHIS (Ministry of Health, 
2008). 
 
1.2. Implementation issues relating to the reimbursement process by the NHIS 
At the start of the NHIS, a fee for service type of provider payment mechanism was used for 
paying health care providers. But this was replaced with the Ghana Diagnostic Related 
Groupings (GDRGs) in April, 2008. The reason for the replacement was that the fee for each 
service was found to be low and hence unattractive, especially for the private providers to 
participate. Providers are encouraged to participate in the NHIS, in order to reduce 
congestions and delays for clients. With the fee for service, providers were also required to 
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submit detailed information on all services and charges for claims submissions. This involves 
a lot of paperwork which providers were not happy with (Ankomah, 2009). 
 
Therefore the GDRGs were introduced to help remedy some of these issues. The tariff covers 
the full cost of the estimated direct consumables for direct patient care, anaesthesia and other 
investigations. The GDRGs also captures about 80% of the estimated overhead cost for 
public health facilities, comprising of building and equipment maintenance, housekeeping 
and utilities (Ankomah, 2009). It is expected that the new tariff will generate adequate 
revenue from the NHIS for health care providers to cover a significant portion of their cost of 
operation. However, the introduction of the new tariff has resulted in the submission of huge 
amounts of claims for payment by health care providers. The National Health Insurance 
Authority therefore has to find extra funds to pay its providers (Sodzi-Tettey, 2010).  
 
Additionally, the process for reimbursement was considered to be too bureaucratic by 
providers, especially for schemes that suffer financial distress (Sodzi-Tettey, 2010). It takes 
some time for the NHIA to investigate the circumstances and to make funds available to such 
distressed schemes for the payment of their providers. 
 
2.0. Research objective 
The study explored the influence of the implementation of the NHIS on the behaviour of 
health care providers. Specifically, the study examined the views of health care providers on 
the NHIS, especially the reimbursement process. The perceptions and experience of insured 
and uninsured clients, and health insurance managers were also assessed to determine the 
behaviour of health care providers. 
 
3.0. Methods 
The study took place in the Bolgatanga municipality and Builsa district between the period of 
December, 2009 and February, 2010 in the Upper East Region of Ghana. Bolgatanga 
municipality is an urban district and Builsa is a rural district. Table 1 is a composition of 
some characteristics for the two districts. 
Table 1: Some characteristics of the districts 
 Bolgatanga Builsa 
Total land area 1,620 km². 2,220sq km 
Total Population 119,975 (2009 estimate) 84,069 (2009 estimate) 
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Number of hospitals  1 (Regional hospital) 1 (District hospital) 
Total doctor population 5 1 
Total nurse population 205 Not available 
Doctor/patient ratio 1:30,932 1: 84,069 
Nurse/patient ratio 1:755 Not available 
Source: Bolgatanga Municipal Assembly, 2009  
             Builsa District Assembly, 2009 
 
Data was collected through patient exit interviews with the insured and uninsured, in-depth 
interviews with health care providers and health insurance managers, and focus group 
discussions with insured and uninsured community members.  
 
4.0. Findings 
Health care providers and health insurance managers perceived that the introduction of the 
NHIS has led to an increase in attendance and the utilization of health care services by more 
than twofold for the insured. Providers also think that the NHIS helps to mobilize health care 
resources for the running of the facilities when reimbursement is done in good time by the 
NHIS. 
 
Both the insured and uninsured were satisfied with the care provided, according to the exit 
survey. However, most insured clients had reported long waiting times, verbal abuse, not 
being physically examined and discrimination in favour of the uninsured and affluent by 
providers. This was what an insured said: “After the consulting room, the doctor gives your 
folder with the prescription to take your drugs from the dispensary, when you place your 
folder there, you can sit and wait without them mentioning your name for a very long time” 
(FGD, insured women-Builsa). The perceived reason for that treatment was that, the insured 
were not making instant payment for health care services.  It was also revealed by providers 
that only a few uninsured clients were utilizing health facilities. A provider stated “We’ve 
realized that with the uninsured, unless they are seriously ill they don’t report early to the 
facilities. Some of them just come to die” (In-depth interview, medical doctor-Builsa). The 
uninsured indicated it was because of the increased cost of health care services under the 
NHIS that they were not utilizing the facilities. An uninsured said: “I have noticed that before 
the insurance started, things were very cheap, in terms of hospital bills and consultation fees, 
but now because of the introduction of the insurance, everything has gone very high in the 
hospital. Initially a folder was sold for GH ¢0.70 (US $ 0.61) but now it is GH¢7.00 (US $ 
4.92)” (FGD, uninsured men-Bolgatanga). 
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However, there is a core challenge that may prevent the achievement of the objective of the 
NHIS, which is the delay in reimbursement. The objective of the NHIS is make health care 
services accessible to all citizens without the need to make OOP payments at the point of 
service consumption (Government of Ghana, 2003). The health insurance managers and 
health care providers showed that the NHIA had not been able to reimburse its providers for 
almost six (6) months. A health care provider reported: “For almost six (6) months the health 
insurance has not paid the hospital” (In-depth interview, hospital administrator-Builsa). But 
the NHI Act (650) stipulates that health care providers should be reimbursed four weeks 
following the month for which claims were submitted. This was not the case and hence 
contravening the NHI Act (650).  
 
The inability of the NHIA to provide funds to the District Mutual Health Insurance Schemes 
(DMHIS) for the payment of health care providers was one of the reasons for the delay in 
reimbursement. The health insurance managers indicated they were waiting for the NHIA to 
provide funds for the payment of their providers. Both managers and providers agreed that 
inadequate and incompetence on the part of some staff responsible for the submission and 
processing of claims could also result in delays. For instance, some staff in charge of the 
submission and processing of claims lacked competencies in the use of computer software for 
their work. This was not only a problem for the facilities, but the District Mutual Health 
Insurance Schemes (DMHIS) as well. Again, some claims could sometimes be submitted 
with errors to the DMHIS which would have to be sent back to the facilities for correction 
and hence causes delay in payment. 
 
It was also the view of managers and providers that disagreements over submitted claims 
between the DMHIS and facilities could generate delays in payment. It is common to find the 
DMHIS rejecting claims submitted by providers due to some unacceptable charges/fees.  
 
The consequences of the delay in reimbursement were that; 
 Health care providers were unable to procure drug and non-drug consumables due to 
their (providers) continued indebtedness to suppliers. They were hamstrung in their 
operations as a result of the delay in reimbursement. A quotation from a provider: 
“..........we are not able to buy drugs and other things to use for our work. We owe 
suppliers a lot. We are not able to pay them for most of the things that they supply to 
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us. You realized that there are no drugs and you cannot go out there and buy” (In-
depth interview, medical doctor-Bolgatanga). 
 
 Due to the inability of health care providers to procure drugs for dispensation, clients 
were continuously being issued with prescription forms in order to buy drugs outside 
the facilities. This creates inconvenience and extra costs in terms of transportation for 
clients. The insured will also have to make OOP payments for these drugs if they 
were to obtain them from unaccredited pharmacies out of the facility. Thus the 
insured enumerated this as one of the things they were unhappy with in the era of the 
NHIS. 
 
 Yet another consequence of the delay in reimbursement was that it affected the ability 
of facilities to pay their casual employees who were not paid from government 
payroll. These employees are paid from Internally Generated Funds (IGF) mobilized 
by the facilities. The result of non-payment of wages to employees is obvious; 
demonstrations which can significantly distract the delivery of health care services. 
 
 Besides, the delay in reimbursement had also affected the behaviour of health care 
providers. It had generated the situation where some providers preferred clients who 
would make instant payment for their services. A provider said; “It is true that some 
facilities and pharmacies would prefer people who will pay in cash to those with 
health insurance, due to the delay in reimbursement. It is business and we don’t do 
business like that (In-depth interview, hospital accountant-Bolgatanga). Also, the 
insured had this to say concerning the behaviour of providers. “But when you come 
without insurance, very quickly they will attend to you” (FGD, insured men-Builsa). 
 
5.0. Policy recommendations 
The policy recommendations here would be typified into short and long term. The immediate 
short term recommendation is the training and provision of adequate staff to man the 
positions responsible for the submission and processing of claims for both the facilities and 
the DMHIS. The provision of adequate and skilled personnel especially in the use of 
computer software for the submission and processing of claims will help speed up the process 
of claims payment. Again, staff of the schemes and facilities should be well motivated to 
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enable them to carry out their duties efficiently in terms of claims submission and processing. 
Furthermore, the DMHIS should endeavour to meet immediately with providers and settle 
disagreements over claims to curb delays in payment. 
 
For the long term policy options, they take account of the mode of payment for providers and 
the manner claims are processed. The recommendations include the following; 
 Mix provider payment mechanism 
One of the reasons for the delay in reimbursement was the inability of the NHIA to generate 
extra funds for the payment of providers. This was as a result of the introduction of the 
GDRGs (new tariff) which had a higher remuneration and thus higher claims submissions by 
providers for payment.  
 
It is recommended that a mix of provider payment systems should be introduced. The mix 
provider mechanism will help reduce the amount that will be paid out to providers as claims. 
This can be achieved by the introduction of capitation payments for outpatient attendance, 
especially for primary health care alongside the GDRGs. With the capitation, the providers 
will be paid a fixed agreed amount per member for all registered members for a given period 
of time, being a month, a quarter or a year. Providers will then be required to provide all the 
defined services for members in need of them. The introduction of the mix provider payment 
mechanism will help beat down costs and make funds available for timely payment. The mix 
payment system had been tried in other countries like china, Korea, etc, and had been 
successful in beating down costs. However, it will involve the use of competent staff on the 
part of the schemes to constantly monitor the facilities to ensure the provision of quality 
services. This group of persons are currently lacking. 
                                                                                                   
 Centralised Claims Payment System 
Another policy option available for adoption is the setting up of a Centralised Claims 
Payment System by the NHIA. All accredited providers and DMHIS will be linked to this 
centralised unit or department where claims by providers can be submitted for vetting and 
processing. The vetting and processing of claims will no longer be done by individual 
DMHIS who may not have competent staff for the task, which usually causes delays in 
payment. The option will help speed up the vetting and processing of claims and thus the 
timely payment of providers. But again, this will also require the employment of competent 
personnel who might not be available in the short run.  
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6.0. Summary and Conclusion 
The study revealed that the NHIS has led to a significant increase in utilization of health care 
services by registered members. One of the major problems with the operations of the NHIS 
is the delay in reimbursement for providers. Providers and insurance managers said the delay 
in reimbursement was due to the inability of the NHIA to timely provide funds, inadequate 
and incompetency on the part of some staff of the health facilities and the DMHIS in the 
submission and processing of claims. Disagreements between the DMHIS and the facilities 
over submitted claims could also cause delay in payments. The consequence of the delay 
included; the inability of providers to procure drug and non-drug supplies leading to the 
issuance of prescription forms for clients to buy drugs outside the health facilities, inability of 
facilities to pay their casual employees, and finally providers’ preference for clients who 
make instant payments for health care services. Insured clients also perceived and 
experienced long waiting times, verbal abuse, not being physically examined and 
discrimination in favour of the uninsured and affluent by providers.   
 
Both short and long term measures have been discussed. This brief particularly recommends 
the mix provider payment mechanism as a long term measure to help alleviate the problem. 
The mix payment mechanism will involve the use of capitation alongside the GDRGs for 
paying outpatients attendance. The mechanism will help reduce costs and make funds 
available for prompt payment. The policy will make the NHIS sustainable at the long run for 
the promotion of universal coverage for all Ghanaians. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                   {Word count: 2731} 
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